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ABSTRACT
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THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS
FEBRUARY 1993
CHERYL L. HUGHES, B.S., PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D.
,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Leonard H. Ehrlich
This dissertation examines the contributions of Martin
Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas to an understanding of the
fundamental meaning and possibility of ethical phenomena. I
begin with the problem of ethics as it is articulated by
Heidegger in his criticisms of Western metaphysical
thinking. Heidegger claims that we need to rethink the
meaning of ethics without reliance on traditional
metaphysical categories, but this task remains secondary to
his own concern over fundamental ontology.
Since Heidegger does not concretely explore the meaning
of ethics, I consider subseguent efforts to produce
Heideggerian ethics. Focusing in particular on the work of
Werner Marx, I question the adequacy of a Heideggerian
analysis of human relations and the adequacy of any ethics
that depends on an individualizing modification of the
anonymous bonds of community
.
In an effort to provide a more adequate description of
human relations and the meaning of ethical responsibility, I
turn to the work of Emmanuel Levinas. I explore Levinas 's
iv
radical and polemical response to Heidegger, his effort to
rethink what it means to be for the human being including
his distinctive descriptions of the face to face relation,
his attempt to point to the elemental conditions that
constitute human subjectivity, and his exploration of the
possibility of ethics understood as infinite responsibility
of one for another.
Through a selective reading of Levinas 's texts and
consideration of various critics of Levinas, this
dissertation concludes that Levinas does not merely call
into question some failure in Heidegger's existential
phenomenology or add an analysis of the ethical relation of
responsibility to Heidegger's Dasein analytic. Levinas's
entire philosophical project challenges the primacy of
ontology in an effort to point to the priority of ethics for
human existence and thought. His work provides substantive
criticisms of Heidegger, demands a radical rethinking about
the meaning of ethics, politics, justice, goodness, and
truth, and calls for a philosophy that is driven by the
exigencies of ethical responsibility.
v
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation treats the problem of ethics as it is
articulated by Martin Heidegger and then concretely
developed by Emmanuel Levinas. When Heidegger speaks of the
problem of ethics, he refers both to the meaning of ethics
as a branch of philosophy and to the problematic demand for
directives for action. Heidegger deals with the problem of
ethics in the context of his critical view of Western
metaphysics. He claims that the Western philosophical
tradition has been dependent on onto-theological
metaphysics, dependent on assumptions that the human being
is a worldless, solitary, rational subject created in the
image of a rational creator, that reality is rational, and
that there is therefore an objective world to be discovered
by science and an absolute moral order to be discovered by
reason and codified in universal moral principles. With the
unmasking of philosophy as onto-theology , Heidegger says
that we must ask again about the meaning of ethics; but we
must also first break free from the categories of onto-
theological metaphysics. We cannot therefore seek to define
1
moral rules or first principles of ethics until we undertake
a fundamental inquiry into the meaning of ethics; we cannot
consider the question of how one ouqht to live one's life
until we have first concretely worked out the meaninq and
possibility of ethical reality.
Heideqqer does not take up this task himself. He gives
priority instead to the work of deconstructing Western
metaphysics? he breaks with the metaphysics of substance and
subject and re-introduces a thinking of the world in its
historical coming to be and passing away, a thinking of
Being in its continual presencing and concealing, and a
thinking of the human being as constituted by its existence
in a shared world of constant flux. Even when directly
asked about ethics, Heidegger gives priority to ontology and
claims that the problem of ethics can only be dealt with in
relation to the task of thinking that brings the truth of
Being to language. For Heidegger, the problem of ethics is
peripheral, secondary to the need to disclose the meaning of
Being as such. According to Heidegger's analysis, the human
being is primordially a disclosing being, and the human
relation to Being constitutes the essence of human
existence. The analysis of Dasein is therefore a useful
entry point for Heidegger's project of rethinking the
meaning of Being as such, and the problem of ethics is
merely part of Heidegger's concern over the mistakes of
Western metaphysical thinking since Plato.
2
By contrast, the problem of ethics is central to the
work of Levinas and has an urgency that demands priority in
philosophical thought. Levinas insists that the most urgent
problem in the twentieth century is the problem of ethics.
In particular, Levinas asks, can we speak of morality after
Auschwitz? Can we speak of morality after the failure of
morality? [ Levinas , 1988 ] . Although the work of Levinas
cannot be understood apart from the pervasive influence of
Heidegger, Levinas is extremely critical of the priority
that Heidegger gives to the question concerning the meaning
of Being as such. Levinas undertakes a fundamental inquiry
into the meaning of the Good as that which transcends Being.
His thinking about the Good is worked out concretely through
phenomenological analyses of the desire for the Good in the
human being and the traces of the Good in the fundamental
ethical relation of responsibility. According to Levinas,
the ethical relation of responsibility for another human
being is the fundamental fact of human existence that
precedes and makes possible all inquiry and disclosing,
including the inquiry into the meaning of Being. The
problem of ethics, the concern to make room for the Good
which transcends Being, and the concern to describe
ineluctable responsibility as a fundamental structure of
human being lead Levinas to reject and rethink much of
Heidegger's analysis of Dasein.
3
Levinas locates the problem of ethics, the need for a
fundamental inquiry into the meaning and possibility of
ethics, in the context of Western philosophical
developments. Levinas is concerned with the suspicion cast
on reason and philosophy by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud
[Levinas , 1975a] . He focuses in particular on the suspicion
that ethics is ideology, that morality is a set of illusions
that are historically and culturally relative and dominated
by class interests; and he claims that this suspicion of
ideology marks the end of the traditional ethics of duty and
value. According to Levinas, it was an ethical cry that
inspired the struggle against ideology. Thus for example,
the spiritual poverty that was apparent to Nietzsche in his
descriptions of humanity reduced to herd existence and blind
obedience to empty traditions, the exploitation,
expropriation and alienation uncovered in Marx's critique of
bourgeois humanism, and the excessive repression discovered
in Freud's studies of psychological disturbances are all
aspects of the same ethical cry that disrupts the modern
belief in progress through science and salvation through
reason. And yet, ironically, although it is an ethical cry
that inspires the struggle against ideology, ethics is the
first victim of this struggle because ethics has itself been
ideological. Heidegger's analysis of human being in Being
and Time is the starting point for much of Levinas 's work on
the problem of ethics, in part, because it is in Heidegger s
4
phenomenological analysis of everyday Dasein that the
ideological structures of human existence are disclosed.
More importantly for Levinas, the primacy that Heidegger
grants to the human relation to Being effaces the desire for
the Good that transcends Being. According to Levinas 's
reading of Being and Time
,
Heidegger's descriptions
of fundamental human relations do not accommodate the
ethical relation of responsibility; and even the mode of
authenticity that Heidegger describes is an accomplishment
of the solitary Dasein that merely modifies Dasein'
s
primordially inauthentic relations with Others.
In order to understand and evaluate these criticisms of
Heidegger, this dissertation begins with Heidegger's work in
Being and Time giving special attention to his analysis of
authenticity and the fundamental relations characterized by
Being-with Others. In his attempt to deconstruct the
Western metaphysics of subject and substance, Heidegger
provides a fresh analysis of the structures of human
existence. The Dasein analytic undermines the Cartesian
view of the self and the distance between self and other; it
undermines the primacy of the knowing relation to the world
and other persons; it undermines the subject-object
dichotomy in favor of a view of human existence as always
already in the world, already involved with Others in a
shared world, and fundamentally constituted by this Being-
in-the-world and Being-with Others. Prior to any knowing
5
relation between oneself and Others there is this practical
and contextual relation of Being-with? and therefore prior
to Cartesian self-certainty or individual subjectivity, the
human being is fundamentally constituted as the ideological
they-self
. Heidegger replaces the traditional dualisms of
mind and body, self and world, subject and object with an
emphasis on the totality and wholeness of Dasein's Being-in-
the-world.
Guided by the problem of ethics, this dissertation also
examines Heidegger's brief references to ethics in Being and
Time and the "Letter on Humanism." Thus for example, as
part of his analysis of Dasein in Being and Time . Heidegger
sets out the formal conditions for the possibility of
morality in the call of conscience that individualizes the
human being, permits the possibility of an authentic Being-
one's-self, and accounts for answerability. But Heidegger
refuses to attach any evaluation to the they-self or the
authentic mode of Being-one's-self, insisting that these are
simply possible modes of Being. He acknowledges the desire
for ethical directives in the "Letter on Humanism" but he
insists that the thought of Being takes precedence over the
search for directives for action. In his concern over
fundamental ontology, Heidegger rejects the demand for
normative ethics and instead makes the question of ethics
problematic, in need of fundamental rethinking. From
Heidegger we get only the claim that the meaning of ethics
6
should be traced to ethos as dwelling place and the
suggestion that since the essence of human being is to dwell
in nearness to Being, perhaps all practical directives must
come from the thinking of Being. it is left to others to
take up the problematic question of the meaning and
possibility of post-metaphysical ethics. The chapter on
Heidegger includes selections from the "Letter on Humanism"
in order to show how Heidegger problematized the question of
ethics and set the staqe for subsequent attempts to use his
work as the basis for a more complete social ontology and
post-metaphysical ethics.
The chapter on Heideggerian ethics is a survey of some
attempts by interpreters of Heidegger to take up the problem
of ethics. In particular, the first part of this chapter
focuses on philosophers who use Heidegger's ontology as a
foundation for ethics and those who develop Heidegger's
suggestion that directives for action might come from
dwelling in a nearness to Being or thinking the truth of
Being. The second half of this chapter deals with the work
of Werner Marx who provides one of the most systematic
attempts to use developments in the later Heidegger in order
to rethink the meaning of ethics.
Werner Marx is sharply critical of attempts to found
ethics on attunement to Being and critical of any ethics of
self-realization based on the distinction between authentic
and inauthentic modes of Being. Instead, Marx insists on a
7
critical rethinking of Heidegger's work after Being and Timp
m order to look for a measure for responsible action and an
ethics concerned with one's fellow human beings. And he
claims to find such a measure in the human attunement to
mortality. According to Marx, the attunement of unsettling
dread in the face of mortality transforms the structures of
everyday human indifference to one another into an
attunement of shared fate and mutual assistance, an
attunement of solidarity and mutual responsibility that Marx
refers to as a healing force. This healing force takes form
as love, compassion, and recognition of Others which give a
measure to the way we conduct ourselves. Marx concedes that
this path of transformation from indifference to solidarity
is only a possibility for human being. It is always
possible for human beings to flee from their own mortality
and revert to a mode of indifference, and therefore the
measure for responsible action might need to be codified in
social institutions. Nevertheless, Marx argues, attunement
to mortality is part of the fundamental structure of human
Being and therefore provides the existential conditions for
responsible action and ethical concern for Others.
Perhaps Werner Marx provides a stronger analysis of the
solicitous regard that human beings may have for one
another, a stronger ground for the possibility of compassion
and collective action. But as in Heidegger's analysis of
the formal conditions for the possibility of morality,
8
Marx s measure for responsible action depends upon an
individualizing modification of the they-self. Heidegger's
analysis of Dasein replaces the isolation of a worldless
rational ego with the primacy of the they-self, a
fundamental existential structure of human Being that may be
modified to produce the individualized authentic Being-
one's-self. The possibility of morality, the possibility of
conscience, answerability, and authentic regard for Others
depends upon this individualizing modification. Similarly,
Marx's critical re-thinking of the attunement to mortality
depends upon an individualizing isolation and dread in order
to overcome everyday indifference; Dasein must extrapolate
from its own needs and its dependence on Others in order to
see the needs of other mortals and an interdependence and
shared mortality that calls for solidarity. Heidegger and
Marx have replaced the individualism of rational self-
interest with an individualizing modification of the
anonymous bonds of community as the starting point for
ethical relations. The human being is no longer viewed as
an isolated atomic individual simply reacting to other
isolated atomic individuals; Heidegger has disclosed
fundamental connections between human beings, connections
that are necessary for the possibility of moral relations.
But in Heidegger's analysis these fundamental connections
are inauthentic connections, characterized by indifference
and always mediated by shared projects and concerns. It is
9
only through an individualizing structure of human Being
that moral relations can be anything other than the
ideological demands of the they-self. And since the
individualizing structure is only a modification of the
primordial they-self, responsibility for Others is limited
to relations that are always mediated by a shared world of
common concerns. In the end, in the analyses of both
Heidegger and Marx, these fundamental and constitutive
connections to other human beings can only provide the
possibility for individual answerability in a context of
communal norms.
Perhaps the critigue of morality as ideology leaves
only the alternatives of heroic amoral individualism
(Nietzsche's creator and legislator of values) or community-
based ethics built around common projects and concerns and
dependent on an attunement to Being or an attunement to
shared mortality. On the other hand, perhaps the they-self
is not the fundamental structure of human Being, perhaps an
individualizing modification of this they-self is not the
only explanation for the possibility of conscience, perhaps
shared projects and concerns mediated by a fundamental
relation to Being are not the only source for ethical
directives. Perhaps fundamental ontology is not the proper
starting point for the problem of ethics. Perhaps it is a
mistake to limit the problem of ethics to a question of
ontology, to the question 'What is ethics?' Perhaps the
10
question of ethics is not a question of what is, not a
question of the existential conditions that supply the
possibility of shared values and norms. Perhaps the
question of ethics is fundamentally the question of what
ought to be. Perhaps with the end of onto-theoloqical
ethics, with the end of all transcendent absolute sanctions
it is still not enouqh to simply work with what is, with
what is qiven historically, culturally, communally. We
still desire somethinq better than what is; we still desire
the Good, not the Good installed in a heaven above Being-in-
the-world but the idea of Good as what is "better than
Being." This desire for the Good is still a particular
desire, present in individual conscience. But is this
desire born out of solitude? Is this desire born out of
shared projects or shared concerns or an awareness of the
shared conditions of being human? How can we understand
this desire for something other than what is, for something
"beyond Being," if our own Being is wholly described in its
totality in relation to Being?
This desire for something other than what is, for that
which transcends the totality of Being, for the Good beyond
or on the hither side of Being and better than Being, marks
the original thinking of Emmanuel Levinas about the problem
of ethics. And it is the central task of this dissertation
to examine the view of ethics that emerges from Levinas 's
confrontation with Heidegger's ontology. Levinas does not
11
ask 'What is ethics?' because he claims there is no essence
of ethics. He is not satisfied with the formal existential
conditions for the possibility of morality because he
insists that ontology is the wrong ground for thinking about
ethics; we cannot explore the desire for what ought to be by
examining what is. The "ethical cry," the cry for justice,
interrupts what is, unsettles our being at home in the
world, and disturbs our instrumental relations with one
another
.
Levinas suggests a radical change in the way we think
about ethics, even more radical than Heidegger's talk of an
originary ethics in the thinking of Being. Levinas claims
that ethics is not a branch of philosophy but first
philosophy, prior to ontology, prior to epistemology. He
says that we are not allergic egoisms competing for scarce
resources and intent on preserving our individual freedom
against the hostile encroachment of Others. We are also not
fundamentally ideological beings, not primordially
constituted by anonymous relations with Others. Levinas
suggests a third way between the autonomous individualism of
onto-theological metaphysics and the ultimate insignificance
of individuals that comes from Heidegger's ontology. He
suggests a pluralism that can accommodate radically
separated, irreplaceable, unique individuals who are
constituted as self-conscious subjects in relation to one
another, in an ethical relation of responsibility. And
12
Levinas describes this as an "infinite responsibility," an
"asymmetrical responsibility," and a "responsibility prior
to freedom." The face to face relation is at the center of
Levinas 's attempt to describe this responsibility that
constitutes subjectivity as one-for-another
.
What if the fundamental connection between human beings
and primordial signification and meaning arise in speaking
to one another face to face? What if this Other facing me
cannot be comprehended as another myself or as an alter ego
or as Mit-dasein? What if this relation to the radical
otherness of the face of another introduces the desire for
what is beyond my own self-satisfied existence, beyond
shared impersonal economic relations? What if this
immediate relation carries with it an infinite
responsibility for this Other facing me? What if society is
built up from my responsibility for the Other facing me,
built up in a network of kinship and an extension of my
infinite responsibility for one to my responsibility for
all? What if justice is the necessary limitation of this
infinite responsibility for all rather than a compromise of
boundless freedom? And what if it is not enough to be?
What if I must justify my Being before the face of another
human being, in the face of the Other's hunger, poverty, and
nakedness? What if we are ethical beings before we are
onto-logical
,
constituted by responsibility for the Other
before any concern over our own Being?
13
All of these provocative suggestions are carefully
developed by Levinas in phenomenological analyses of human
existence that attempt to penetrate beneath the concernful
absorption of Being-in-the-world and the mediated relations
of Being-with described by Heidegger. But Levinas 's
attempts to point to the elemental conditions of human
existence and the priority of the ethical relation are
complicated by the problem that according to Levinas the
ethical relation of responsibility is pre-ontological
,
prior
to experience, and accessible only in traces. The one-for-
another of the face to face relation is distorted as soon as
it is described in the language of ontology so that the
philosophical inquiry into the problem of ethics also
involves problems of language. In addition, this
asymmetrical ethical relation cannot be universalized, it
cannot serve as a ground for first principles of ethics, and
therefore no normative ethics will fall out of Levinas 's
work on the problem of ethics. Instead, Levinas makes a
distinction between the infinite responsibility that marks
the primordial ethical relation and the concerns of justice
that arise as soon as we consider the multiplicity of
relations among individuals. He does not develop a view of
justice beyond the provocative suggestions that justice
involves a limitation of infinite responsibilities rather
than a limitation of hostilities, and that just social,
political, and economic relations are both inspired by and
14
held in check by the primordial ethical relation of infinite
responsibility. But if we have sufficient evidence or
sufficient imagination to support this radical reversal of
our thinking about human Being and the problem of ethics,
then perhaps we should explore the outcome of such a
thinking. Would we see ourselves, our relations to Others,
our personal and social responsibilities differently? Would
we be moved to make changes in our social institutions, or
our political and economic relations?
This dissertation does not deal with moral rules or the
guestion of how one ought to live one's life. This
dissertation undertakes a selective and critical reading of
Heidegger and Levinas in order to examine their
contributions to an understanding of the fundamental meaning
and possibility of ethical reality. This dissertation makes
no attempt to produce a code of ethics but asks the more
fundamental question of how ethics is possible. But this
dissertation is also intended to contribute weight to the
claim that we must each pay attention to the desire for the
Good, we must each listen to the cry of the other person,
whether neighbor or stranger, and we must find concrete ways
to respond.
15
CHAPTER II
MARTIN HEIDEGGER: THE MEANING OF BEING
AND THE QUESTION OF ETHICS
This chapter is intended to serve several purposes.
First, it provides a selective reading of Being and Time as
essential background for understanding the work of Emmanuel
Levinas. Levinas was deeply influenced by Heidegger but he
was also extremely critical of Heidegger's analysis of
Dasein. I have therefore selected relevant passages from
Being and Time that will lay the groundwork for
understanding Levinas 's criticisms of Heidegger.
Secondly, this chapter explores the priority and
centrality that Heidegger gives to the question of the
meaning of Being as such. Although the selections from
Being and Time focus on Heidegger's analysis of Dasein,
Heidegger did not undertake the Dasein analytic for the sake
of understanding human existence but for the sake of
disclosing Dasein 's relation to Being. This chapter
therefore serves to reaffirm Heidegger's own assertions that
Dasein is investigated in order to work out the question of
the meaning of Being.
16
Finally
,
my selections from Heidegger's work are also
guided by the question of the meaning of ethics. I have
concentrated on Heidegger's analysis of human relations, his
description of solicitude, and his discussion of conscience,
guilt, answerability and the possibility of morality in
jjeinq qnd Time. And I have included Heidegger's explicit
consideration of the meaning of ethics and the relation
between ontology and ethics from the "Letter on Humanism" in
order to elucidate Heidegger's contribution to the problem
of ethics.
A. Dasein and the Meaning of Being
Heidegger begins Being and Time by raising the question
of the meaning of Being, a question which was once the theme
for investigation in Plato and Aristotle, but which has been
trivialized, dogmatized and forgotten according to
Heidegger. Although we live in an understanding of Being
and claim that the concept must be self-evident because of
constant use, the meaning of Being is not made explicit.
Furthermore, the meaning of Being is problematic: as the
most universal concept, Being differs from the categories
applicable to things; the concept of Being is not derivable
from higher concepts nor constructable from lower ones;
Being is not an entity that can be defined as entities are
defined in traditional logic. Therefore, Heidegger argues,
we must explicitly restate the question of the meaning of
Being. But everything we talk about, everything we have in
17
view is Being; even inquiry is a mode of Being. According
to Heidegger, since inquiry is a mode of Being, of the Being
of the inquirer, we can work out the question of the meaning
of Being by making the inquirer "transparent in his own
Being." Heidegger labels this being, the inquirer, Dasein.
Dasein is distinguished as an entity by the fact that
in its Being, that Being is an issue for it; an
understanding of Being, though vague, is a characteristic of
Dasein 's Being. Fundamental ontology may therefore be
sought in the existential analysis of Dasein, an uncovering
of what constitutes the structures of existence of Dasein.
But Dasein tends to understand its own Being in terms of the
world; Dasein falls prey to tradition so that tradition
blocks access to the primordial sources of an understanding
of Being. Thus according to Heidegger, access to Dasein
must be achieved so that Dasein shows itself to itself in
its average everydayness.
Heidegger's phenomenological method is of central
importance in this preparatory fundamental analysis of
Dasein. Heidegger explains in the introduction to Being and
Time that the word 'phenomenology' is a compound of
'phenomenon' and 'logos' where the phenomenon is "that which
shows itself from itself" and where logos is understood as
discourse—to make manifest what one is talking about, to
let something be seen. Thus phenomenology is a method: "to
let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very
18
way in which it shows itself from itself." Phenomenology
lets us see what has been covered up or forgotten.
According to Heidegger, a phenomenological description of
Dasein is not an idealization and it does not contain any
assertion of value nor any judgement regarding possible ways
to be
.
Thus in Being and Time
. Dasein is investigated because
it is accessible, because it is an inquiring being, a
disclosing being, and because it is an entity for whom Being
is of concern. Even when Heidegger is involved in a
detailed analysis of the existential structures of Dasein,
his aim is to uncover the meaning of Being—his analysis is
directed by the question concerning the meaning of Being as
such. And the work of Being and Time is used to step toward
his later assertion that the cause of thinking is the
disclosure of Being; that thought is the point where Being
is brought to light. So that even when he turns directly to
questions of ethics and action in the "Letter on Humanism,"
he remains primarily concerned over Dasein' s essential
relation to Being, insisting that the thought of Being is
prior to the split between theory and practice and must take
precedence over the search for directives for action.
Despite his refusal to produce an ethics, Heidegger's
Dasein analytic does include discussion of the relations
between human beings, of care as the structural whole of
Dasein and solicitude as the mode of care in Being-with-
19
others. The following sections will therefore briefly
review Heidegger's analysis of Being-in-the-world as Being-
with and then look carefully at his temporal
reinterpretation of the analysis of Dasein that includes a
discussion of conscience and the possibility of morality in
general
.
1- Being-in-the-world as Beina-with
In Being and Time . Heidegger approaches the unitary
phenomenon of Being-in-the-world in three ways: first, by
analyzing the worldhood of the world, secondly, by asking
who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness, and lastly by
analyzing Being-in as such. It is in the second approach to
the ontological structure of Dasein that Heidegger discusses
Being-with and Dasein-with as structures of Dasein, ways for
Dasein to be. Heidegger begins this section of the Dasein-
analytic with a reminder of the formal characteristic that
Dasein is in each case an "I", a self: "The 'who' is what
maintains itself as something identical through changes in
its Experiences and ways of behavior, and which relates
itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing"
[ 1962 , p. 150 ] . Heidegger warns against uncritical acceptance
of this ontically obvious characteristic of Dasein;
discussion of the worldhood of the world has already shown
that a bare subject without a world is never given.
Likewise, Heidegger asserts, "...in the end an isolated "I"
20
without Others is just as far from being proximally given"
[ 1962 ,p. 152 ]
.
The orientation for the investigation of the "who" of
everyday Dasein is thus taken from the prior analysis of the
world. Others are already encountered environmentally, not
as eguipment ready-to-hand
,
nor as person-things merely
present-at-hand
,
but as like Dasein, as circumspectively
concernful Being-in-the-world too. If we simply broaden the
view of Dasein as concernfully absorbed in the work-world,
for example, we see that Others are those for whom our work
is produced, those who supply materials, those who own
property, those who serve us, sell to us, buy from us.
Other Dasein are already there with us in the world. Thus
Heidegger can say,
By reason of this with-like [mithaften] Being-in-
the-world, the world is always the one that I
share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-
world [Mitwelt] . Being-in is Being-with Others.
Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is
Dasein-with [Mitdasein] . [1962, p. 155]
According to Heidegger, if we attend to phenomenal facts, we
see that Others are encountered from out of the world in
which Dasein dwells; they are encountered environmentally.
Heidegger insists that since care [Sorge] defines the
Being of Dasein, Being-with must also be interpreted in
terms of the phenomenon of care. Just as 'concern'
[Besorgen] characterizes our Being-towards what is ready-to-
hand, so 'solicitude' [Fursorge] describes our Being-towards
entities which are themselves Dasein. 1 Heidegger describes
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both deficient inodes and positive inodes of solicitude. He
claims that deficient and indifferent modes of passing one
another by, not mattering to one another, or being for,
against, or without one another characterize average
everyday Being-with. And these deficient modes of
solicitude mislead us into interpreting Being-with as the
mere Being-present-at-hand of several subjects. Even in its
positive modes, solicitude may simply leap-in for the Other,
take over for him, dislodge the Other from his concern with
the ready-to-hand, so that the Other may become dominated
and dependent. Only authentic care can produce a kind of
positive solicitude that is directed toward the existence of
the Other. Heidegger describes this as a form of solicitude
that leaps ahead of the Other and liberates his existentiell
potentiality-for-Being : "...it helps the Other to become
transparent to himself in his care and to become free for
it" [ 1962, p. 159 ] . Thus Heidegger claims that solicitude is
bound up with Dasein's Being toward the world of its
concern: "Being with one another is based proximal ly and
often exclusively upon what is a matter of common concern in
such Being" [ 1962 ,p. 159 ]
.
Here again, Heidegger draws on an analogy to the
concernful absorption with equipment ready-to-hand. He
claims that just as circumspection [Umsicht] belongs to
concern as a way of discovering what is ready to hand, so
considerateness [Rucksicht] and forbearance [Nachsicht]
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guide solicitude. Heidegger is here playing on the
etymological root word for sight [Sicht] in each of these
descriptive terms. Thus considerateness and forbearance
amount to a kind of regard for Others that Heidegger claims
will also range across deficient and indifferent modes.
Being-with one another is part of the existential structure
of Dasein, but indifference (not mattering to one another)
is the most frequent mode of regard for Others. Thus, in
our everyday absorption in environmental concerns, Others
are encountered in what they do; "the Dasein-with of Others
is encountered proximally and for the most part in terms of
the with-world with which we are environmentally concerned"
[1962, p. 163]
.
But Heidegger goes on to claim that in its everyday
absorption in the world and in its Being-with Others, Dasein
is not itself. In fact, Being-with-one-another dissolves
one's own Dasein into what Heidegger calls the they-self.
Heidegger speaks of a dictatorship of the "they"
,
a
levelling down of all possibilities into averageness, a
covering up of everything primordial or exceptional in
publicness
;
We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man]
take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about
literature and art as they see and judge; likewise
we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they
shrink back; we find 'shocking' what they find
shocking. The "they", which is nothing definite,
and which all are, though not as the sum,
prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.
[1962, p.164]
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This anonymous "they" controls the ways in which Dasein and
the world get interpreted. And because the "they" dictates
every judgement and decision, the particular Dasein is
disburdened by the "they", deprived of any answerability or
responsibility, accommodated in its tendency to make things
easy
.
Thus Heidegger says, everyday Dasein is the "nobody",
it is the they-self as distinguished from the authentic Self
which might discover the world in its own way and disclose
its own authentic Being to itself. In the mode of they-
self, Dasein's way of Being is inauthenticity, a failure to
stand by one's Self. But this they-self is an existentiale
of Dasein, a fundamental structural feature of Dasein 's
Being, so that according to Heidegger,
Proximally
,
factical Dasein is in the with-world,
which is discovered in an average way.
Proximally
,
it is not 'I' in the sense of my own
Self, that 'am', but rather the Others, whose way
is that of the "they". In terms of the "they",
and as the "they", I am 'given' proximally to
'myself' [mir "selbst" ]. Proximally Dasein is
"they", and for the most part it remains so....
Authentic Being-one' s-Self does not rest upon an
exceptional condition of the subject, a condition
that has been detached from the "they"; it is
rather an existentiell modification of the "they"-
-of the "they" as an essential existentiale .
[ 1962
,
pp .167-68] 2
Although Heidegger goes on to characterize the everyday
Being of Dasein as "falling", he warns that this is not a
"moralizing critique" of Dasein but an ontological
interpretation of phenomena [ 1962 , p. 211 ] . "Fallenness"
refers to Dasein's falling away from itself, falling into
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the world, Being-lost in the publicness of the "they" and
absorbed in the idle talk and ambiguity of inauthentic
Being-with-one-another
. Authenticity refers only to the
possible modification of this everyday absorption in the
world, a modification in which Dasein can choose itself.
Heidegger also characterizes Dasein's absorption in the
"they" as a fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself as an
"authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self
" [ 1962 ,p. 229 ]
.
And this fleeing is grounded in anxiety, the state-of-mind
that discloses Dasein as Being-possible and thus
individualizes Dasein. Anxiety is a feeling of
"uncanniness"
,
a feeling of "not-being-at-home" ; and Dasein
flees this anxiety as it falls into tranquilized average
everydayness. But according to Heidegger, anxiety brings
Dasein face to face with its world and with itself as Being-
in-the-world. Anxiety takes away the possibility of
understanding oneself in terms of the way things have been
publicly interpreted and instead brings Dasein face to face
with the freedom of choosing itself; anxiety brings Dasein
back from its absorption in the world and makes manifest to
Dasein that authenticity and inauthenticity are
possibilities of its Being. But it is not until Heidegger
turns to the temporal reinterpretation of the existential
structures of Dasein that he articulates the way in which
authentic Being-one's-self can modify Being-with Others.
25
2 • Temporal—Interpretation of Beinq-in-the-world
: The Cal]
of Conscience,
—
Authenticity, and Solicitous Being with
Others
As the Dasein analytic progresses in Division Two of
Being and Time
,
Heidegger takes up the problem of disclosing
Dasein in its possibilities of authenticity and totality.
It is in Being-towards-death as Dasein 's "ownmost" and "non-
relational" possibility, that Dasein can be wrenched away
from the "they" [ 1962 ,p. 307 ] . In the anticipation of
authentic Being-towards-death, Dasein can take hold of the
possibility of authentic existence, where authenticity
[eigentlich]
,
according to Heidegger's introductory
definition, means "my own" [eigen] [1962, p. 68]. This
"ownmost possibility" is non-relational in that each Dasein
must face death alone; "death lays claim to it as an
individual Dasein" and both our concernful Being-alongside
things and our Being-with Others "will fail us when our
ownmost potentiality-for-Being is the issue" [ 1962 ,p. 308 ] .
Although death is certain, it is always ahead of us and
indefinite. Our anticipatory understanding is therefore
accompanied by the mood of anxiety. Heidegger says of this,
In anticipating [zum] the indefinite certainty of
death, Dasein opens itself to a constant threat
arising out of its own "there". In this very
threat Being-towards-the-end must maintain
itself ... .But the state-of-mind which can hold
open the utter and constant threat to itself
arising from Dasein' s ownmost individualized
Being
,
is anxiety. In this state-of-mind, Dasein
finds itself face to face with the "nothing" of
the possible impossibility of its existence.
26
Anxiety is anxious about the potentiality-for-
Being of the entity so destined
...[ 1962
,
p. 310
]
Thus, according to Heidegger, Being-towards-death is
anxiety; and the anticipation of authentic Being-towards-
death individualizes Dasein, reveals to Dasein its lostness
in the they-self, and brings Dasein face to face with the
possibility of Being-itself
. Heidegger points out that the
everyday understanding of death is an evasive concealment of
these possibilities. For example, a tranguilizing
solicitude toward the dying always refuses to release Dasein
for its ownmost potentiality. Nevertheless, death is
certain and remains an inescapable issue for Dasein.
The analysis has thus projected the ontological
possibility of Dasein as authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-
whole in Being-towards-death. But Heidegger seeks a
phenomenal basis for this merely ontological possibility.
He asks, "Does Dasein ever tactically throw itself into such
a Being-towards-death?" [ 1962
,
p. 311 ] . Heidegger asserts
that the call of conscience is the phenomenon that
corresponds to the ontological possibility of authentic
Being-one's-self. The call of conscience comes from me and
yet settles upon me; conscience calls Dasein to itself,
appeals to the they-self but calls Dasein to the possibility
of choosing itself as a modification of the they-self. The
caller is Dasein in its uncanniness as thrown Being-in-the-
world, not-at-home in everydayness, and anxious about its
ownmost potential ity-for-Being. Thus, as a phenomenon of
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Dasein, conscience attests to Dasein's ontological structure
as care:
Conscience manifests itself as the call of care:
the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in
its Being-already-in)
,
is anxious about its
potentiality-for-Being . The one to whom the
appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned
to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being (ahead of
itself...)* Dasein is falling into the "they" (in
Being-already-alongside the world of its concern),
and it is summoned out of this falling by the
appeal. [1962, p.322]
Conscience is in each case mine because in each case the
call comes from I myself and is directed to my ownmost-
potentiality-for-Being; conscience is thus linked to the
notion of authenticity as "mineness".
Heidegger goes on to characterize the call of
conscience in a discussion of guilt. He indicates the
everyday interpretations of conscience in the various
significations of "Being-guilty": Being-guilty has the
sense of indebtedness, of owing something to Others; it has
the signification of being responsible for something; and it
has the signification of the breach of a moral requirement,
"a failure to satisfy some requirement which applies to
one's existent Being with Others" [ 1962 ,p. 328 ] . But these
everyday significations are quickly set aside as belonging
to the domain of concern, involving a reckoning and
balancing of claims and debts. These ordinary phenomena of
"guilt" depend on the existential idea of guilt as "Being
the basis of a nullity" [ 1962, p. 329] . Dasein's primordial
"Being-guilty" is disclosed in Dasein's Being as care, in
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the thrownness of facticity, in existence as projection, and
in falling. Each of these three aspects of care is part of
the "nullity", the "not" that Heidegger attributes to Being-
guilty. Thus in existing as thrown, Dasein is not the basis
of its own Being: "it has been brought into its "there", but
not of its own accord" [ 1962
,
p. 329 ] . Dasein understands
itself in terms of possibilities; but as projection, in
having a potentiality-for-Being
,
Dasein is itself null. And
in falling, Dasein is not itself.
In passing, Heidegger notes that this primordial Being-
guilty provides "the ontological condition for Dasein's
ability to come to owe anything in factically existing"
[ 1962 ,p. 332 ] . This Being-guilty is therefore also the
condition for the possibility of morality in general
[ 1962
,
p. 332 ] . The call of conscience, the call of care from
the uncanniness of Being-in-the-world
,
summons Dasein to its
ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty . And in understanding
the call, Dasein chooses itself; it makes possible its
ownmost Being-guilty. According to Heidegger, understanding
the call of care means wanting to have a conscience.
Whereas the they-self manipulates rules, calculates,
reckons, and balances infractions of public norms, in
wanting to have a conscience, "Dasein lets its ownmost Self
take action in itself in terms of that potentiality-for-
Being which it has chosen. Only so can it be answerable"
[ 1962 ,p. 334 ] . The call of conscience fails to give any
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practical ethical injunctions because it calls Dasein to its
own authentic existence, to its ownmost potentiality-for-
Being-its-Self
. Heidegger draws a sharp distinction between
a morality of rules and norms that might be subject to
calculation or regulation and this idea of conscience as a
more primordial basis for the very possibility of taking
actions for which one is answerable. The call of conscience
makes possible the formal conditions of answerability,
responsibility, and indebtedness that we associate with
morality, but conscience will not supply a material ethic of
value. Furthermore, as in his introduction of the terms
authentic and inauthentic, Heidegger refuses to attribute
any judgement regarding the moral guality of Dasein's
existentiell experience of conscience. Rather than
prescribing some ideal possibility against which any
factical Dasein would measure itself, he insists that he is
describing existential structures, possible ways for Dasein
to be . 3
Heidegger goes on with his analysis of conscience in
order to uncover the existential structure of Dasein's
authentic potentiality-for-Being. Wanting to have a
conscience is a way in which Dasein is disclosed to itself
,
and this disclosedness is characterized by anxiety as state-
of-mind, by understanding as projection of oneself upon
one's ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence.
In the call of conscience, Dasein is brought back from the
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loud idle talk of the "they" to the reticence of keeping
silent. Heidegger says of this,
This distinctive and authentic disclosedness
,
which is attested in Dasein itself by its
conscience
—
this reticent self-projection upon
one's ownmost Being-guilty
,
in which one is ready
for anxiety—we call "resoluteness"
. [1962, p.343]
Resoluteness as authentic Being-one ' s-Self is not only an
authentic disclosedness of one's own Dasein? it also
modifies the ways in which the world is discovered and the
Dasein-with of Others is disclosed. Heidegger asserts,
...both one's Being towards the ready-to-hand
understandingly and concernfully
,
and one's
solicitous Being with Others, are now given a
definite character in terms of their ownmost
potentiality-for-Being-their-Selves . . . . Dasein'
s
resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it
possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in
their ownmost potentiality-for-Being
,
and to co-
disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which
leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is
resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of
Others. Only by authentically Being-their-Selves
in resoluteness can people authentically be with
one another..." [1962, p.344]
Heidegger is careful to remind the reader that authentic
Being-one ' s-Self is a modification of the they-self, that
resoluteness does not detach Dasein from its world, and that
the irresoluteness of the "they" remains dominant.
Furthermore, as thrown Being-in-the-world, resolute Dasein
can only project itself upon definite factical
possibilities. Heidegger uses the term "Situation" to
describe the "there" which is disclosed in resoluteness.
Thus in resoluteness, Dasein discovers what is factically
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possible and seizes upon concrete possibilities for action
in every situation.
In order to complete the ontological analysis of what
it means to be as Dasein, Heidegger shows that the
anticipation of authentic Being-towards-death belongs
together with the resoluteness of Dasein ' s authentic
potentiality-for-Being in anticipatory resoluteness. In
anticipation of death, resoluteness can accomplish the
disclosure of Dasein primordially as a potentiality-for-
Being-guilty
. According to Heidegger, death is not "added
on" to Dasein as its 'end'; but Dasein, as care, is the
thrown (that is, null) basis for its death: "The nullity by
which Dasein 's Being is dominated primordially through and
through, is revealed to Dasein itself in authentic Being-
towards-death" [ 1962
,
p . 354 ] . And since the existential idea
of guilt is revealed as being the basis of a nullity, it is
only in anticipation of death that Dasein 's potentiality for
Being-guilty becomes whole and transparent. Thus Heidegger
says
,
When the call of conscience is understood,
lostness in the "they" is revealed. Resoluteness
brings Dasein back to its ownmost potentiality-
for-Being-its-Self . When one has an understanding
Being-towards-death—towards death as one's
ownmost possibility—one's potentiality-for-Being
becomes authentic and wholly transparent.
[1962, p.354]
Anticipatory resoluteness is not an evasion of death nor an
escape from the world; it is rather "that understanding
which follows the call of conscience and which frees for
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death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein 's
existence..." [ 1962
,
p . 357 ] . Wanting to have a conscience is
not a kind of contemplation; rather it brings Dasein to the
resoluteness of taking action. If we recall the
disburdening and tranquilizing of the "they", then by
contrast, anticipatory resoluteness is a condition for
responsible action, freeing us from the idle talk and
curiosity of the "they" and bringing us face to face with
our individualized potentiality-for-Being
.
Anticipatory resoluteness, as Dasein 's authentic Being-
a-whole, is also Dasein 's primordial experience of
temporality. Anticipatory resoluteness is Being towards
one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being
,
and this Being-
towards-itself is the phenomenon of the future as coming
towards. Anticipation as Being-towards-death "makes Dasein
authentically futural" [ 1962 ,p. 373 ] . But anticipatory
resoluteness also means that in existing, one takes over
Being-guilty; one comes back understandingly to the having-
been of thrownness. And taking over thrownness means "being
Dasein authentically as it already was " [ 1962 ,p. 373
]
. Thus
Heidegger claims, "Anticipation of one's uttermost and
ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one's
ownmost "been". Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be
authentically as having been. The character of "having
been" arises, in a certain way, from the future"
[ 1962 ,p. 373 ] . Similarly, anticipatory resoluteness
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discloses the current Situation of Dasein 's Being-there.
Dasein is circumspectively concerned with what is factically
ready-to-hand, and resolute Being-alongside what is ready-
to-hand in the Situation is a making present. Heidegger
says of this, "Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness
brings itself into the Situation by making present"
[1962, p.374]
.
Thus anticipatory resoluteness discloses temporality as
the primordial unity of the structure of care. Heidegger
reminds us that Dasein 's totality of Being as care means:
"ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-
alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)
"
[ 1962
,
p. 375 ] . The "ahead-of-itself " is indicative of the
future, Being-already-in has the character of "having been",
and "Being-alongside" involves making present. Thus the
self-projection of existentiality is grounded in the future,
the existential meaning of facticity lies in the character
of "having been", and making present is the basis for
falling into the ready-to-hand with which we concern
ourselves. Temporality therefore makes possible the unity
of existence, facticity, and falling (and thus the totality
of the structure of care) as the unity of a future which
makes present in the process of having been [ 1962 ,p. 401 ]
.
Having disclosed the primordial totality of Dasein 's
structural whole as temporality, Heidegger turns to the task
of repeating the existential analysis of Dasein in order to
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provide a temporal interpretation of Dasein in its
everydayness. In this temporal interpretation of Being-in-
the-world, Heidegger looks at the temporality of
circumspective concern, but he does not return explicitly to
the phenomena of Being-with. In fact, in the last sections
°f Being and Time
,
Heidegger tends to speak of Being-with
only in reference to what is public and average, and he
makes no further reference to the authentic solicitude that
is possible in anticipatory resoluteness. 4 The only
relevant exception to this general tendency occurs in
Heidegger's discussion of historicality
. Heidegger speaks
of fate as Dasein's "primordial historicizing" and of
destiny as a "co-historicizing. " Thus he says of fate:
Once one has grasped the finitude of one's
existence, it snatches one back from the endless
multiplicity of possibilities which offer
themselves as closest to one—those of
comfortableness, shirking, and taking things
lightly—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of
its fate. This is how we designate Dasein's
primordial historicizing, which lies in authentic
resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down
to itself, free for death, in a possibility which
it has inherited and yet has chosen. [1962, p.435]
Carrying this a step further, Heidegger asserts that as
Being-in-the-world
,
Dasein exists essentially in Being-with
Others so that its historicizing is a co-historicizing.
This co-historicizing, the historicizing of a community or
of a people, is determinative for Dasein as destiny. And
Heidegger says of this:
Destiny is not something that puts itself together
out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-
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one-another can be conceived as the occurring
together of several Subjects. Our fates have
already been guided in advance, in our Being with
one another in the same world and in our
resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in
communicating and struggling does the power of
destiny become free. Dasein 's fateful destiny in
and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full
authentic historicizing of Dasein. [1962, p.436]
Here again, as in earlier passages, Heidegger's concern
seems to be Dasein' s activity of disclosing; this final
temporal interpretation of Being-with is concerned with the
disclosing of the destiny of a people.
The emphasis on Dasein as a disclosing being also plays
a central role in the essays that come after Being and Time .
In Being and Time Heidegger takes up the question of the
meaning of Being through the analysis of Dasein as the
inquiring being, the disclosing being, the being for whom
Being is an issue. In "The Essence of Truth" Heidegger
claims that Being withdraws into the mystery so that every
conceptual approach is a concealing; we may still approach
the meaning of Being by thinking from the ground of Dasein
where the essence of Dasein is ek-sistence—openness for
Being, standing out into the open region of disclosure. But
Heidegger concludes that the task is now to get closer to
Being through a way of thinking that is experiential rather
than conceptual. And finally in the "Letter on Humanism",
Heidegger claims that since we cannot grasp Being as a whole
or conceptualize the truth of Being, we must take a path of
thinking that brings us into a nearness to Being as it
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continually unfolds; thought is the point where Being is
brought into light and Dasein is the shepherd of Being whose
task is to think the truth of Being. it is in this context,
in the "Letter on Humanism", that Heidegger considers
questions concerning ethics and action.
B, The Question of Ethics in the "Letter on Humanism"
In the "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger takes up the
question of the relation of ontology to ethics, reflects on
the question of action, and insists again that thought of
Being occurs prior to any distinction between theory and
practice or contemplation and action. In fact, according to
Heidegger's claim that the essence of action is
accomplishment, thinking is action in that "thinking
accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man"
[ 1977 ,p. 193 ] . The task for human beings is to bring the
truth of Being to language; but in this essay we see clearly
that we cannot grasp Being as a whole, that we cannot
conceptualize the truth of Being, and therefore, that the
task calls for a new kind of thinking. Heidegger claims
that we must free ourselves of the technical interpretation
of thinking as a process of reflection in the service of
doing and making, an instrument of education, a cultural
concern dominated by the public realm. In order to find our
way back to the truth of Being we must first "learn to exist
in the nameless." And Heidegger says, "Even such names as
'logic,' and 'ethics,' and 'physics' begin to flourish only
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when original thinking comes to an end" [ 1977 ,p. 195 ] . Thus,
for example, in his taking up the question, ' How can we
restore meaning to the word "humanism"?', Heidegger suggests
that perhaps the label "humanism" is destructive of
/ that if we are to restore any sense to humanism
then it can only be through uncovering the primordial
"essence of man." And when we come to think the essence of
human being primordially and in relation to Being, we see
that the human being is claimed as the shepherd of Being,
dwells in the nearness of Being, stands out into the open
region in the lighting of Being and is thus an instrument of
Being, bringing forth what is into the light of truth.
Heidegger says of this,
"Humanism" now means, in case we decide to retain
the word, that the essence of man is essential for
the truth of Being, specifically in such a way
that the word does not pertain to man simply as
such. So we are thinking a curious kind of
"humanism." The word results in a name that is a
lucus a non lucendo (literally, a grove where no
light penetrates). [ 1977
,
pp. 224-25
]
Therefore, rather than redefine "humanism" in a way that
contradicts all previous humanism, Heidegger prefers to
resist "humanism" and to risk misinterpretations in order to
shock us into questioning the humanity of human Being.
There is a Socratic flavor to this argument, to the
idea that the path of thinking might be closed to us if we
believe we already understand what it means to be human and
if we simply operate with an everyday understanding of
"humanism." But Heidegger's rejection of humanism is also
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evidence of his concern to overcome metaphysical
subjectivism and the forgetfulness of Being that has led
Western metaphysics astray. Heidegger's refusal to produce
an ethics seems to be moved by the same concerns. At the
end of the "Letter on Humanism", he takes up the guestion of
ethics
:
Where the essence of man is thought so
essentially, i.e., solely from the question
concerning the truth of Being, but still without
elevating man to the center of beings, a longing
necessarily awakens for a peremptory directive and
for rules that say how man, experienced from
eksistence toward Being, ought to live in a
fitting manner. The desire for an ethics presses
ever more ardently for fulfillment as the obvious
no less than the hidden perplexity of man soars to
immeasurable heights .... But does this need ever
release thought from the task of thinking what
still remains principally to be thought and, as
Being prior to all beings, is their guarantor and
their truth? Even further, can thinking refuse to
think Being after the latter has lain hidden so
long in oblivion but at the same time has made
itself known in the present moment of world
history by the uprooting of all beings?
[1977, pp. 231-32]
Heidegger goes on at this point with a discussion that
follows the same lines as his redefinition and rejection of
the term "humanism." He asks what "ontology" and "ethics"
are, whether as philosophical disciplines they still remain
"near and proper to what is assigned to thinking"
[1977, p.232]
.
Using a fragment from Heraclitus, Heidegger attempts to
locate the meaning of the word ethics in the Greek word
"ethos": "Ethos means abode, dwelling place. The word
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names the open region in which man dwells" [ 1977
,
p. 233 ]
.
And he continues,
If the name "ethics," in keeping with the basic
meaning of the word ethos, should now say that
"ethics" ponders the abode of man, then that
thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the
primordial element of man, as one who eksists, is
in itself the original ethics. However, this
thinking is not ethics in the first instance,
because it is ontology. [ 1977 ,pp. 234-35]
Thinking the truth of Being is what Heidegger has called
"fundamental ontology" in Being and Time . But he now finds
the terms "ethics" and "ontology" to be misleading, too
tightly bound to their customary meanings in the tradition
of metaphysics. Therefore, rather than look for a relation
between ethics and ontology, Heidegger asks whether we can
obtain directives for our active lives from the thinking
that ponders the truth of Being. He claims that such
thinking is prior to any distinction between theory and
practice: "Such thinking has no result. It has no
effeet .... For it lets Being be" [ 1977
,
p . 236 ] . But this
recalls the preliminary definition of action as
accomplishment, as leading something forth into the fullness
of its essence. Thinking "lets itself be claimed by Being
so that it can say the truth of Being" [ 1977 ,p. 194 ] , and
"Thinking acts insofar as it thinks" [ 1977 ,p. 193 ]
.
The essence of human Being is to "dwell" in the truth
of Being; to be in the world means to dwell and be at home
there. And Heidegger thus connects this sense of dwelling
with the need for directives:
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Only so far as man, ek-sisting into the truth of
Being, belongs to Being can there come from Being
itself the assignment of those directions that
must become law and rule for man. . . .Nomos is not
only law but more originally the assignment
contained in the dispensation of Being. Only the
assignment is capable of dispatching man into
Being. Only such dispatching is capable of
supporting and obligating. Otherwise all law
remains merely something fabricated by human
reason. More essential than instituting rules is
that man find the way to his abode in the truth of
Being.... The truth of Being offers a hold for all
conduct. [1977, pp. 238-39]
Although it appears that Heidegger has pointed toward the
possibility of an ethics directed by the truth of Being, he
immediately limits this possibility by reasserting the
relation of such thinking to theory and practice. The
thinking of Being "exceeds all contemplation" and "surpasses
all praxis ." According to Heidegger, "thinking in its
saying merely brings the unspoken word of Being to language"
[ 1977 ,p. 239 ] . Language is the "house of Being," language is
the "home of eksistence," and thoughtful saying can thus
bring ek-sistence into the lighting of Being; but this is
very far from providing directives for our practical lives.
Heidegger says the thinking of Being is neither
theoretical nor practical; this thinking is claimed by
Being, takes its measure from Being, and therefore is not
merely arbitrary. But this thinking is also not absolute
knowledge; rather, it is an adventure, "bound to the advent
of Being" [ 1977 ,p. 241 ] . If ethics is a branch of
philosophy, then Heidegger insists that "what is needed in
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the present world crisis is less philosophy, but more
attentiveness in thinking..." [ 1977
,
p . 242 ]
.
Being remains mysterious, "the simple nearness of an
unobtrusive governance" [ 1977 ,p. 212 ] . And the task for
human being, according to Heidegger, is to take the path of
thinking and remain a wanderer on the way into the
neighborhood of Being, the open region in which Being grants
its truth to thinking Dasein. We have been led astray by
the names, categories, and concepts of metaphysics; we have
forgotten Being, forgotten our essential relation to Being.
We must break free of metaphysics, dwell in the nameless,
take the path of thinking that attends to Being as advent
and brings the truth of Being to language. Thought of Being
comes first, is prior to, is perhaps a foundation for any
sort of directives for action. Clearly, for Heidegger, the
thought of Being takes precedence over the demand for
practical directives. It is therefore left to others to
take up the problematic question of ethics.
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1* Macquarrie and Robinson, the translators of Beina and
Time, note that
There is no good English equivalent for
' Fiirsorge'
. . . the kind of care which we find in
'prenatal care' or 'taking care of the children',
or even the kind of care which is administered by
welfare agencies. Indeed the word 'Fiirsorge' is
regularly used in contexts where we would speak of
'welfare work' or 'social welfare'? this is the
usage which Heidegger has in mind in his
discussion of 'Fiirsorge'as 'a factical social
arrangement'. [Footnote 4, p.157]
2. It is interesting to note that Heidegger defines the
phrase 'proximally and for the most part' in the following
way:
'Proximally' signifies the way in which Dasein is
'manifest' in the "with-one-another" of
publicness, even if 'at bottom' everydayness is
precisely something which, in an existentiell
manner, it has 'surmounted'. 'For the most part'
signifies the way in which Dasein shows itself for
Everyman, not always, but 'as a rule'.
[1962, p.422]
3. When Heidegger assesses the "hermeneutic situation" and
the methodological character of the Dasein analytic in
Division II of Being and Time , he makes the following
remarks
:
If, in the ontology of Dasein, we 'take our
departure' from a worldless "I" in order to
provide this "I" with an Object and an
ontologically baseless relation to that Object,
then we have 'presupposed' not too much, but too
little. If we make a problem of 'life', and then
just occasionally have regard for death too, our
view is too short-sighted . The object we have
taken as our theme is artificially and
dogmatically curtailed if 'in the first instance'
we restrict ourselves to a 'theoretical subject'
,
in order that we may then round it out 'on the
practical side' by tacking on an 'ethic'.
[1962, pp. 363-64]
Heidegger has tried to exhibit the "authentic totality" of
Dasein in anticipatory resoluteness; he sees the work of
Being and Time as a "primordial analytic of Dasein" ; he
attempts to break out of the traditional divisions between
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subject and object, theory and practice. He therefore
rejects the demand for normative ethics in favor of
exhibiting the existential conditions for the possibility of
morality.
4. Particularly good examples of this treatment of Being
with Others occur in Heidegger's discussion of temporality
and our concern with time:
"As being with Others, it [Dasein] maintains
itself in an average way of interpreting—a way
which has been Articulated in discourse and
expressed in language." [1962, p.458]
"As something disclosed, Dasein exists tactically
in the way of Being with Others. It maintains
itself in an intelligibility which is public and
average." [1962, p.463]
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CHAPTER III
HEIDEGGERIAN ETHICS
Heidegger ' s fundamental analysis of Dasein in Being and
Time provides a fresh approach to an understanding of human
existence, an approach that attempts to break away from the
metaphysical presuppositions that underlie much of Western
philosophy. The Dasein analytic undermines the subject-
object dichotomy, undermines the Cartesian view of the self
and the distance between self and other, and undermines the
primacy of the knowing relation to the world. With the
deconstruction of these metaphysical presuppositions,
Heidegger's work also undermines much of modern ethical
theory and leads subsequent thinkers to consider the
possibility of a post-metaphysical ethics. Heidegger's
comments on ethics in the "Letter on Humanism" emphasize his
concern to overcome metaphysical subjectivism and his
insistence on the priority of the thought of Being. His
refusal to produce an ethics is in part a rejection of
metaphysical categories and everyday understanding in favor
of a rigorous pursuit of truth through questioning. But
Heidegger also rejects the desire for rules that say how one
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ought to live because he wants to break with the traditional
division between theory and practice. Thinking the truth of
Being is neither theoretical nor practical; and for
Heidegger
,
the thought of Being takes precedence over the
demand for practical directives.
Thus although the problem of ethics is raised in the
"Letter on Humanism" and the desire for practical directives
is acknowledged there, Heidegger does not offer any further
explicit thoughts on the relation of ontology to ethics or
the possibility of an "original ethics" directed by the
truth of Being. There have been many subsequent comments on
Heidegger's failure to provide an ethics and a variety of
attempts to construct some form of ethics that is based on
Heideggerian ontology. This chapter will briefly survey
some of those developments before turning to a more detailed
discussion of the work of Werner Marx who recognizes that
questions of ethics are problematic and yet begins with
Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in order to "think further"
to possibilities of experience that might provide the
foundation for a nonmetaphysical ethics.
A. Ontology as the Foundation of Ethics
Norman Swazo is one interpreter of Heidegger who claims
that Heidegger only began the preliminary work that is
needed before we attempt to formulate practical ethical or
political directives. Against the claim that Heidegger's
failure to provide a political or ethical program is a
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fundamental limitation of his work, Swazo argues that the
question concerning the meaning of Being as such is more
fundamental than questions of ethics and politics, that
Heidegger considered the domain of ethics and politics and
the relation of ontology to ethics and politics to be
problematic, and therefore, that it would be inappropriate
to simply produce a concrete ethical or political program.
Appealing to Heidegger's remarks in the "Letter on
Humanism", Swazo says, "We must ask: What is 'ethics'?
What is 'politics'?—and do so in the light of Heidegger's
Dasein analytic" [1987, p. 8]. We must set aside the demands
for an ethical or political program and first see that the
questions of ethics and politics are in need of a more
fundamental interpretation. According to Swazo, without
this sort of preliminary work, it is impossible to produce a
Heideggerian ethics or politics.
Charles Sherover agrees that Heidegger did not develop
a moral philosophy because he saw the need to concentrate on
the project of thinking the foundational "truth of Being."
But Sherover argues that fundamental ontology provides the
foundation for a moral philosophy and that Being and Time
can therefore be read as a propaedeutic to ethics. Sherover
appeals to passages in Being and Time that refer to the
possibility of morality as it depends on the fundamental
structures of human existence. For example, he notes that
in Heidegger's analysis of guilt, "moral obligation only
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becomes possible on the ground of a primordial capacity for
taking on guilt or responsibility" [ 1981
,
p . 226 ] . Sherover
discusses the importance of anticipatory resoluteness as the
capacity to make oneself responsible for the free
development of oneself and Others. And he notes that "the
call of conscience calls me to particular judgement,
particular decision, in particular specific situations.
Resoluteness consists and manifests itself as specific
choosing" [ 1981 ,p. 226 ]
.
Sherover also finds support for his view in themes that
run throughout Being and Time . He claims that Heidegger
builds on the fundamental Kantian distinction between
persons and things, making a distinction between
circumspective concern and solicitude, for example, and
asserting the importance of individuality, freedom, and
choice as part of the Being of Dasein. Furthermore,
Sherover claims that Heidegger's analysis of temporality
reveals the fundamental ontological ground for the exercise
of practical human reason:
Our essential temporality enables us to choose and
realize specific possibilities as the "ought" or
the "should" which impels us to decision and
action. This temporalizing nature enables us to
reach into the future as presented by
possibilities discerned as present, retrieve the
relevant past, and thus construct the living
present in which we choose, decide, and act.
[1981, p.229]
Thus Sherover argues, if we re-examine Heidegger's early
writings from the perspective of moral reason, we see that
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Heidegger sought to ground the exercise of practical
reasoning in the existential structure of the human being.
But Sherover is critical of Heidegger's failure to
acknowledge the functioning of an evaluative structure as a
fundamental part of coherent experience. He argues that
evaluative principles define the individual, guide all of
one's practical reasoning, and thus "constitute one's
principle of individuation" [ 1981 ,p. 231 ] . He argues further
that "judgmental activity is constitutive of the self as it
interprets its world to itself" and that "such judgmental
activity is primarily directed to one's relations with
others" [ 1981 ,p. 232 ] . And here again, although Heidegger
asserts the ontological priority of Being-with, Sherover
argues that he fails to develop the sociality of the person.
He says of this, "Such lack of development is seriously
subversive of the project that is Being and Time "
[ 1981 ,p. 232 ] . Sherover claims that we must develop a social
ontology in order to produce a meaningful ethic for this
technological age.
Sherover makes brief and relatively vague suggestions
regarding the development of an existential ethic from the
phenomena of resoluteness and Being-guilty. He speaks of
the responsible exercise of freedom and a notion of
stewardship as the "moral counterpart" of Heidegger's
"ontological concept of care." And finally, he suggests
that a founded existential ethic would "honor our own
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historicity by retrieving and appropriating the best of the
tradition of moral philosophy" [ 1981 ,p. 234 ]
.
Sherover quotes from the "Letter on Humanism" to show
that Heidegger acknowledged the need for a founded ethic
leaving the task to others. But Sherover ignores the idea
that ethics is made problematic by Heidegger in that same
Letter, that metaphysics has also shaped the tradition of
moral philosophy which Sherover would borrow from, and that
we are in danger of reinstating metaphysics if we simply
fill out a traditional framework of ethical theory with the
language of freedom, responsibility, and authenticity
derived from Being and Time .
Douglas Kellner also argues that ontology provides a
foundation for ethics; but he has taken a slightly different
approach to the problem of ethics, arguing that Heidegger's
analyses are a critical challenge to contemporary ethical
theory. In particular, Kellner argues that the distinction
between descriptive and evaluative statements and the
distinction between fact and value are put in question by
Heidegger's work. Despite Heidegger's claim that he is
doing pure ontology and that the distinction between
authenticity and inauthenticity has no evaluative aspects,
Kellner argues that "his [Heidegger's] concepts do have an
evaluative connotation if one takes them in their ordinary
signification, or their philosophical usages..."
[ 1984 ,p. 161 ] . Kellner claims that the discussion of
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authentic and inauthentic existence contains both evaluative
and descriptive dimensions, that the distinction between
authenticity and inauthenticity serves the same function as
traditional ethical language, and therefore "that Heidegger
offers a new type of evaluative language that is grounded in
descriptive ontology" [ 1984 ,p. 162 ]
.
Kellner reviews Heidegger's discussion of authenticity
in order to claim,
Our interpretation suggests that Heidegger's
concept of authenticity yields notions of self-
determination, autonomy, responsibility,
commitment, loyalty, and a concept of the
authentic self ... .Moreover
,
one could argue that
Heidegger's distinction between an authentic and
inauthentic existence also provides an ontological
grounding of some of the fundamental concepts of
ethics. [ 1984 ,p. 166
J
1
But Kellner is not willing to simply reinstate traditional
normative ethical theory. Rather, he argues that ontology
is the foundation of ethics and that "the presuppositions of
ethics must be analyzed, grounded, and delimited in an
ontological analysis" [ 1984
,
p . 167 ] . According to Kellner,
What is at stake is the question of the
conditions of the possibility of ethics. Before,
on this analysis, one can define such concepts as
"good," "guilt," "responsible," and so on, one
should be clear as to the conditions of the
possibility of being-good, being-guilty, being-
responsible .. .This type of questioning, if
developed, would, I believe, lead to a powerful
critique of existing ethical theory. Moreover, I
believe that these considerations also illuminate
Heidegger's own position in regard to ethics. For
his seeming rejection of ethical analysis as a
separate, specialized mode of inquiry is an
implicit critique of the fragmentation of
philosophical analysis that considers questions of
the good, right, or ought without having
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adequately secured a conceptual understanding ofhuman being. [1984, p. 168]
Kellner goes on to suggest that if ontology is the
foundation of ethics, then "the ought must be shown to be
grounded in the is," that Heidegger's analyses serve as a
critical challenge to the concept of moral law and the
concept of "ought" as a universally valid, binding,
obligatory imperative, and that Heidegger thereby puts into
question both Kantian morality and Hegelian social ethics.
Thus Kellner concludes, Heidegger provides strong
philosophical objections against traditional ethical
theories while at the same time, "he lays at least the
foundation for a new type of ethical theory grounded in a
well-secured philosophical anthropology..." [ 1984 ,p. 173 ]
.
John Caputo is another interpreter of Heidegger who
agrees with Kellner that Being and Time supplies a critique
of metaphysical ethics. Caputo argues that there is no
"ethics" in Being and Time because Heidegger objects to the
ethics of subjectivity, the ethics that begins with an
isolated ego and then asks how that ego can make necessary
connections to the world and other persons. Caputo says,
In just the same way that Heidegger wants to
undercut modern epistemology and return Dasein to
its primordial ontological bond with the world, so
also he undercuts modern moral theory and returns
Dasein to its primordial engagement with the
concrete world of historical action. Heidegger's
objections to ethics are primarily objections to
metaphysical ethics, to the ethics of rules, to
the foundationalist project, to the fact-value
distinction. [1989, p. 55]
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If we acknowledge the primordial connections between Dasein
and Others and between Dasein and the world, then there is
no isolated moral subject and there is no need to construct
a table of values to supplement the truth of Being.
According to Caputo, in place of an ethics of values,
Heidegger suggests a deeper thinking, an "originary ethos?"
and his talk about the truth of Being "constitutes a more
radical, originary ethical discourse" [ 1987 ,pp. 236-7 ] . This
originary thinking attempts to discern what one's ethos
demands; and this includes the particular way a historical
people "dwells," their understanding of the world and of
themselves, their art and science, and the political,
economic, and social structures within which they live their
lives. According to Caputo,
Originary ethics is an important delimitation of
value theory which stands value theory on its
head. Directives are issued by Being itself, not
man, whose task is to become responsive to the
nomos sent his way, not to be a legislator of
universal imperatives. [1987, p.237]
But this reversal of value theory is only a first step
on the way to postmetaphysical ethics. Caputo claims that
Heidegger's originary ethics is only an eschatological
version of metaphysics; it looks back to the early Greeks,
tells a story of the primordial ethos prior to the subject-
object split, and then "looks ahead to a new dawn, which is
to be an eschatological repetition and renewal..."
[ 1987 ,p. 237 ] . This eschatological ethics waits for a
transformation, a coming together in the bonds of a
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primordial ethical community where nomos is the dispensation
of Being. But no individual effort can achieve the hoped-
for salvation. And furthermore, Caputo argues,
The truth of Being is that there are many truths
of Being. And, if the truth of Being means the
primordial ethos
,
then in the end there is no
primordial ethos but only the manifold sense of
ethos, the array of historical differences.
[1987, p.238]
According to Caputo ' s argument, there is no fixed point of
reference, no higher plane, no revealed law, no privileged
ethos . There can be no solid ground for ethics, no new
table of values, but only the realization that there is only
flux. Caputo claims that we must accept a transformed
relationship to action,
We act not with the security of metaphysical
foundations but with a raised awareness of the
insecurity to which we are exposed. .. .We act, but
we understand that we are not situated safely
above the flux, that we have not secured any
transcendental high ground, that we do not have a
view of the whole.... We act with fear and
trembling... [1987, p.239]
Caputo is therefore critical of Heidegger's celebration of
ancient thinking, his hope for a renewal of an ancient
"original solidarity." Caputo claims.
Deprived of any primordial, uncontaminated mode of
dwelling, every epoch is equally a mode of
withdrawal, finitized by its very structure as an
"epoch." Every epoch is but a particular way we
are granted to be and to dwell... none can be
privileged. Each has its own hazards.
[1987, p.249]
If every epoch is marked by both the disclosing and the
withdrawal of the truth of Being, if every epoch witnesses
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both "the malice of rage" and "the holy" in the clearing of
Being, then no ethos is innocent. Caputo claims that there
are no ahistorical norms, that "an ethic is an essentially
historic affair," and that "it belongs to each historical
people, to each epoch and culture, to sort things out for
itself and to reach an articulation of Being and ethos which
meets its needs" [ 1987
,
p . 256 ] . Attunement to Being will not
disclose universal and unconditional ethical principles;
thinking the truth of Being will not grant transcendent
directives for action; and each historical epoch must
therefore determine its own contingent principles of action.
Drawing on the work of Derrida and Foucault, Caputo
calls for a radical liberation from metaphysical principles
and "eschatological dreaming." He calls for an "ethics of
dissemination" that includes both humility and compassion, a
humility that recognizes the inadequacy and contingency of
all action in the midst of flux, and a compassion that
recognizes a common fate. He says,
And so I envisage, as the moral upshot of all
this, a "community of mortals," bound together by
their common fears and lack of metaphysical
grounds ... Compassion is the sense of togetherness
which mortals share who understand the finitude of
the cut they make into things. [1987, p.259]
Along with these virtues, Caputo claims that an ethics of
dissemination requires the dissemination of difference, an
effort to keep open as many possibilities as we can, an
effort to permit "the free assembly of diverse points of
view" and to provide for "the conditions of a free and
55
nonmanipulated public debate" [1987, p. 261] . He claims that
the ethics of dissemination is also an ethics of
Gelassenheit which means an ethics of letting be, "of
letting gods and mortals
,
earth and sky be and be in play"
[ 1987
,
p . 264 ] . Caputo makes use of Heidegger's reference to
Gelassenheit as "openness to the mystery," but Caputo
insists that an ethics of Gelassenheit is an openness to the
mystery of Others, "the sense of respect or reverence the
other commands" [ 1987 ,p. 267
]
. Caputo concludes that we must
radicalize Heidegger's thought of Gelassenheit, of letting
be:
Heidegger tends to be more interested in letting
jugs and bridges and Greek temples be, and to let
it go at that, and never quite gets around to
talking about letting others be, about our being-
with others as mortals.... I do not think there is
anything in what he says that excludes his doing
this. He just never gets around to it. But we
can do it for him and in so doing restore to
Gelassenheit its ethical punch... [ 1989 ,pp. 61-2
]
Thus, Caputo argues, the possibility of postmetaphysical
ethics rests on Heidegger's deconstruction of value
thinking. But we must extend and radicalize Heidegger's
critique of metaphysical ethics? we must refuse the
nostalgia and hope that accompany Heidegger's talk of
originary ethics and the truth of Being. We must instead
disseminate difference, liberate those who are marginalized,
refuse all strategies, schemes and masterplans, and act
locally rather than globally.
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Whereas John Caputo moves in the direction of Derrida
and Foucault in his attempt to develop a postmetaphysical
ethics, Werner Marx provides a systematic attempt to
articulate a nonmetaphysical ethics that remains
Heideggerian. Whereas Caputo denies that there can be any
measure or fixed point of reference for judging responsible
action, Marx insists that the concept of "measure" is the
ultimate determinant of ethics and that the central concerns
of ethics must be what measure we use to determine what is
good and evil and what provides us with a motivation for
preferring good to evil. Marx therefore takes up the task
of providing a new articulation of the essence of measure
and a new foundation for an ethics concerned with one's
fellow human beings; and he begins with the work of
Heidegger, insisting that we must take up determinations
developed by the later Heidegger and critically think them
further
.
B. Werner Marx: Measures for Responsible Action
According to Marx, although "heavenly beings" may still
provide both a measure and motives for the faithful, our
pluralistic and predominantly secular age needs a measure
that is not dependent on any divine standard or religious
doctrine, a nonmetaphysical measure for responsible action.
This raises the immediate problem of what constitutes a
measure, and Marx explores both the onto-theological
tradition and the contemporary secularized understanding of
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measure in order to suggest that these must make way for a
different comprehension of measure. Marx uses Schelling to
outline the essential traits of a measure according to the
onto-theological view:
A measure is a "normative standard" that as such
contains the demand of an "ought." As something
already valid prior to any derivation of measure,
its mode of Being is one of "transcendence." At
the same time, it has the "power" to determine man
"immanently , " and herein lies the decisive
significance of a measure, its "binding
obligation." It also has the power to endure as
"self-same" in various situations and thus has the
traits of being "manifest" and "univocal."
[1987, p. 20]
Secularized normative standards are borrowed from this onto-
theological tradition and include the Judeo-Christian
prescriptions for love of neighbor, compassion, and justice.
But these secular standards lack the legitimation derived
from belief in a divine creator, and traditional
foundational thinking has not succeeded in supplying any
adequate legitimation. These secularized measures have
therefore lost their effectiveness and fallen into ruin.
But Marx suggests.
For anyone engaging in philosophy "between the
tradition and an other beginning," the question,
then, is whether it is not the task of philosophy
to proceed beyond these ruinous determinations of
measure according to the traditional view. We
must ask whether there might not be another kind
of thinking than traditional foundational thought,
whether there might not be a different kind of
thinking—an "other thinking"—that has already
been able to conceive of a different sort of
measure with different essential traits. Even if
this has not yet come about, then we must still
ask whether we cannot bring to light the issue
with which this line of thought is concerned and
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then try to "think further" in this direction
[ 1987 ,pp. 22-3
]
And so Marx turns to the thinker who attempted to overcome
the metaphysics of reason and light, the thinker who saw the
need for a different kind of thinking, Martin Heidegger.
Even though Heidegger refused to develop an "ethics," he is
the contemporary thinker who has most radically tried to
free himself from the metaphysical presuppositions on which
traditional conceptions of ethics rest.
Marx is looking for a foundation for "man's measure" in
an experience here on earth, and thus he confronts
Heidegger's thinking with the ethical question, "Is there a
measure on earth?" [1987,p.3]. Marx notes that Heidegger
never raised the question of measure in his early writings,
that he refused to supply directives for action, and that
his thinking was intended to be a radical departure from
traditional values. Nevertheless, Marx insists that
Heidegger's thinking can be thought further to possibilities
of experience that lead back to these values, possibilities
of experience that could provide a measure for orientation
for responsible action.
Marx is sharply critical of any attempt to solve the
problem of ethics with the notion of an attunement to the
self-giving of Being derived from Heidegger's "Letter on
Humanism." Marx reminds us that Being conceals itself, that
with the self-giving of Being there is also withdrawal and
mystery, and that every disclosure involves errancy. Given
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that errancy belongs essentially to Dasein, one could not
speak of guilt, accountability, or responsibility if the
measure for action was simply an attunement to Being. The
"truth of Being" cannot serve as a measure for responsible
action because, according to Marx,
...one could not discern whether or not and to
what extent the particular "assignments"
[ Zuweisungen] that are to be the "laws" and
"rules" for those who have found their "abode in
the truth of Being," are still permeated by the
"mystery" and "errancy" that belong to truth.
[1987, p. 39]
Marx acknowledges that Heidegger may have articulated a
measure that the poet takes "for the construction of poetic
dwelling" but Marx argues that in his later writings,
Heidegger did not even inquire into a measure for
responsible action. However, according to Marx, Heidegger
did describe an experience, the experience of mortality,
that could be thought further to provide such a measure.
The experience of mortality cannot simply be drawn from
the analysis of Being-towards-death in Being and Time ;
instead, Marx relies on the references to death in the later
Heidegger where death is considered to be a "power" that
determines us throughout our lives. According to Marx's
interpretation, we can experience ourselves as being mortal
if we are knowingly "capable of death as death" [ 1987 , p. 47],
Marx is concerned with the human attunement in relationship
with death, and he argues that anxiety is not the
appropriate characterization for the attunement of mortals.
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The efficacy of death, as described in the later Heidegger,
induces an attunement of dread:
Death unsettles, dis-places mortals from their
accustomed habits and relationships with things.
Above all, however, it wrests them from their
everyday way of "Being-with-others . " . . .The
attunement that corresponds to this unsettling
power of death is that of veritable "dread,"
horror, or even desperation. [ 1987, p. 51]
And Marx claims that this dread may "set one on a path" that
allows one to overcome dread, converting the attunement of
mortality into a "healing force." Concretely, this
transformation involves a change in our Being-with Others
from a mode of indifference into a Being-together-with-one-
another. According to Marx,
The task is, then, to show the steps involved in
this development. In this path of experience, I
see the foundation for a nonmetaphysical ethics
that Heidegger himself did not think
through. . . .only the possibility of such a path can
be demonstrated; but even if most people avoid
facing this possibility, it is nevertheless one
that represents the "truth" of human Being and can
thus serve as the foundation for a nonmetaphysical
ethics concerned with one's fellow man.
[1987, p. 53]
Marx provides a phenomenological description of this
path from unsettling dread to the healing force. He claims
that the human being lives in complete indifference to
mortality and that the attunement of indifference marks the
human relationship to oneself and to Others. But according
to Marx,
In a moment of "sudden insight," the meaning of
the statement "I am constantly dying" becomes
clear. It is this "intuition" that has such an
immediately "unsettling" effect....! become aware
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in a more radical way that death, which extendsinto my very Being [Casein], continually
undermines, subverts my efforts to produce,
sustain, and promote life, only to thwart them
completely in the end. I experience myself asbeing on the way to certain "disaster" [ Unheil ]
;
and, above all, I experience myself as thrust back
upon myself alone. I must face this impending
disaster all by myself. The shock trembling
through me dissolves my consciousness into utter
helplessness. [1987, p. 54]
This is the attunement, the unsettling dread, that replaces
indifference. Through this experience of distress, Marx
claims. Others emerge from the background of beings merely
present-at-hand and become those to whom I turn for help.
In a gradual transformation. Others may become my "fellow
men," and we may escape indifference and "become mortals."
Gradually, Others may show themselves as beings subject to
the same fate of being mortal and just as much in need of
help in their own distress. Marx says,
They are also mortals delivered unto the
unsettling force of dread. This means that they
are no longer strangers but are rather "comrades"
in the sense of those who share my fate and who in
turn need me as a comrade. Moreover, it means
that they even have a right to expect that I
accept responsibility for them and that I intend
to act responsibly. . . .My slowly awakening and
constantly increasing attunement is now one of
solidarity .... I feel increasingly that these
comrades are friends and assume a similar
development on their part, as I feel that I am
accepted by them as a friend with the same
inclinations. Thus, the form of intersubjectivity
that is thoroughly in accord with indifference may
gradually give way to a thou-community of friends
who accept responsibility for each other, a
relationship in which each person stands for the
other and puts himself in the other's place.
[1987, p. 55]
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Marx includes a reminder that this path of transformation is
only a possibility. We cannot prove the necessity of this
path as metaphysical thinking demands. In fact, Marx
claims, "Often, perhaps even in most cases, one relapses
into the old manner of relating to oneself and Being-with-
others in which indifference predominates. The
transformation was not profound enough" [1987, p. 55]. But
Marx claims it is sufficient to show the possibility of this
path from unsettling dread to the healing of those who dwell
in a community of thous.
Because such a transformation may be temporary, Marx
insists that dwelling within the healing force must take a
concrete form; the transformation must be stabilized in
lasting character traits. Marx claims,
The healing force can thus have taken on a form
that resembles what the tradition has called love,
compassion, and recognition of others, for
instance. These forms of the healing power, then,
would have become measures for one who intends to
act responsibly, measures that underlie his whole
Being and therefore do not confront him as demands
or duties. Such a person would have already
traversed the pathway that has led him to the
attunement of a fraternal "thou." [ 1987, p. 56]
Marx goes on to claim that the healing force is different
from the experience of anxiety as it is described in Being
and Time . The healing force must be experienced as a gift
bestowed on mortals rather than something one attains by
oneself. Whereas anxiety was an isolating and individuating
experience, the healing force gives a nearness that brings
human beings closer to each other in solidarity. And the
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healing force develops into the forms of love, compassion,
recognition of Others which give a measure to the way we
conduct ourselves with our fellow mortals.
This measure is not like a normative standard
confronting the human being; it is not objective and it is
not transcendent. Rather, according to Marx's
characterization, "he who takes measure 'dwells' in the
measure, it embraces him and determines him..." [ 1987, p. 59].
The healing force involves a change in one's character; to
dwell in the measure means that this measure becomes a part
of one's Being so that one is not confronted by a
transcendent standard. And yet, Marx argues that some of
the traditional traits of a measure are still valid. The
healing force and its measures are unconditional, manifest
and univocal, selfsame and binding in every situation. The
healing force and its measures are binding because they are
part of one's transformed Being. According to Marx,
The healing force and its measures are, as
measures, "absolute." For one who loves, who is
compassionate and is capable of recognizing
others, the other is unconditionally and
immediately someone who is beloved, who arouses
his compassion, to whom he grants recognition.
The decisive characteristic of this
nonmetaphysically conceived measure lies in its
absoluteness, in the fact that it no longer has
"transcendence" and "immanence" as its forms of
Being, in its power to bind all in each and every
case, in its obligatory character ... and the
essential trait of self-sameness lies in the fact
that this obligation binds the one who loves, is
compassionate, and grants others recognition, in
each and every situation. For one who "dwells" in
these measures, they are immediately evident.
[1987, pp. 59-60]
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Thus Marx concludes that love, compassion, and recognition
of Others are forms of nonmetaphysical measures for
orienting one's conduct, measures that can be experienced
and, in this sense, measures that exist on earth.
It is important to note that the determinations of good
and evil are also altered in the light of these
nonmetaphysical measures. According to Marx, in the onto-
theological tradition, human beings take their measures from
God and therefore good corresponds to the will of divine
love, evil is the act of a particular will in defiance of
the divine order, and humans are moved to prefer good on the
grounds that "every creature must serve the coming of the
end of the history of salvation" [1987, p. 65]. But if the
meaning of good is no longer determined by religious
doctrines, then it must be oriented on the healing force and
the measures of love, compassion, and mutual human
recognition. Marx claims.
If the good is taken to be order and evil to be
disorder, then they must derive their meaning
directly from these measures .... If a compassionate
person wants to be able to justify himself with
regard to some previous action, then he must give
an account of whether the "order" attained was
truly good because it proceeded from compassion or
whether it was actually ruthless and therefore
evil. He will want to confirm himself in the fact
that his motive for preferring good to evil was
the measure of compassion within which he dwells.
[1987, p. 68]
Marx concludes that those who experience the healing force
are transformed into loving and compassionate persons who
grant recognition to Others. Mortals learn to dwell in
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these measures
,
and it is in light of these measures that
they can distinguish between good and evil and find a
motivation for preferring good. 2
But in order to support his claim that the traditional
binding characteristics of a measure are still valid, Marx
must show that these measures have their own "sphere" beyond
the occurrence of truth and therefore free from concealment
and errancy. As Marx has already indicated, the sphere of
Being (the sphere of truth) has an aletheia structure; this
means that responding to the claim of Being and disclosing
the truth of Being always entail concealment and errancy.
But in a detailed discussion of Heidegger's later writings,
Marx describes Heidegger's efforts to surmount subjectivism
by "projecting a dimension that cannot be characterized in
terms of its relationship to us," a dimension he named the
"open that surrounds us" and the "region of all regions"
[ 1987 ,pp. 74-5 ] . Marx interprets this region as distinct
from the clearing of Being and the occurrence of truth
described in the "Letter on Humanism." He insists that the
open region is a dimension in itself, a dimension "over
which man's essence has no power" [ 1987, p. 92]. Marx argues
that in Heidegger's final essays, he alters his view of
aletheia so that "lethe" no longer implies a concealing and
withdrawal but rather signifies the "heart" of aletheia as a
keeping and preserving. Furthermore, Marx claims that death
is this lethe at the heart of aletheia and that death has
66
its sphere in the openness of the region of all regions.
According to Marx,
The region of all regions, the free expanse and
abiding as the "free area of clearing" would then
be the enduring sphere of the measure, the sphere
in which man does not stand out into Being, as he
does for Heidegger, but rather into the lethe that
is part of aletheia, into death. It is in and
through this standing out into death that man
becomes a "mortal" ... Death provides the measure
with regard to man. It makes mortals open to
their mortality and thus to the experience of the
measure in the attunement that shows itself as the
"result of the path" upon which man finds his way
from the attunement of unsettling dread to that of
the "healing force." [1987, p. 97]
And Marx insists that this region of all regions must be the
sphere for the healing force so that its forms, love,
compassion and recognition of one's fellow mortals, cannot
be considered emotional processes within the subject.
But this claim involves a significant departure from
Heidegger's view of death and the relation between Being and
Nothing. Marx claims that death is "the form in which
Nothing confronts man" [ 1987 ,p. 107 ] . He argues, based on
the later Heidegger, that death is the "shrine" of Nothing
and the "shelter" of Being. But going beyond Heidegger,
Marx claims that death has an other essence than Nothing and
Being, that "death is a power in its own right"
[ 1987 ,p. 108 ] . As the lethe at the heart of aletheia, death
grants unconcealedness to Nothing and to Being; but at the
same time, death grants to both the character of mystery.
Thus Marx claims,
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We thus think Heidegger's determination of
death further, so that death both grants Nothing
and Being the possibility of disclosure,
manifestness, as well as lending them the
character of a "mystery. ,, It is thus a third
force over against Being as well as the nihilating
Nothing ... .As a third force, death "is" as the
distinction; that is, it "is" as something that
separates nihilating Nothing and Being. It cannot
be emphasized strongly enough that we are thereby
departing from Heidegger's position, according to
which "Nothing occurs in Being itself" or "Being
nihilates—as Being." [1987, p. 110]
Death makes a distinction between what is and what is not,
and Dasein experiences this difference in the face of death.
In the region of all regions, standing out into death,
Dasein experiences the nihilating Nothing as "the calamity
that unsettles everything meaningful
,
in the attunement of
unsettling dread;" but Dasein also experiences the healing
force in the "supreme manifestness" of Being [ 1987 ,p. 110 ]
.
Human beings are mortals because they can die, because
to be capable of death is part of the essence of human
Being. And this interpretation of death as a power in
itself, as the lethe at the heart of aletheia, as that which
makes the distinction between what is and what is not—this
interpretation allows Marx to claim,
...man's essence does not lie in his standing out
"into the clearing," the aletheia of Being. It
lies rather in his standing out into the lethe
that belongs to aletheia, into death . .. .As we have
shown, this means first of all that man
experiences death as the power that gives
standards insofar as it is a distinction that
grants to the essentially unfolding Nothing and
Being the unconcealedness, the manifestness in
which they emerge. Second, it means that man
experiences death as the power that gives the
essentially unfolding Nothing and Being the
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character of a mystery
. Only when human beings
have experienced this power in death in the
twofold directions that give measure can they
"become" mortals. [ 1987, p. 112]
n°tes that this interpretation of the human relation to
death is completely different from Heidegger's position in
Being and Time. Death is not simply the end of life, nor is
death understood as one's "ownmost possibility," as that
which individualizes Dasein when it anticipates death.
Rather the relationship of Dasein and death is inverted so
that death is the power that sets standards for Dasein.
According to Marx,
What is so completely other in the meaning of
death lies in the fact that, on the basis of this
inversion, death must be conceived of as an
occurrence to which man owes his "essence." The
role that death is thus given according to our
interpretation is admittedly enormous, for if
death is what grants disclosedness
,
manifestness,
then it is because of death that man is as man,
for without death there would not be the
"determinations" that appear to human experience
only within this manifestness and provide the
basis for all understanding and speaking.
[1987, p. 115]
Thus, Marx concludes that death belongs to another
dimension, is something other than Being or Nothing, and
therefore that death has its own sphere that is separate
from the occurrence of Being and the occurrence of truth.
He says of this,
. . .we discovered that what is "lacking" in
Heidegger's entire project is that there is
neither a "sphere" free from concealment, errancy,
withdrawal, and danger, nor did Heidegger conceive
of the measures that would reign in such a sphere.
We have thought further the "region of all
regions" as such a "sphere" in which a measure
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holds and we have called this measure the "healing
force," a term we also applied to its exemplary
forms of love, compassion, and mutual human
recognition. [1987,p.ll6]
It is not the transforming anticipation of death, but the
transforming awareness of one's mortality that moves Dasein
out of the attunement of indifference, through unsettling
dread, and into what Marx calls the attunement of gratitude.
It is the experience of dread that provokes a transformation
of the essence of Dasein and it is the experience of the
healing force that gradually changes one's relationship to
oneself, to Others, and to the things around one.
In the end, Marx seems to offer only a renewal of
Judeo-Christian ethics, the ethics of neighborly love, with
the measure for responsible action derived from awareness of
shared mortality rather than belief in divine order or
divine law. Instead of brotherly love, Marx substitutes
solidarity among comrades. Instead of a divine exemplar,
Marx simply refers to "exemplary" love, compassion, and
recognition of Others. And instead of religious conversion,
Marx offers the salvation of the healing force. He seeks an
experience on earth that can serve as a measure for
responsible action, but he acknowledges that the experience
of the healing force and the attunement of gratitude can
succeed in overcoming indifference only if "a person has
truly experienced within himself the transformation as a
specific development" [ 1987, p. 62]. He says of this,
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The objection that most people will reject this
experience and hence will not accept the measure I
am delineating cannot prevent us from exhibiting
the existence of this possibility
,
for here we aredealing with an experience and with measures that
are founded in the essence of human Being as
such .... Likewise
,
in Judeo—Christian ethics an
"original experience" serves as a basis for those
few who have been granted divine grace, and yet
this ethics has had a tremendous effect on those
who are not able to bring about this original
experience by themselves. [ 1987 ,pp. 6-7
]
As a partial answer to this objection, Marx argues that
modern developments point to the need for such a
transformation. For example, the threat of nuclear war and
other perils of modern technology have caused people to come
together as comrades in the struggle to preserve themselves
and the natural world. Marx claims that the development of
a community of thous is already evident in these struggles
and that even though the transformation from indifference to
solidarity must be experienced by individuals, at least part
of the transformation might be achieved collectively. He
says of this.
We have already admitted that, because it is
difficult to face the truth of our Being, some
people tend to flee an insight into their
mortality and thus rule out the possibility that
they might set out on this path. However, it does
seem possible to traverse at least part of this
path "collectively" with a group that has a common
goal; however, if the path has not been
internalized through one's own experience of
mortality, it would not have the effect of
changing one's character. It could well lead to
utopias or to changes in social institutions, but
certainly such changes would be desirable only if
they could be attained without violence and with
the broadest possible consensus in a democratic
society governed by just laws. [ 1987, p. 63]
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Since there is no necessity in the path of transformation
from indifference to solidarity and since it is always
possible for individuals to revert to indifference, ethics
might simply become a matter of rights and duties within an
organized community.
But this talk of collective transformation raises
critical questions for Marx's view. Is morality adequately
characterized by terms like solidarity and community? Does
the path of transformation from indifference to compassion
and recognition provide an adequate understanding of human
relationships? The solidarity Marx speaks of is the result
of individual isolation, dread, and need. The recognition
of Others is only the recognition that Others are like
myself, also in need. The establishment of solidarity
relies on the identification of my own well-being as
dependent on the aid of Others and an extrapolation from my
need and dependency to the needs of Others and the
interdependency of my fellow mortals. But have I recognized
the Other as truly other than myself? Have I recognized
differences or unique needs? The maintenance of solidarity
depends on a transformation of character, recognition of
common goals, and the creation of a community. But are my
responsible actions limited to achieving common goals,
making a unified effort, working with Others to meet mutual
needs?
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Among the interpreters of Heidegger considered here,
Werner Marx is the one who remains most Heideggerian in his
attempt to develop a nonmetaphysical ethics. But even Marx
has acknowledged that Heidegger's entire project lacks any
consideration of some measure for responsible action. In
fact, Marx must make a radical departure from Heidegger in
order to describe a "sphere" for such a measure. Marx must
reinterpret aletheia, reinterpret the relation between Being
and Nothing, and set death up as a power in itself,
independent from the errancy of Dasein and the concealing
withdrawal of Being and truth, in order to describe the
possibility of an ethical measure.
Emmanuel Levinas is also an interpreter of Heidegger.
Like Marx, Levinas sees the urgency and centrality of the
need for ethics. Like Marx, Levinas sees the lack, even the
impossibility of ethics, in Heidegger's thinking. But
Levinas sees the further lack of an adequate analysis of
human relations, a lack that Marx does not rectify with his
reinterpretation of the later Heidegger. Levinas is also
concerned over the priority granted to ontology and the
question of the meaning of Being in Heidegger's work; he
insists that ethics should not be subordinated to or derived
from ontology. If no satisfactory understanding of ethics
is possible based on Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, then
Levinas suggests that perhaps Heidegger's analysis is
fundamentally flawed. And therefore, unlike Marx, Levinas
73
sees the need to begin again, to rethink the analysis of
human Being in order to explore the meaning of ethics and
thereby develop a view of ethics and ontology that is
systematically opposed to the work of Heidegger. It is
through Levinas' s critical reading of Heidegger, through the
guestions he raises about the fundamental structures of
human existence and the human relation to Being, that we can
more clearly see both the inadeguacies of Heideggerian
ethics and the pervasive influence of Heidegger on Levinas 's
own contribution to the problem of ethics.
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1. Fred Dallmayr suggests a similar view in his discussion
of authentic existence and the possibility of authentic
community. Dallmayr says,
[Heidegger's] conception of authentic existence
and co-being can (in my view) be seen as a
reformulation of the traditional notion of the
"good life" and, in particular, of the Kantian
postulate of the "kingdom of ends." in comparison
with the latter principle, Heidegger's conception
has the advantage, not only of increased "realism"
or concreteness, but also of greater moral
adequacy. Despite its anti-utilitarian intent,
the postulate to treat others as ends rather than
means still contains instrumentalist traces: in
the sense that the ego tends to function as a
means for others who, in turn, appear as values
"for me" or as "my" ends. Authentic co-being, on
the contrary, is distinguished by respect for
others in their Dasein and their "potentiality for
Being" rather than in their role as moral goals.
[1980, p.244]
2. Note that Marx rejects traditional accounts of free will
and rational freedom and instead speaks of a "free latitude"
for measuring and responding. In particular, he compares
his account to Hegel's Philosophy of Right where the idea of
freedom, ethical life, the good, and order are all
manifestations of reason. By contrast, Marx claims that the
realms of love, compassion, and mutual human recognition are
not determined by reason but by emotions. Marx says of
this
,
Whoever has been transformed by the experience of
death has become open to the appeal of another to
act in solidarity or even fraternity and to put
oneself in his place. By being wrested from their
indifference toward others and by having been
freed from their will to predominate, such persons
have become above all else "seeing persons." They
measure things in their free space with open eyes
and thus are very unlike indifferent
persons ... .The fact that such persons already
dwell in these forms of the healing force should
not be taken to mean that they are determined by
these forms as if by the compulsion of a drive.
Rather, as the poet says so rightly, they are
indeed "always aware of the right path."
[1987, p. 72]
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CHAPTER IV
EMMANUEL LEVINAS: A CRITICAL READING OF HEIDEGGER
This chapter is devoted to Levinas 's critical relation
to Heidegger, to his rejection of Heidegger's emphasis on
the question of the meaning of Being and his rethinking of
the fundamental analysis of human Being that points to
critical problems in Heidegger's Dasein analytic. The
chapter begins by exploring Heidegger's initial influence on
Levinas and the questions that quickly lead Levinas to
attack much of Heidegger's work. Levinas 's most explicit
criticisms of Heidegger are presented through two of
Levinas 's early works, Existence and Existents and Time and
the Other .
Levinas 's work cannot be understood apart from his
critical relation to Heidegger. His criticisms of Heidegger
open the space for his own original analyses of human
existence and the problem of ethics. Thus this chapter also
serves as preparation for Levinas 's fundamental inquiry into
the meaning and possibility of ethics in the works that come
after Time and the Other .
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A. Heidegger's Inspiration and Provocation
In a series of radio interviews with Philippe Nemo in
1981, Levinas refers to his first encounter with Heidegger's
Being and Time [Levinas, 1985]. Levinas spent a year in
Freiburg, from 1928-29, auditing the lectures of Edmund
Husserl and writing his own dissertation, The Theory of
Intuition—in Husser 1 ' s Phenomenology ; it was during this
stay in Germany that he discovered Being and Time . He ranks
that book as one of the finest books among four or five
others in the history of philosophy (Plato's Phaedrus .
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
,
Hegel's Phenomenology of
Mind
,
and Bergson's Time and Free Will ] . He describes
Heidegger's analyses of anxiety, care, and Being-toward-
death as "a sovereign exercise of phenomenology"; he speaks
of Being and Time as "the very model of ontology" ; he
credits Heidegger with awakening a concern over the
signification of Being as verb rather than as substantive;
and he admires Heidegger's new way of reading the history of
philosophy, a way of conversing with philosophers and thus
bringing back current teachings from the great classics.
Despite his admiration and acknowledged debt to Being
and Time . Levinas becomes increasingly critical of Heidegger
after 1932, increasingly concerned to move beyond
phenomenological ontology. Beginning with Existence and
Existents . his own philosophy is laced with both explicit
and implicit polemics against Heidegger. It is important to
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note that Levinas 's interpretation of Heidegger is itself
problematic. In his article, "Responding to Levinas," David
Boothroyd suggests that Levinas sets up a Heideggerian straw
man, refers to it as "Heidegger's ontology," and thus
develops his criticisms against his own misreading of
Heidegger [ Boothroyd , 1988 ] . Although it is beyond the scope
of this exposition to address Boothroyd 's criticisms, it is
important to see the complex connections between Levinas 's
admiration of Heidegger and his polemical attacks, between
the influence and inspiration provided by Heidegger and
Levinas 's avowed need to escape Heideggerian thinking in
order to articulate his own alternative philosophical
position.
The depth and complexity of Levinas 's criticisms of
Heidegger can be traced to several sources. The first is
pointed out by Adrian Peperzak in a survey of Levinas 's
early critical articles on Husserl and Heidegger
[Peperzak, 1983 ] . In his early essays on Husserl, notably
influenced by Heidegger, Levinas is critical of the primacy
of theory, an unquestioned preference for the contemplative
attitude, an ahistorical conception of Being, and thus a
kind of intellectualism in Husserl. 1 Levinas asks: How
does philosophy emerge from life? What are the relations
between existence and philosophizing? Is contemplation the
privileged access to reality? But in later articles,
similar objections are directed against Heidegger himself,
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against Heidegger's claim that existence is primordially a
comprehension and that Being is the light or openness by
which that comprehension is possible. Peperzak says of
this
,
The main argument of Levinas against this
position prolongs and radicalizes the objection he
made since 1930, with Heidegger, against Husserl's
identification of philosophy with the ideal of
objectifying theory: Heidegger opposes that
contemplative ideal, but he remains himself
tributary to the Western tradition by declaring
that comprehension is the fundamental Existential .
Notwithstanding his transformation of Western
ontology, the structure of Seinsverstandnis
remains that of an understanding which grasps a
particular being against a background or horizon
which has the character of generality. The
traditional explanation of knowledge as seizure,
definition, or circumscription of a universal
essence, concept, or form continues to dominate
the thought of Heidegger's ontology.
So far, so good. But why should this scheme be
rejected? Why should a philosopher refuse to
state the primacy of understanding and
comprehension?
...Levinas answers this question with the clear
statement that Heidegger's understanding of
existence and of understanding does not permit
another human being ( autrui ) to present
him/herself as he or she is. This thesis is the
centre and source of Levinas' development from the
1940s until the appearance of Totality and
Infinity in 1961. [1983, p. 124]
This central criticism of fundamental ontology is closely
linked to other problems, to the closed character and
solitude of Heidegger's Dasein, to the description of human
relationships as constituted and mediated by some common
idea or interest, and to the priority given to Being over
beings that Levinas finds in Heidegger.
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Heidegger's assertion of the priority of the
ontological and the priority of the question of the meaning
of Being as such points to a second and not unrelated source
Levinas 's critical approach to Heidegger. As Levinas
phrases it, in Time and the Other . "...it is toward a
pluralism that does not merge into unity that I should like
to make my way and, if this can be dared, break with
Parmenides" [ 1987b, p. 42 ] . According to Levinas, Parmenides
represents a tradition in Western philosophy that is
inherited by Heidegger, a tradition that asserts the unity
of Being and asserts that only thinking can reach the truth
of Being. As Bouckaert points out Levinas locates Heidegger
within the tradition of Western ontology:
The thinking subject collects all phenomena in
their unity and distinction on a horizon. It
reduces the multiplicity of the existents to a
common ground that bears everything: history,
logos, matter, the highest existent, being itself.
Since this totality is centered in the thinking
subject, Levinas calls it at times the Self, and
he speaks of Western philosophy both as a
philosophy of totality and a philosophy of the
Self. And he is convinced that Heidegger too,
although his concern was to bring about an
Ueberwindung of Western metaphysics, does not
succeed in overcoming Western ontology, but rather
realizes it in a new way ...[ 1970 ,p. 403
]
For example, in his discussion of truth as disclosedness in
Being and Time . Heidegger cites Parmenides as affirming the
connection between Dasein, disclosedness, and truth
[ 1962 , section 44]. Although Heidegger replaces static
abstract thought with disclosedness as a way of Being for
Dasein, truth as disclosedness is constitutive of Dasein,
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and we approach the meaning of Being by thinking from the
ground of Dasein. Thus according to Levinas, Heidegger
remains within the tradition begun with Parmenides because
he maintains the unity of Being and the priority of truth.
Robert Bernasconi also comments on Levinas 's desire to
break with Parmenides:
Parmenides represents for Levinas the philosophy
of the unity of being that suppresses the beyond;
both Husserl and Heidegger are to be counted among
its representatives. Whereas for Heidegger the
forgotten experience is that of being, for
Levinas—and he invests Plato's formula with an
anti-Heideggerian ring— it is that of "the good
beyond being," which he also calls "metaphysical
exteriority," "transcendence," and "infinity."
The good surpasses 'being,' 'objectifying
thought,' 'objective experience,' 'totality,' and
'history.' [1986, p. 185]
The attempt to find a pluralism in existence and to break
with Parmenides can be seen explicitly in Levinas 's analyses
of death and sexual difference. And although the
development of metaphysical exteriority, of the Good beyond
Being, is not articulated until Totality and Infinity , it is
already present behind the text of Existence and Existents .
As Levinas says in the preface to that essay:
"The Platonic formula that situates the Good
beyond Being serves as the general guideline for
this research — but does not make up its content.
It signifies that the movement which leads an
existent toward the Good is not a transcendence by
which that existent raises itself up to a higher
existence, but a departure from Being and from the
categories which describe it. .. [1978a, p. 15]
Thus in Levinas 's critical reading of Heidegger there is the
concern to make room for an alterity that is not absorbed by
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the understanding self and the concern to release ethics
from its subordination to ontology.
Finally, as Levinas has said in a brief
autobiographical essay, "Signature," the memory of the Nazi
horror is the ever-present background of his own reflections
and development [Levinas, 1978b]. It is thus important to
see how Heidegger's connection to Nazism stimulates
Levinas 's criticisms. This is not a simple rejection of
Heidegger's political mistakes? rather, Levinas rejects the
kind of thinking that could remain silent on the death
camps, silent after the fact, silent in time of peace. In a
recent article on this subject, Levinas recounts how he
learned of Heidegger's sympathy toward National Socialism;
he says he took the news with disappointment but also "with
the faint hope that it expressed only the temporary lapse of
a great speculative mind into practical banality"
[Levinas, 1989 ] . Levinas says that he found nothing in
Being and Time to indicate any political or violent motives;
nevertheless his concern over Heidegger's participation in
"Hitlerian thinking" was confirmed after the war by
Heidegger's testament in Per Spiegel . in particular, from
his silence concerning the "final solution." Levinas says
of this,
Indeed it is the "final solution," in the pure
extermination of the death camps that—beyond all
the major injustices that stamp the thirteen years
of the Hitlerian regime—National Socialism
revealed the diabolical criminality, the absolute
evil, of what cannot be called "thought." All the
82
rest could, if necessary, still be attributed to
the inevitable immorality of
politics.
. .Consequently, all forms of compromise
and servility, self-serving contacts and suspect
friendship, unworthy statements and acts, and the
pure opportunism of the citizens of totalitarian
states could still, if necessary, be ascribed to a
lamentable self-interest—cowardice or caution
—
and as human weaknesses appeal to some indulgence
on our part.... But doesn't this silence, in time
of peace, on the gas chambers and death camps lie
beyond the realm of feeble excuses and reveal a
soul completely cut off from any sensitivity, in
which can be perceived a kind of consent to the
horror? [1989, p.487]
Levinas concludes this brief essay by reaffirming his
admiration for the intellectual vigor of Sein und Zeit . but
he also closes with a question: "Can we be assured,
however, that there was never any echo of Evil in it? The
diabolical is not limited to the wickedness popular wisdom
ascribes to it and whose malice, based on guile, is familiar
and predictable in an adult culture. The diabolical is
endowed with intelligence and enters where it will"
[ 1989
,
p. 488 ] . Thus Levinas is critical of Heidegger's
silence on the Nazi death camps. Heidegger's silence is a
failure to say what ought to have been, it is a failure to
recognize the necessity to speak of good and right and
justice after the fact in order not only to recall the
horrible inhumanity and injustice but also to remind us of
the need for vigilance in the present. Heidegger's silence
is a failure of ethical thinking, a failure which Levinas
attributes to Heidegger's assertions of the priority of
ontology over ethics, the priority of truth over justice,
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the priority of freedom and autonomy over responsibility,
and the priority of the self over the other.
Levinas ' s reading of Heidegger will be elaborated in
the present chapter through an exposition of passages from
Existence and Existents and Time and the Ofhpr
,
the essays
that develop a critical distance from Heidegger. The
direction of Levinas / s thinking in these early essays is a
radical reversal from the direction of Heidegger's thought
which moved from the ontic to the ontological, from an
analysis of human Being to the problem of the meaning of
Being as such. Even the title of the book, Existence and
Existents
,
marks this reversal. The literal translation of
the French title, De 1' existence a l'existant . would be
"From existence to the existent." Levinas articulates this
movement in the introduction to the book:
This work will be structured as follows: it
sets out to approach the idea of Being in general
in its impersonality so as to then be able to
analyze the notion of the present and of position,
in which a being, a subject, an existent, arises
in impersonal Being, through a hypostasis. But
these issues did not just arise by themselves.
They seem to us to ensue from certain positions of
contemporary ontology which have made possible the
renewal of the philosophical problematic ... .If at
the beginning our reflections are in large measure
inspired by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger,
where we find the concept of ontology and of the
relationship which man sustains with Being, they
are also governed by a profound need to leave the
climate of that philosophy, and by the conviction
that we cannot leave it for a philosophy that
would be pre-Heideggerian. [ 1978a, p. 19]
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B. Existence and Existents
As Levinas asserts in a prefatory remark, Existence and
Existents is a brief preparation for his later work. It
introduces the problem of the Good, time, and the
relationship with the Other, but little is said about the
Good beyond Being in this work. As the title suggests,
Levinas is interested in the existent and the relationship
with existence, in what he will call the event of hypostasis
in which an existent emerges from anonymous Being. In
contrast to Heidegger's use of the German "es gibt," it
gives, Levinas introduces the anonymous state of Being as
the II y a, as the fact that there is. Levinas insists on
the impersonality of the "there is" without any sense of the
abundance and generosity in Heidegger's vision of the self-
giving of Being into an open region. 2 Levinas claims that
when our relations with the world are interrupted, we find
neither death nor the "pure ego", but this anonymous state
of Being: "For the Being which we become aware of when the
world disappears is not a person or a thing, or the sum
total of persons and things; it is the fact that one is, the
fact that there is" [ 1978a ,p. 21 ] . Furthermore, awareness of
this existence and this anonymous state of Being does not
come through anxiety over death or nothingness; rather,
Levinas suggests that anxiety over Being, horror of Being,
the fear of Being are just as primal and originary as the
fear for Being: "Being is essentially alien and strikes
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against us. We undergo its suffocating embrace like the
night, but it does not respond to us. There is a pain in
Being" [ 1978a
,
p . 23 ]
.
In seeking some preliminary indication of the emergence
of the personal existent from anonymous existence, Levinas
examines experiences of fatigue and indolence. According to
Levinas, these are both positions taken with regard to
existence: they mark the event of refusal, the recoil before
existence. There is a kind of weariness and fatigue in
which we want to escape existence itself, we want to refuse
the obligation to act and to undertake. And similarly there
is an experience of indolence that is an aversion to effort,
a refusal to begin an action. Indolence is a holding back
from the future? it is a being fatigued by the future. The
analysis of these experiences indicates that the effort of
beginning that characterizes the human existent is a job, a
concern. Levinas says of this, "Concern is not, as
Heidegger thinks, the very act of being on the brink of
nothingness; it is rather imposed by the solidity of a being
that begins and is already encumbered with the excess of
itself" [1978a, p. 27]
.
Through a more detailed analysis of fatigue, Levinas
indicates the way in which fatigue is "like the lag of an
existent that is tarrying behind its existing," the way in
which this lag constitutes the present, the way in which
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this weariness marks the upsurge of an existent in
existence
:
If the present is thus constituted by the
taking charge of the present, if the time-lag of
fatigue creates the interval in which the event of
the present can occur, and if this event is
equivalent to the upsurge of an existent for which
to be means to take up being, the existence of an
existent is by essence an activity .... it is the
act of positing oneself on the ground... the
bringing about of a here. The fundamental
activity of rest, foundation, conditioning, thus
appears to be the very relationship with being,
the upsurge of an existent into existence, a
hypostasis. This entire essay intends only to
draw out the implications of this fundamental
situation. [ 1978a ,pp. 35-6
]
The pain of effort seen in fatigue marks the event of the
present, the event of hypostasis in which the existent
actively takes up its existence. This event is prior to any
relationship to a world of things, prior to any labor that
would conserve or prolong existence. In contrast to
Heidegger 's analysis of Being-in-the-world as the basic
state of Dasein in its everydayness, and yet in what appears
to be a deliberate parallel, Levinas turns to look at the
world and Being in the world. He asks, "What is the world
in the context of the ontological adventure, whereby an
existent arises in existence by hypostasis?" [ 1978a, p. 36]
Levinas says that to be in the world is to be attached
to things with a "joyous appetite" best characterized by the
concept of intention understood simply as the desire for
things: "In desiring I am not concerned with being but am
absorbed with the desirable, with an object that will
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completely slake my desire The desirable is a terminus,
an end" [ 1978a
,
p. 37 ] . in explicit criticism of Heidegger's
analysis, Levinas objects to the idea that things in the
world are first discovered as ready to hand for some
project, as tools or material for human activity in the
world, and as thereby included in the ontological care for
existing that characterizes Dasein. He objects that a house
is not an implement for inhabiting and food is not material.
In fact, food serves as one of the best examples of the
relationship between desire and satisfaction that is typical
of life in the world. Levinas says: "Of course we do not
live in order to eat, but it is not really true to say that
we eat in order to live; we eat because we are hungry.
Desire has no further intentions behind it, which would be
like thoughts..." [ 1978a ,p. 37 ] . To see this complete
correspondence between desire and its satisfaction, Levinas
compares eating with loving. In a brief description that
anticipates his later analyses of eros and voluptuousness,
Levinas says.
For what characterizes love is an essential and
insatiable hunger ... something unfulfilled, a
permanent desire.... In the random agitation of
caresses there is the admission that access is
impossible, violence fails, possession is
refused. .. .But eating, by contrast is peaceful and
simple; it fully realizes its sincere
intention. .. .This structure, where an object
concords fully with a desire, is characteristic of
the whole of our being-in-the-world. Nowhere in
the phenomenal order does the object of an action
refer to the concern for existing; it itself makes
up our existence. [ 1978a ,pp. 43-44
]
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This glimpse of the erotic relation is not part of our
encounter with Others in the civilized world. Social life
in the world is a matter of appearances in which Others are
encountered in relation to things; social life is
communication or communion, a participation in something
common, a relationship in which the ego maintains its
ipseity
,
its self-same identity. This recalls Heidegger's
analysis of Being-in-the-world as Being-with, as Being in a
world where Others always already are; but there is already
an implicit criticism contained here. Levinas says,
What characterizes, then, being in the world is
the sincerity of intentions—the self-sufficiency
of the world and contentment. The world is
profane and secular. [1978a, p. 41]
This implies that Being in the world is the secular aspect
of human existence that somehow misses the religious, the
spiritual, that which transcends; Being in the world is
economic activity, consumption in response to limited
desires; and Being with Others in this social and economic
life never attains the dimension of an encounter with
alterity but is merely contact across some common idea,
interest, work, or third person. Thus the significance of
this phenomenon of Being-in-the-world is limited according
to Levinas:
There is, according to Heidegger, a circuit which
leads each moment of our existence to the task of
existing; thus in turning the handle of our door
we open up the totality of existence, for beyond
the action we have already traversed the
intermediaries separating this action from our
concern for being itself . But consciousness
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describes a closed circle in which it stays by
effacing every ulterior finality, a circle where
there can be satisfaction and avowal
. This circle
is the world. in it at least the bond with care
is relaxed.
. . .As we shall show at once, life in
the world is consciousness inasmuch as it provides
the possibility of existing in a withdrawal from
existence. Sincerity with respect to objects is a
hesitation with regard to existence, which appears
as a task to be taken up. A subject, an existent
to take it up, will arise from that hesitation.
[1978a, p. 45]
Whereas the unitary phenomenon of Being-in-the-world as the
basic state of Dasein in its everydayness serves as the
central focus of Heidegger's analysis in Being and Time
r
as
the way to proceed from the being for whom Being is a
question to the question of the meaning of Being as such,
for Levinas, the world has a very limited ontological
function: "...the possibility of extracting oneself from
anonymous being" [ 1978a ,p. 45 ]
.
This ontological function becomes clear as Levinas
turns to an analysis of light and illumination as another
way to speak of intentionality
,
our relation to things given
in the world. Levinas points out that although
intentionality marks the presence of the ego in the world,
this is a presence across a distance; we are separated from
objects by a distance that distinguishes the inwardness of
the I from the outside. Levinas speaks of intentionality as
the origin of sense, and he characterizes sense as
luminosity: "For we can speak of vision and light wherever
there is sensible or intellectual apprehension..."
[ 1978a, p. 47 ] . Phenomenologically, light is a condition for
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phenomena, a condition for the appearance of objects and
their apprehension in sensation. These descriptions of
light and vision, of thought as "the dawning of a light," of
knowing as a way of relating to objects and events that are
illuminated and given in a "lit up space" lead Levinas to an
emphasis on the distance that is maintained between the
knower and what is given. Levinas says of this.
Yet, though it tends unambiguously toward an
object, knowing is essentially a way of being on
the hither side of being. It is a way of relating
to events while still being able to not be caught
up in them. To be a subject is to be a power of
unending withdrawal, an ability always to find
oneself behind what happens to us.... This power of
an agent to remain free from any bond with what
remains present to it, of not being compromised by
what happens to it, by its objects or even its
history, is just what knowing qua light and
intention is .... Existence in the world qua light,
which makes desire possible, is, then, in the
midst of being, the possibility of detaching
oneself from being. [ 1978a ,pp. 49-50
]
Note that without dismissing Heidegger's arguments that
knowing is founded on a more primordial relation with things
in the world (a relation that diminishes any distance
between subject and objects taken up in concernful
absorption)
,
Levinas reasserts the importance of the knowing
relation as it marks the distinction between interior and
exterior, as it marks the possibility of escaping from
anonymous existence. Knowing and consciousness appear to
constitute a freedom from absorption in the totality of
existence. Thus Levinas looks at Being in the world in
order to assert, against Heidegger,
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Our existence in the world, with its desires and
everyday agitation, is then not an immense fraud,
a fall into inauthenticity, an evasion of our
deepest destiny. it is but the amplification of
that resistance against anonymous and fateful
being by which existence becomes consciousness,
that is, a relationship an existent maintains with
existence, through the light, which both fills up,
and maintains, the interval. [ 1978a, p. 51]
And it is this resistance against anonymous existence, this
event of a hypostasis that is of central interest to
Levinas. In order to directly approach this event, Levinas
seeks some way to describe anonymous existence, the absence
of the world, the elemental, existence without existents,
the undifferentiated background he refers to as the II y a.
In a discussion of Levinas 's notion of the "there is,"
Philip Lawton points out the difficulties in describing the
situation where nothing is, where even the term experience
does not apply since this anonymous existence is prior to
the knowing subject, prior to the cognitive relation
[Lawton, 1975]. Levinas is attempting to describe the
background of Being in general, to describe participation
and absorption in the there is prior to any determinate
personal existence and thus prior to any possible
experience. As a result, he can only give indications,
withdraw every positive description as soon as it is
offered, use negative assertions and paradoxical language in
order to point to the there is. Thus Levinas describes
experience in the night as pointing to the elemental and
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anonymous there is, but we must understand this description
as metaphorical:
We could say that the night is the very
experience of the there is, if the term experience
were not inapplicable to a situation which
involves the total exclusion of light.
When the forms of things are dissolved in the
night, the darkness of the night, which is neither
an object nor the quality of an object, invades
like a presence ... .The exterior— if one insists on
this term—remains uncorrelated with an interior.
It is no longer given. It is no longer a world.
What we call the I is itself submerged by the
night, invaded, depersonalized, stifled by it.
The disappearance of all things and of the I
leaves what cannot disappear, the sheer fact of
being in which one participates, whether one wants
to or not, without having taken the initiative,
anonymously. [ 1978a, p. 58]
The night offers the silence of nothingness, the absence of
forms, the disappearance of all things that constitutes an
insecurity, an indeterminate menace: "One is exposed. The
whole is open upon us. Instead of serving as our means of
access to being, nocturnal space delivers us over to
being The rustling of the there is ...is horror"
[1978a, p.59-60]
.
And once again, Levinas explicitly contrasts his work
to that of Heidegger. This horror is not an anxiety about
death; it is instead the impossibility of death, the
universality of existence, the participation in the there is
that has "no exits." In Heidegger, anxiety is a fear of
nothingness, the fear that "One day I shall die." But the
horror that Levinas describes is a fear of Being, the fear
that "Tomorrow, alasl one will still have to live," the
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horror of irremissible existence; the true problem of human
destiny is, therefore, the necessity of taking up the burden
of my own existence. 3
In an effort to describe the event of hypostasis, the
advent of a subject, Levinas looks at insomnia, a
wakefulness marked by vigilance that is "absorbed in the
rustling of the unavoidable being" [ 1978a
,
p . 65 ] . This
vi9ilance is not the attention directed to objects by a
subject; there is no outside or inside, there are no objects
nor any subject to apprehend them. Wakefulness is
anonymous; one is held by Being, by the universal and
oppressive presence of the there is. And here Levinas
includes a note on the problem of method;
Our affirmation of an anonymous vigilance goes
beyond the phenomena, which already presupposes an
ego, and thus eludes descriptive phenomenology.
Here description would make use of terms while
striving to go beyond their consistency; it stages
personages, while the there is is the dissipation
of personages. A method is called for such that
thought is invited to go beyond intuition.
We can be more or less close to this limit
situation. In certain awakenings of delirium, in
certain paradoxes of madness, we can surprise this
impersonal "consciousness" into which insomnia
sinks. The fatality of these strange states,
which it is impossible to recount, is due to the
fact that they do not happen to me as their
subject. [ 1978a ,pp. 66-67
]
Thus even the description of the advent of a subject can
only point to the possibility of this paradoxically pre-
personal experience that is inaccessible to thought. The
event of hypostasis is prior to every experience.
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By continuing to use the images of the night and
wakefulness, Levinas claims that it is the possibility of
sleep and unconsciousness that marks the breakup of the
insomnia of anonymous Being; consciousness appears to stand
out against the anonymous background of the there is by its
ability to forget and interrupt it, by its ability to sleep.
Consciousness "forms a recess in the plenum," a place as a
refuge for sleep. In the act of lying down, existence is
limited to a place, a base. "Consciousness comes out of
rest, out of a position, out of this unique relationship
with a place ... .That consciousness is here is not in its
turn an element of consciousness, a thought, feeling, or
volition; it is the positing of consciousness" [ 1978a ,p. 70 ]
.
Thought has a point of departure, a here; it is a
localization of consciousness.
This here that serves as a base for consciousness, the
place of its sleep and its escape into itself, is radically
different from the Da in Heidegger's Dasein. Dasein already
presupposes the world; but the here of consciousness marks
the fact that consciousness starts from itself, that it is
an existent
:
The here we are starting with, the here of
position, precedes every act of understanding,
every horizon and all time.... In positioning
itself on a base the subject encumbered with being
gathers itself together, stands up and masters all
that encumbers it; its here gives to it a point of
departure .... Place
,
then, before being a geometric
space, and before being the concrete setting of
the Heideggerian world, is a base. This is what
makes the body the very advent of
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consciousness
.... It is not posited; it is a
position. It is not situated in a space given
beforehand; it is the irruption in anonymous being
of localization itself. [1978a, p. 71]
Thus, contrary to Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as Being-
in-the-world, Levinas points to the necessity of a prior
moment in the economy of Being, the positing of
consciousness against the background of anonymous Being, the
event of hypostasis.
Furthermore, Levinas asserts that "position is the very
event of the instant as a present" [ 1978a
,
p. 72 ] . This is a
very different notion of the present than the one found in
Heidegger; this is a present with no continuity or
connection to past or future, a present that starts with
itself, refers only to itself, and therefore refracts the
future. According to Levinas, the present is a halt, an
interruption of the infinity of time; it is evanescent,
transitory, and yet it marks the event of hypostasis:
"Its evanescence is the ransom paid for its
subjectivity, that is, for the transmutation,
within the pure event of being, of an event into a
substantive—a hypostasis .... Despite its
evanescence in time, in which alone it has been
envisaged, or rather because of that evanescence,
it is the effectuation of a subject. It breaks
with the duration in which we grasp it."
[1978a, p. 73]
In this event of hypostasis, Levinas insists on
affirming the aspect of substance that Heidegger would set
aside in favor of the becoming of Being. According to
Levinas, each instant is a beginning, a birth; and
paradoxically, each instant is both point of departure and
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point of arrival since it must give birth to itself and come
to itself without coming from anywhere. There is no
duration in the instant; the instant will vanish— its
evanescence constitutes its presence. And yet the instant
is a relationship with Being, it is a stance and marks the
emergence of an existent as a substantive. What Levinas
describes as the rebound movement of beginning and
instantaneous maturity in the present is a movement of
identification; the present turns into a being, it is the
affirmation of the I. But this I is neither a thing nor an
object nor a center for acts of consciousness:
The "I" has to be grasped in its amphibological
mutation from an event into an "entity," and not
in its objectivity. It consists in the original
possession of being, in which the I nevertheless
reverts ineluctably to itself ... .The "present" and
the "I" are the movement of self-reference which
constitutes identity. [ 1978a ,p. 79-80
]
Thus the present turns into a being; through a stance taken
at a site, in the effort of taking position, a subject comes
to be. The subject is affirmed through taking position in
the anonymous there is, not as mind or object or thing, but
only as the apparition of an existent, as a substantive.
Levinas is not initially concerned with the subject as mind
or consciousness but merely as existent, as personal Being
affirmed on the ground of the anonymous there is. And yet,
in the end, hypostasis is consciousness because
consciousness is localized and posited, consciousness is
present, it comes to being out of itself, it is the
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appropriation of existence by an existent. Levinas says of
this
,
Consciousness, position, the present, the "I," are
not initially—although they are finally
—
existents. They are events by which the
unnameable verb to be turns into substantives.
They are hypostasis. [ 1978a, p. 83]
Levinas briefly sketches the difference between this
event of hypostasis and Heidegger's analysis of Dasein. He
says the act of taking position does not transcend itself;
it is "a folding back upon itself." In an effort to get
beneath the subject-object distinction, Heidegger seems to
neglect what is substantive in the entity that is Dasein.
In Heidegger, existence is a movement of the inside toward
the outside; existence is characterized as ecstasy, as
standing out into the lighting of Being. And here Levinas
seems to play with the notion of illumination introduced at
the beginning of the essay to characterize perception,
experience and cognition. Whereas Heidegger begins with
Being-in-the-world
,
Levinas looks for the upsurge of an
existent from existence without a world, prior to the
illumination of sense and experience. Whereas Heidegger
posits entities by distinction from Being as such, Levinas
asks how an entity comes to be in the general economy of
Being. Levinas suggests that existence is not simply
contemporaneous with the world and with light:
In starting with position, we question whether
ecstasy is in fact the original mode of existence,
whether the relationship currently called a
relationship between the ego and being is a
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movement toward an outside, whether the ex is theprinciple root of the verb to exist. [ 1978a, p. 82]
In contrast to ecstatic Being outside of oneself, Levinas
discovers in this event of hypostasis the solitude of the
ego. The ego is riveted to its own Being; it is impossible
f o*" the ego not to be a self . The world and light are part
of this solitude, according to Levinas:
These given objects, these clothed beings are
something other than myself, but they are mine.
Illuminated by light, they have meaning, and thus
are as though they came from me. In the
understood universe I am alone, that is, closed up
in an existence that is definitively one.
[1978a, p.84-5]
Anticipating his later work, Levinas insists, for example,
that it is not possible to grasp the alterity of the Other
in phenomenological description:
The relationship with the other is not to be
conceived as a bond with another ego, nor as a
comprehension of the other which makes his
alterity disappear, nor as a communion with him
around some third term .... Phenomenological
description, which by definition cannot leave the
sphere of light, that is, man alone shut up in his
solitude, anxiety and death as an end, whatever
analyses of the relationship with the other it may
contribute, will not suffice. Qua phenomenology
it remains within the world of light, the world of
the solitary ego which has no relationship with
the other qua other, for whom the other is another
me, an alter ego known by sympathy, that is, by a
return to oneself. [1978a, p. 85]
Reaching the Other, as other, is according to Levinas, "the
event of the most radical breakup of the very categories of
the ego, for it is for me to be somewhere else than my
self..." [1978a, p. 85]
.
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Thus, the event of hypostasis marks an initial solitude
of self-identity, a problematic solitude. In Levinas'
identification is the event of hypostasis, the
work of taking position in the present instant, a pure self-
reference that is the negation or ignorance of time. The
subject is free with regard to past and future, but this
freedom of the present is a weight, an enchainment to one's
self: "Being me involves a bond with oneself, an
impossibility of undoing oneself. To be sure, a subject
creates a distance from itself, but this stepping back is
not a liberation" [ 1978a
,
p . 87 ] . What Levinas calls the
illusory divorce of the ego from its self is merely the
thought of freedom, the hope of freedom, a presentiment of
the order of time. But this is merely a hope, merely the
thought of the possibility of breaking the bond of self-
identification in the present. There is, according to
Levinas, no way to move from this hope to the actuality of
the future. Whereas for Heidegger, Being toward my own
death opens up the dimension of the future for me in the
present, Levinas argues that there can be no future for the
solitary subject:
Here freedom does not presuppose a nothingness to
which it casts itself; it is not, as in Heidegger,
an event of nihilation ; it is produced in the very
"plenum" of being through the ontological
situation of the subject. But as there is only a
hope of freedom and not a freedom of engagement,
this thought knocks on the closed doors of another
dimension .. .The hope for an order where the
enchainment to oneself involved in the present
would be broken still does not of itself have the
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force to effect what it hopes for. There is nodialectical exorcism contained in the fact that
the "I" conceives of a freedom. It is not enough
to conceive of hope to unleash a future.
[1978a, p. 89]
According to Levinas, the solitary subject cannot have
anything other than the present which is not yet time. The
solitary ego, locked in self-identification, cannot deny
itself, it cannot escape the present, it cannot produce the
absolute alterity of the future out of a negation of the
present moment.
Levinas says that the alternation of effort with
leisure makes up the time of the world, the "time of
economy," monotonous time because its instants are
equivalent. Levinas refers to this as the secular world, a
world where the "I" accepts wages in compensation for effort
and suffering in the present. The time of economic life is
constituted by a series of instants: "...where the instants
are equivalent, and the "I" circulates across them to link
them up" [ 1978a ,p. 92 ] . The "I" is the ferment of time in
the present. And the tragic in human existence is the
inescapable definitiveness of the present with only the
thought of freedom, only hope. The compensation in economic
time, the moment of leisure in which we enjoy the fruit of
our effort, is not enough for true hope: "Hope then is not
satisfied with a time composed of separate instants given to
an ego that traverses them so as to gather in the following
instant, as impersonal as the first one, the wages of its
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pain.... The true object of hope is the Messiah, or
salvation" [ 1978a
,
p. 91 ] . But the impossibility of
constituting time dialectically is the impossibility of
saving oneself by oneself. We cannot find the means for
salvation in the subject itself, we cannot find any possible
break in the bonds of the ego with itself in the event of
self-identification. Time cannot arise in a solitary
subject; the absolute alterity of another instant cannot be
found in the subject. There can be no redemption from the
self-reference of each instant, no liberation from the
present which lacks past and future, no realization of the
hope contained in the present except through relation to the
Other. According to Levinas: "The dialectic of time is the
very dialectic of the relationship with the other... And the
nothingness necessary to time, which the subject cannot
produce, comes from the social relationship" [ 1978a ,p. 93 ]
.
Although Levinas does not develop his view of time in
this essay, he does give a preliminary description of the
social relationship, the face to face relationship that is
central to his later work. Again, this preliminary
description is in contrast to Heidegger's analysis of Being-
with. Levinas refers to Heidegger's Miteinandersein as a
collectivity in which the Other is simply alongside oneself,
a collectivity formed around some mediating third term which
supplies what is common. According to Levinas, "...in
Heidegger sociality is completely found in the solitary
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subject" [ 1978a ,p. 95 ] . By contrast, Levinas speaks of "the
fearful face-to-face situation of a relationship without
intermediary, without mediations" [ 1978a
,
p . 95 ] . This is not
the reciprocal relationship of interchangeable terms; in
fact, Levinas insists that the relationship is initially
asymmetrical
:
The other as other is not only an alter ego. He
is what I am not: he is the weak one whereas I am
the strong one; he is the poor one Or else the
other is the stranger, the enemy and the powerful
one. What is essential is that he has these
qualities by virtue of his very alterity.
[1978a, p. 95]
The Other is wholly exterior to me and yet the Other is also
the neighbor. The combination of both distance and
proximity is seen in eros where distance is wholly
maintained in the proximity of another:
It is in eros that transcendence can be conceived
as something radical
,
which brings to the ego
caught up in being, ineluctably returning to
itself, something else than this return, can free
it of its shadow. .. .Asymmetrical intersubjectivity
is the locus of transcendence in which the
subject, while preserving its subject, has the
possibility of not inevitably returning to itself,
the possibility of being fecund and (to anticipate
what we shall examine later) having a son.
[1978a, p. 96]
This face-to-face relationship precedes the reciprocal
relations of civilization. Both society and time can be
understood with reference to this unmediated and
asymmetrical face-to-face relationship, a relationship that
Levinas will come to categorize as the ethical relation and
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come to locate beyond the ontological context of Heidegger's
analysis in Being and Time ,
Thus the conclusion to Existence and Existent?;
summarizes the critical distance achieved from modern
philosophy in general and Heidegger in particular. Levinas
notes the paradox of the present: "To have a time and a
history is to have a future and a past. We do not have a
present; it slips between our fingers. Yet it is in the
present that we are and can have a past and a future"
[ 1978a, p. 97 ] . According to Levinas, modern philosophy
attempts to solve this paradox by asserting that the pure
present is an abstraction, that the present is only a
movement out of the past that is directed toward the future.
In its concern to make human existence independent of the
categories that traditionally apply to things, in its
concern to escape definitions of human essence and to assert
the becoming of human Being, modern philosophy loses sight
of the stability in human existence, the fact that each
human being is the subject of its own becoming. Levinas
attempts to relocate the substantiality of the subject
without divorcing human Being from dynamic becoming. He
does this with the notion of the event of hypostasis:
The present instant constitutes a subject which
is posited both as the master of time and as
involved in time. The present is the beginning of
a being. The expressions which constantly
recurred in this exposition, such as "the fact
of...," "the event of...," "the effecting of...,"
aim to convey this transmutation of a verb into a
substantive, and to express beings at the instant
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of their hypostasis, in which while still in
movement they are already substances .... In other
words, the present is the very fact that there is
an existent. [1978a, p. 98]
Levinas insists again that this is a preliminary essay,
that the present is neither the point of departure nor the
point of arrival of philosophical meditation. The present
is not the point of departure for an idealist ego, nor is it
equivalent to the engagement in the world of Heidegger's
Dasein. Once again, Levinas asserts that the event of
hypostasis is antecedent to any inscription in the world:
"It concerns the meaning of the very fact that in Being
there are beings" [ 1978a
,
p . 101 ] . Likewise, the present, as
the taking position of a solitary subject, calls for the
dialectic of time; the solitary and self-identical subject
hopes for a liberation from the burden of self in the
present, a liberation provided by time and the Other.
C. Time and the Other
In Time and the Other , a series of lectures given in
1946-47 and published in 1948, Levinas takes up the analyses
of Existence and Existents in order to move beyond the
solitude of the existent posited against the background of
the anonymous there is. This work supposes that solitude is
a problem; in particular, Levinas says, "The aim of these
lectures is to show that time is not the achievement of an
isolated and lone subject, but that it is the very
relationship of the subject with the Other" [ 1987b, p. 39 ]
.
Against Heidegger's analysis of temporality in Being and.
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Time, Levinas says that time is not "the ontological horizon
of the being of a being." Through analyses of solitude and
hypostasis, material enjoyment, work, suffering, death, the
relation to the Other in eros and the liberation of the ego
in paternity, Levinas continues to widen the critical
distance from Heidegger already achieved in Existence and
Existents . In the opening pages of Time and the other
. he
outlines his fundamental criticisms:
Thus from the start I repudiate the
Heideggerian conception that views solitude in the
midst of a prior relationship with the
other.... The relationship with the Other is indeed
posed by Heidegger as an ontological structure of
Dasein, but practically it plays no role in the
drama of being or in the existential analytic.
All the analyses of Being and Time are worked out
either for the sake of the impersonality of
everyday life or for the sake of solitary Dasein.
Then again, does solitude derive its tragic
character from nothingness or from the privation
of the Other that death accentuates? There is at
least an ambiguity .... Finally
,
the other in
Heidegger appears in the essential situation of
Miteinandersein
,
reciprocally being with one
another.... I hope to show, for my part, that it is
not the preposition mit that should describe the
original relationship with the other.
[1987b, pp. 40-41]
Time and the Other thus continues Levinas 's effort to leave
Heideggerian ontology.
Part I of this book is a quick review of the work
already done in Existence and Existents . Levinas
characterizes solitude as "the indissoluble unity between
the existent and its work of existing." [ 1987b, p. 43] He
points to the possibility of existence without existents,
taking the distinction between Being and beings from
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Heidegger but translating it into the distinction between
the anonymous there is and the upsurge of a determinate
existent. In the event of hypostasis, Levinas asserts that
the existent bears existing as an attribute, is master of
this existing, and in the work of identity remains closed
upon itself in solitude. The present is this event of
hypostasis, "a rip in the infinite beginningless and endless
fabric of existing," the freedom of beginning, but
evanescent, fleeting, vanishing—the present does not endure
and does not represent a point in the current of already
constituted time. Implicitly recalling Heidegger's analysis
of Dasein as they-self in its average everydayness and
authentic Being-one's-self as a modification of the "they,"
Levinas insists that the solitude of the existent "does not
appear as a privation of a previously given relationship
with the Other." Rather,
Solitude is the very unity of the existent, the
fact that there is something in existing starting
from which existence occurs. The subject is alone
because it is one. A solitude is necessary in
order for there to be a freedom of beginning, the
existent's mastery over existing—that is, in
brief, in order for there to be an existent.
Solitude is thus not only a despair and an
abandonment, but also a virility, a pride and a
sovereignty. [ 1987b, pp. 54-5
]
This solitude, the necessary result of the work of identity,
the positing of consciousness in the event of hypostasis, is
further characterized as a primordial independence, a
freedom that is already not free since it is enchained to
itself, responsible for itself, occupied with itself. And
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Levinas calls this material existence. The tragedy of
solitude is this material occupation with oneself, the
burden that the subject is to itself.
In the introduction to Part II, Levinas immediately
marks the differences between his own view and that of
Heidegger
:
Materiality and solitude go together. Solitude is
not a higher-level anxiety that is revealed to a
being when all its needs are satisfied. It is not
the privileged experience of being toward death,
but the companion, so to speak, of an everyday
existence haunted by matter .... everyday life, far
from constituting a fall, and far from appearing
as a betrayal with regard to our metaphysical
destiny, emanates from our solitude and forms the
very accomplishment of solitude and the infinitely
serious attempt to respond to its profound
unhappiness. Everyday life is a preoccupation
with salvation. [1987b, p. 58]
Levinas uses the term salvation to refer to an escape from
the initial materiality of the subject, a departure from the
self-absorption that marks the event of hypostasis. Whereas
Heidegger describes the world as a system of tools that
refer to one another, to other persons, and ultimately to
our care for existing, Levinas asserts that "prior to being
a system of tools, the world is an ensemble of nourishments"
[ 1987b, p. 63 ] . And our relationship to nourishments can be
characterized by enjoyment, sensation, and thus also light
and knowledge. In enjoyment, the subject absorbs the
object, but also takes a distance from itself, forgets
itself. This is what Levinas refers to as salvation through
the world. In everyday existence in the world, the
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identical subject does not return to itself immediately,
rather it is outside itself in relation to objects; in
enjoyment, the subject eludes solitude.
But this escape from solitude is illusory; the exit
toward the world involves an inevitable return to the
solitude of the self. As Levinas has already argued in
Existence and Existents, the light that illuminates objects
other than the self is intelligibility; the object remains
part of the solipsism of knowing, possessed by thought.
Similarly, in the concrete effort to satisfy need, one must
conquer the distance between self and object, one must work
to take hold of the object of enjoyment. Thus Levinas says,
"In work—meaning, in effort, in its pain and sorrow—the
subject finds the weight of the existence which involves its
existent freedom itself. Pain and sorrow are the phenomena
to which the solitude of the existent is finally reduced"
[ 1987b, p. 68 ] . Physical suffering points to the fact of
being directly exposed to Being, the irremissibility of
Being, the impossibility of detaching oneself from the
instant of existence. There is no retreat from suffering,
as there is no retreat from being oneself, and in this
sense, Levinas says that suffering is the impossibility of
nothingness
.
But at the same time, Levinas reminds us that suffering
is also the proximity of death. Death is the possibility of
an end to suffering, but it is also completely unknowable.
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impossible to experience or illuminate; death is an unknown
that is "refractory to the intimacy of the self with the ego
to which all our experiences return" [ 1987b, p. 69 ] . With the
proximity of death in pain and suffering, the subject is in
relationship with something that does not come from itself,
the subject is passive in relationship to the mystery that
is death. According to Levinas, "...death announces an
event over which the subject is not master, an event in
relation to which the subject is no longer a subject"
[ 1987b, p. 70 ] . Of course Levinas notes a sharp contrast to
Heidegger's analyses of Being-toward-death
:
Being toward death, in Heidegger's authentic
existence, is a supreme lucidity and hence a
supreme virility. It is Dasein'
s
assumption of
the uttermost possibility of existence, which
precisely makes possible the very feat of grasping
a possibility—that is, it makes possible activity
and freedom. Death in Heidegger is an event of
freedom, whereas for me the subject seems to reach
the limit of the possible in suffering. It finds
itself enchained, overwhelmed, and in some way
passive. [ 1987b, p. 70-71
]
Whereas in Heidegger's analysis, Dasein is concerned with
the nothingness of death, Levinas insists that we know
nothing about this nothingness; what is remarkable in the
proximity of death is this situation where something
absolutely unknowable appears, something foreign to all
light, something that can never be present. Death is thus a
unique relationship with the future.
Levinas does not dwell on any anxiety toward death;
rather he insists that prior to death there is always a last
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chance, always hope. Death marks the end of the subject's
virility and heroism, the end of mastery over possibilities.
Yet death is always immanent and never present, so that
there is room for hope in relation to death. Death is the
impossibility of having a project, the impossibility of
grasping or taking hold; the approach of death indicates
that we are in relation with something that is absolutely
other, an unknowable mystery. Implicitly contrary to
Heidegger, Levinas says, "My solitude is thus not confirmed
by death but broken by it" [ 1987b, p . 74 ] . My relation to
death is not the springboard for a more authentic relation
to my self in the present; the future is not simply the
working out of my projected possibilities. Rather my
relation to death is a relation to alterity, to something I
cannot grasp; the future is absolutely surprising.
According to Levinas:
Anticipation of the future and projection of the
future, sanctioned as essential to time by all
theories from Bergson to Sartre, are but the
present of the future and not the authentic
future; the future is what is not grasped, what
befalls us and lays hold of us. The other is the
future. The very relationship with the other is
the relationship with the future. It seems to me
impossible to speak of time in a subject alone, or
to speak of a purely personal duration.
[1987b, pp. 76-7]
There is already an indication here of the problem of human
temporality as it is treated by Heidegger. According to
Heidegger's analysis, Being-toward-death discloses the
temporal structure of care; anxiety discloses Dasein as
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Being-possible, it individualizes Dasein; Dasein is summoned
out of its lostness in the They-self and confronted by its
own potentiality-for-Being. Care as anticipatory
resoluteness discloses temporality as a unitary phenomenon:
Dasein 's directedness toward the future discloses the
having-been of our thrownness and gives off the present.
But Levinas rejects this view of temporality as disclosed
within the solitary subject. In seeking escape from the
self-absorbed solitude of hypostasis, Levinas asserts that
the alterity of death breaks the mastery of the subject and
thus breaks the solitude of the present. But the
relationship to death as other, as mystery, and as future is
problematic. Levinas asks:
But the death thus announced as other, as the
alienation of my existence, is it still my death?
If it opens a way out of solitude, does it not
simply come to crush this solitude, to crush
subjectivity itself? ...How can an event that
cannot be grasped still happen to me?... How can a
being enter into relation with the other without
allowing its very self to be crushed by the other?
[1987b, p. 77]
My own death is not an experience for me as subject. And
the event of death, the immanence of death in suffering may
point to an alterity in existence, but it does not
constitute time in my existence. This is a future I cannot
possess, a future to which I can have no relation. As
Levinas says, "The future that death gives, the future of
the event, is not yet time" [1987b, p. 79] . Levinas claims
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that only the relationship with the other person can produce
a relationship with the future.
Death is a relationship with alterity that crushes
subjectivity; it indicates a future in which I can no longer
be. In order for this future to become an element of time,
it must enter into relationship with the present. Levinas
refers to this as the problem of the preservation of the ego
in transcendence. There must be a situation in which an
event happens to the subject who does not master the event
but who nevertheless faces up to it and thus remains a
subject— is not absorbed or crushed by the event. It is
important to note here that Levinas refers to this as the
attempt to vanquish death: "Vanquishing death is to
maintain, with the alterity of the event, a relationship
that must still be personal" [ 1987b, p. 81 ] . And according to
Levinas, the concrete situation where this dialectic is
accomplished is the face-to-face relationship with the
Other:
Relationship with the future, the presence of
the future in the present, seems all the same
accomplished in the face-to-face with the Other.
The situation of the face-to-face would be the
very accomplishment of time; the encroachment of
the present on the future is not the feat of the
subject alone, but the intersubjective
relationship. The condition of time lies in the
relationship between humans... [1987b, p. 79]
Thus in Part IV of Time and the Other . Levinas describes the
way in which the presence of the future is accomplished in
the relationship with the Other, the way in which this
113
relationship with alterity maintains the identity of the
existent while it liberates the ego from its solitary
enchainment to itself.
Levinas argues that fundamental alterity is veiled by
decency in everyday life; the Other is known through
sympathy as another (my) self, as an alter ego. Or alterity
is misunderstood in social life as what I myself am not, as
the weak, the poor, the stranger. With regard to Heidegger,
Levinas insists that the relationship with the Other is not
the Being-with of Heidegger's Mitsein, a relationship
mediated by something in common. Levinas looks for a
relationship where the alterity of the Other appears in its
purity, unmediated, and without reference to the identity of
the ego. He finds this situation in eros
,
in the relation
with the alterity of the feminine . 4 According to Levinas,
sexual difference is not a specific difference (as two
species of the same genus), it is not a contradiction or a
relation of negation, nor is sexual difference the duality
of complementary terms. The erotic relationship preserves
alterity:
The pathos of voluptuousness lies in the fact of
being two. The other as other is not here an
object that becomes ours or becomes us; to the
contrary, it withdraws into its mystery.
[1987b, p. 86]
Thus Levinas distinguishes eros from possession and power.
The relationship with the feminine is not an opposition of
wills, it is neither a struggle nor a fusion; it is neither
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possession nor knowledge. it is a relationship that
maintains distance and yet permits communication, "...a
relationship with alterity, with mystery—that is to say,
with the future, with what (in a world where there is
everything) is never there..." [ 1987b, p. 88 ] . The alterity
of the feminine Other is a future that never comes into the
present. As death is an ungraspable future, an event that
happens to the subject, so also love is ungraspable, not a
possibility, not due to our initiative: "...it invades and
wounds us, and nevertheless the I survives in it"
[1987b, p. 89]
.
5
Thus Levinas returns to the problem that moved him to
consider the concrete situation of eros:
Before a pure event, a pure future, which is
death, where the ego can in no way be able—that
is, can no longer be an ego— I seek a situation
where nonetheless it is possible for it to remain
an ego, and I have called this situation "victory
over death." [ 1987b, pp. 90-91
]
Levinas does not locate this situation in eros but in
fecundity, "the perspective of the future opened by eros"
[ 1987b, p. 91 ] . How can the ego become other than itself?
How can I remain in the alterity of a you without losing
myself in that you? Levinas points to paternity as the
answer to this dilemma:
Paternity is the relationship with a stranger
who, entirely while being Other, is myself, the
relationship of the ego with a myself who is
nonetheless a stranger to me ... .Neither the
categories of power nor those of having can
indicate the relationship with the child. Neither
the notion of cause nor the notion of ownership
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permit one to grasp the fact of fecundity. I do
not have my child; I am in some way my child.
[1987b, p. 91]
Paternity is thus the remission of solitary self-identity
and a pluralist existing. It is not simply the existence of
another freedom next to mine; it is not a collectivity
around something common. Levinas insists that sexuality,
paternity
,
and death introduce a duality into existence that
concerns the existing of each subject. This is the
pluralism in existence that does not reduce to unity and
thus provides the first indication of a break with
Parmenides
.
In his concluding remarks, Levinas notes the way in
which this plurality of existents differs from the ideal of
fusion that has dominated the social ideal from Plato to
Heidegger
:
It is the collectivity that says "we," that,
turned toward the intelligible sun, toward the
truth, feels the other at its side and not in
front of itself ... .Mi teinandersein
,
too, remains
the collectivity of the "with," and is revealed in
its authentic form around the truth. It is a
collectivity around something common. Just as in
all the philosophies of communion, sociality in
Heidegger is found in the subject alone; and it is
in terms of solitude that the analysis of Dasein
in its authentic form is pursued. [ 1987b, p. 93]
Levinas refuses the collectivity of the side-by-side in
favor of the I-you. Yet he explicitly distances himself
from Buber's reciprocal I-Thou relation and he also refuses
to consider the face-to-face to be the antagonistic
relationship of two freedoms (as in Sartre's conception of
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the relation between self and Other that inevitably leads to
a failure of communication). Levinas says of this:
I have tried to find the temporal transcendence of
the present toward the mystery of the future.
This is not a participation in a third term,
whether this term be a person, a truth, a work, or
a profession. It is a collectivity that is not a
communion. It is the face-to-face without
intermediary, and is furnished for us in the eros
where, in the other's proximity, distance is
integrally maintained, and whose pathos is made of
both this proximity and this duality. [ 1987b, p. 94 ]
Levinas 's rejection and rethinking of Heidegger's
analysis of Dasein is guided throughout by his concern to
make room for that which transcends Being and the categories
of Being. Levinas is concerned to counter the unity of
Being with pluralism and excess, he is concerned to make
room for the radical otherness of another human being and
the plurality of existents that cannot be reduced to the
unity of a common ground or universal essence. He is also
concerned to maintain the alterity of the future as what is
absolutely unknowable and surprising and therefore dependent
on the intersubjective relationship.
In working out these concerns, Levinas rejects the
priority of the question of the meaning of Being. He
reverses the direction of Heidegger's analysis and begins
with the idea of Being as the anonymous "There is" in order
to focus on the upsurge of the existent in the event of
hypostasis. Rejecting Heidegger's emphasis on ecstatic
Being outside of oneself in relation to Being, Levinas
reaffirms the primordial localization of embodied
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consciousness and the substantiality of the subject. Prior
to the Being-there of Dasein's Being-in-the-world
,
Levinas
points to the event of hypostasis as the solitary work of
identity, the moment of taking position in material
existence, the enchainment to oneself that marks a
distinction between the interiority of consciousness and the
exteriority of a world of things. Prior to Heidegger's
world as a system of tools, Levinas points to a sense of the
world as an ensemble of nourishments; prior to the
concernful absorption in projects that disclose Dasein's
care for existence, Levinas points to the immediacy of
hunger and the enjoyment of self-satisfied material
existence; and prior to the mediated relations to other
persons, the reciprocal Being with one another described by
Heidegger, Levinas points to the immediacy of the face to
face relation.
Whereas Heidegger focuses on the fear of nothingness
and anxiety over the end of one's existence, Levinas points
to the fear of Being, the horror of Being, and the burden of
irremissible existence. According to Heidegger, Being-
towards-death makes possible the activity and freedom of
authentic Being-one's-self; anxiety over the nothingness of
death opens up the horizon of the future and makes Dasein
project itself toward the future by taking hold of its own
possibilities. But Levinas describes death as the limit of
the possible and an end to the mastery of possibilities.
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Death opens up the future but only as an unknowable mystery.
The future is not the working out of one's projected
possibilities but what is absolutely surprising. And it is
°nly the relation to another human being in eros, fecundity,
and paternity that provides a relationship with the future.
Temporality is not disclosed within the solitary subject as
in Heidegger's analysis; according to Levinas, temporality
is only disclosed in relation to the Other who comes to
break the solitude and self-reference of the present.
Finally, whereas in Heidegger's analysis, solitude is a
modification of a prior relation with Others, for Levinas,
solitude is the necessary result of the primordial work of
identity and points to the freedom of beginning in the event
of hypostasis. Solitude is also the problematic enchainment
to oneself that is accompanied by the desire for liberation
from the closed circle of self-sufficient existence. And
the relation to the other person, the face to face relation,
provides this liberation from solitude in the present and
opens up a relation to that which transcends one's own
Being.
The phenomenology of material existence, and the
analyses of eros, fecundity, and paternity are more fully
developed in Totality and Infinity , Levinas's first major
work. It is in that work that the face to face relation
becomes more than the solution to the problem of existential
solitude and more than a rejection of Heidegger's Dasein
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analytic. It is in that work that the face to face relation
is developed as the locus for the fundamental ethical
relation of responsibility. It is in Totality and Infinity
that Levinas explicitly raises the problem of the Good
beyond Being, the problem of ethics that takes the central
place in his subsequent philosophical work.
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1* The inspiration of Heidegger is evident in a passagefrom Levinas 's dissertation: "Here again, one can reproach
Husserl for his intellectualism.
. . . Is our main attitude
toward reality that of theoretical contemplation? Is not
the world presented in its very being as a center of action,
as a field of activity or of care—to speak the language of
Martin Heidegger?" [Levinas, 1973b, p. 119]
2. In the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger asserts,
In Being and Time (p.212) we purposely and
cautiously say, il y a l'etre: "there is / it
gives" ["es gibt" ] Being. II y a translates "it
gives" imprecisely. For the "it" that here
"gives" is Being itself. The "gives" names the
essence of Being that is giving, granting its
truth. The self-giving into the open, along with
the open region itself, is Being itself. [1977,
P-214]
3. In Ethics and Infinity . Levinas adds to this description
of the there is: "It is something resembling what one hears
when one puts an empty shell close to the ear, as if the
emptiness were full, as if the silence were a noise. It is
something one can also feel when one thinks that even if
there were nothing, the fact that 'there is' is undeniable.
Not that there is this or that; but the very scene of being
is open: there is. In the absolute emptiness that one can
imagine before creation—there is" [1985, p. 48].
4. Note that just as death introduces plurality in
existence as an otherness not mastered by the existent who
otherwise is master over Being, the difference between the
sexes is announced as a formal structure that "conditions
the very possibility of reality as multiple, against the
unity of being proclaimed by Parmenides." [ 1987b, p. 85]
5. This is what Levinas will come to call the diachrony of
time: the relationship with the other is an absence of the
other in a horizon of the future, an absence that is time.
The other is never wholly present to me; the other always
withdraws into its mystery.
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CHAPTER V
THE CONTRIBUTION OF LEVINAS TO AN UNDERSTANDING
OF ETHICAL PHENOMENA
In his critical reading of Heidegger, Levinas rethinks
the analysis of human Being in order to break with the
totalizing thought that attempts to grasp human Being as a
whole in relation to Being. Levinas reverses the direction
of Heidegger's thinking, describing the emergence of an
existent from anonymous existence in order to resist
Heidegger's claim that existence is characterized as
ecstatic Being outside of oneself in relation to Being.
Instead of beginning with the Being-with of anonymous
relations to Others and moving toward the solitude of
authenticity, Levinas describes the primordial solitude of
enchainment to oneself in the event of hypostasis that is
antecedent to Being-in-the-world; he describes the hope for
salvation from solitary material existence, a hope that is
only realized in relation to an Other. Levinas rethinks the
human relation to the world, he rethinks the human relation
to other human beings, and he rethinks Heidegger's analysis
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of temporality in order to point to a pluralism in existence
that does not reduce to the unity of Being.
This critical reading and rethinking of Heidegger that
takes up much of Existence and Existents and Time and the
Qtfrgr serves as preparation for Levinas 's subseguent inguiry
into the meaning and possibility of ethical reality. His
efforts to uncover inadequacies in Heidegger's analysis of
Dasein make room for his own fundamental rethinking of the
elemental conditions of human Being and the primordial
relations between human beings. His rejection of
Heidegger's emphasis on the meaning of Being as such is
directed by his own fundamental inquiry into what is
"otherwise than Being," the Good that transcends Being.
Throughout Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence . Levinas continues to contrast his work to
that of Heidegger and the Western philosophical tradition,
but his emphasis shifts to his own fundamental rethinking of
the meaning of ethics. The face to face relation, already
described in his critical reading of Heidegger, now takes a
central place in Levinas 's contribution to the problem of
ethics. It is the command of the Other in the immediacy of
the face to face relation that ruptures the solitary
existence of the self-identified ego and produces the
ethical relation of responsibility. And, according to
Levinas, ethical phenomena can be understood as the traces
of this primordial responsibility.
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This chapter will examine Levinas ' s contribution to an
understanding of ethical phenomena by starting with his
preparatory meditations on the idea of infinity and what he
calls metaphysical desire in the relationship with the
Other. This preparatory work is part of Levinas 's effort to
make room for the idea of the Good as that which transcends
the horizon of Being and to release ethics from its
subordination to ontology. He asserts that the central task
°f Totality and Infinity is to describe the metaphysical
relation, the face to face relation with the Other that
exceeds the totalizing thought of Western ontology. The
second part of this chapter is taken up with the
phenomenological descriptions that are carefully developed
in Totality and Infinity in order to concretely work out the
primordial structures of human existence and the meaning of
ethical responsibility. Guided by the problem of ethics,
Levinas adds to his analysis of elemental existence and
carefully develops the face to face relation as the locus of
ethical responsibility. Consideration of some of the
critics of Levinas in the third section of the chapter helps
to clarify the meaning of responsibility and leads into the
concluding section on Levinas ' s restatement of his
fundamental thinking about ethics in Otherwise than Being or
Bevond Essence .
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A. The Idea of Infinity
In the preface and opening section of Totality and
Infinity
,
Levinas once again takes up the task of
challenging the venerable tradition of Western philosophical
thinking, including Heidegger's ontology, by reversing the
priority of its terms. Levinas has already reversed the
direction of the thinking of Being in order to concentrate
on the upsurge of the existent from anonymous Being. Now
guided by the idea of infinity as that which is other than
the totality of essences, the primacy of the same over the
other, of ontology over metaphysics, and of freedom over
justice will also be reversed.
But this reversal of terms is not arbitrary; rather,
the reversal comes in response to the problems and failings
of Western ontology. These problems are presented by
Levinas in short essays published just before Totality and
Infinity . In "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" for
example, Levinas claims that Western philosophy can be
characterized as "the conquest of being by man over the
course of history" [ 1987a, p. 48 ] . By maintaining the freedom
and autonomy of the thinking being, philosophy engages in
encompassing every other in the same; and the work of truth
is then to integrate exterior realities, to fit the foreign
being into a network of a priori ideas. According to
Levinas
,
Cognition consists in grasping the individual,
which alone exists, not in its singularity which
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does not count, but in its generality, of which
alone there is science.
. . .The surrender of
exterior things to human freedom through their
generality does not only mean, in all innocence,
their comprehension, but also their being taken in
hand, their domestication, their
possession. .. .Reason, which reduces the other, is
appropriation and power. [ 1987a, p. 50]
But Levinas claims that this philosophy of the same is
challenged by another tradition in philosophy, the tradition
of the other. Plato stands in this tradition when he
locates the Good beyond Being, and Descartes' analysis of
the idea of infinity is also in this tradition. The
infinite is radically and absolutely other; and the alterity
of the infinite is not canceled in the thought that thinks
it because thinking cannot contain infinity—the ideatum
(the content of the idea) exceeds the idea of infinity.
In his own work, Levinas argues that the idea of
infinity occurs in the relationship with the Other; that
"The idea of infinity is the social relationship"
[1987a, p. 54] . Exposed to the face of another person, I
approach an exterior being beyond what I may contain or
possess. According to Levinas,
This situation is an experience in the strongest
sense of the term; a contact with a reality that
does not fit into any a priori idea, which
overflows all of them. . . .A face is pure
experience, conceptless experience. [1987a, p. 59]
This face—to—face encounter not only fails to fit neatly
into my comprehension, but the face of the Other measures me
and puts into question my right to appropriate and possess.
The face offers ethical resistance to my freedom, an ideal
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resistance rather than any real obstacle or menace, a "gaze
which forbids my conquest" and through which my freedom is
found to be arbitrary and unjust. And thus, Levinas claims,
I never find my solitude again; the consciousness of the
Other, moral consciousness, remains unsatisfied, is always a
desire
.
1 . Metaphysical Desire
The subtitle of Totality and Infinity is "An Essay on
Exteriority" and the central task of the book is the
description of the metaphysical relation, the face to face
relation with the absolutely Other that challenges Western
ontology. Levinas introduces the notion of transcendence to
mark both the absolute distance that separates the self-
identified I and the Other and the irreversible relation
between them. And he speaks of metaphysical desire as
desire for the absolutely other, desire for what is
elsewhere, alien, and outside of oneself. According to
Levinas, Western ontology is totalizing thought that
renounces metaphysical desire, a comprehension that brings
the other under a neutral concept or an ontological
structure in order to reduce it to the same. But the other
resists the system, breaks this totalizing comprehension,
refuses to be encompassed by generality. Totalizing thought
finds itself faced with an irreducible other, "refractory to
categories", an exteriority, an infinity. Metaphysical
desire is desire for what is not given, for what has no
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adequate idea; this is a desire for what is remote, for what
has height and nobility [ 1969b,p. 35 ] . And the metaphysical
desire for the absolutely other, for something I cannot
consume and possess, is present concretely in the face to
face relation with the stranger
,
the free one over whom I
have no power
.
According to Levinas, the relation of metaphysical
desire has its point of departure in the identity of the I.
To be I is to work at identifying oneself through all that
happens, and this work begins with the concrete relationship
between an I and the world. Levinas speaks of a sojourn in
the world, identifying oneself against the "other" of the
world by occupying a site, taking a stance, existing at home
with oneself [chez soi], and dwelling. In his earlier work,
Levinas had already described this self-identified
localization of consciousness as the solitude of the ego in
material existence [see Chapter IV, pages 98-100]. This is
a problematic solitude characterized by the freedom of
spontaneous living, but already not free in its dependence
on the contingencies of material life and in its solitary
enchainment to itself. Metaphysical desire is the desire
for liberation from this pure self-reference that cannot
even achieve sufficient distance from itself to be described
as self-conscious. The alterity of the world falls under
one's powers of possession and consumption and cannot
therefore liberate the self-identified I; but what is
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absolutely Other, the other person, can question and
challenge my possession. The self-identified I, engaged in
a sojourn in the world, finds itself faced with a stranger
who refuses possession or reduction to the same. The
stranger, unlike any object in the world, disturbs my being
at home with myself.
Metaphysical desire arises in relation to the stranger
who faces me and yet remains transcendent, infinitely
distant from my own reality. Levinas sets out to show that
this Other enters into a relation with the same through
language. In conversation and discourse, in speaking,
distance is maintained without destroying the relation;
likewise, in speaking, a relation is established without
compromising the transcendence and exteriority of the
stranger. The face of the Other is not simply a set of
qualities forming an image; rather, in speaking, the Other
expresses itself and overflows every image, exceeds the idea
of the Other in me [ 1969b, p . 50 ] . The metaphysical relation
with the Other as interlocutor is an immediate relation
where expression precedes any thematization. Speaking,
saying, the calling into question of the spontaneous freedom
of the ego, begins in the relation to the Other which
Levinas labels the ethical relation. According to Levinas,
The effort of this book is directed toward
apperceiving in discourse a non-allergic relation
with alterity, toward apperceiving Desire—where
power, by essence murderous of the other, becomes,
faced with the other and "against all good sense,"
the impossibility of murder, the consideration of
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the other, or justice. Concretely our effort
consists in maintaining, within anonymous
community, the society of the I with the Other
—
language and goodness This "saying to the
Other"—this relationship with the Other asinterlocutor
,
this relation with an existent—
precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate relation
in Being. [ 1969b, pp. 47-8
]
Thus we begin to see how Levinas will challenge the priority
of the terms of Western philosophical thinking through a
careful description of the pre-ontological relation to the
Other, the metaphysical relation that is also an ethical
relation.
2 . Radical Separation
Levinas continues in these preparatory sections of
Totality and Infinity to introduce terms and make
connections and distinctions in order to set the scene for
the phenomenological descriptions that follow. He
approaches the problem of the same and the other from a
slightly different direction, emphasizing that the idea of
infinity in the social relation implies a radical separation
of same and other and a metaphysical asymmetry. If the
metaphysical relation with the Other breaks with the
totality of the same, then the relation cannot be a
correlation or a reciprocal negation because this would
imply some further totality that could encompass both.
Rather, the metaphysical relation is asymmetrical; the same
as a radical interiority finds itself faced with the radical
exteriority of the Other. 1 This emphasis on radical
separation and asymmetry is a further attempt to break with
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the "totalizing thought" of Western ontology that gives
priority to the social whole, assumes the sameness of
individuals (the They-self of Heidegger's Dasein, for
example), and thereby avoids the problem of how I am related
to Others. Levinas will produce an entirely different
conception of society starting with the radical separation
of inferiority and the asymmetry of the face to face
relation
.
Separation of the same, according to Levinas, is
produced in the form of an inner life, a psychism, an event
in Being and a way of Being that resists totalization. The
inferiority of separated being has its own time, separate
from historical time. And here again Levinas wants to break
with a certain philosophical tradition:
The thesis of the primacy of history constitutes
an option for the comprehension of being in which
inferiority is sacrificed. The present work
proposes another option. The real must not only
be determined in its historical objectivity, but
also from interior intentions, from the secrecy
that interrupts the continuity of historical time.
Only on the basis of this secrecy is the pluralism
of society possible. It attests this secrecy.
[1969b, pp. 57-8]
Inferiority is a postponement of the totalization
accomplished in history. And radical separation implies
that each being has its own time, its own inferiority, a
secrecy that can never be exhibited in historical time.
Levinas also refers to radical separation as a "natural
atheism." This natural atheism is not a negation of the
divine but simply an absolute and naive independence; it is
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"produced primordial ly in the enjoyment of happiness" and
"accomplished in the plenitude of economic existence"
[ 1969b, p. 60 ] . Atheism denotes a separation so complete that
the separated being maintains itself in existence all by
itself and at home with itself.
3 • Discourse and the Quest for Truth
Levinas claims that this radical separation is a
necessary component of the quest for truth. He refers to
truth as a relation with exteriority, a contact between the
same and the other. Contrary to Heidegger, truth is not
rooted in a primordial participation in Being nor is truth
best described as disclosedness . Rather, Levinas claims,
truth is expressed in the "veritable conversation" that
occurs face to face, and the quest for truth involves the
risk of ignorance, illusion, and error because of the
radical separation of inner life. Thus truth is better
described as revelation. 2 Furthermore, the quest for
truth is not propelled by any lack since separated being is
satisfied and independent; rather, Levinas characterizes the
quest for truth as a "going toward the other in Desire"
[ 1969b, p. 61 ] . And according to Levinas,
Such a situation is language. Truth arises where
a being separated from the other is not engulfed
in him, but speaks to him. ... Separation and
interiority, truth and language constitute the
categories of the idea of infinity or metaphysics.
[1969b, p. 62]
Discourse is the quest for truth in a struggle between
thinkers; the presence of the Other calls into question my
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possession of the world, and to recognize the Other is to
ve * "Language is universal because it is the very passage
from the individual to the general
,
because it offers things
which are mine to the Other. To speak is to make the world
common, to create commonplaces..." [ 1969b
,
p . 76 ] . It is in
speaking, in discourse, that the relation of truth is
established between the same and the Other. And since the
relation between the same and the Other is an ethical
relation, there is a direct link between the primacy of this
ethical relation and truth. 3
Levinas makes the further claim that speech is the
origin of signification. Contrary to Heidegger's attempt to
locate signification within our practical behavior such as
the manipulation of tools, Levinas claims that objectivity
is not what remains of an implement or a food when it is
separated from the practical world, rather, objectivity is
posited in discourse, in conversation which proposes the
world, in speech which thematizes and interprets the world.
Thus Heidegger's view of truth as disclosure is called into
question, solitary certitude is called into question, and as
Levinas says, the locus of truth is society; truth commences
with language [ 1969b, p . 101 ]
.
4 . Justice. Truth, and Freedom
As in most of this preparatory work, the problem of
freedom is considered first in relation to the idea of
infinity and thus in abstraction from any concrete human
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experience. Levinas is critical of the European
philosophical tradition that attempts to produce justice
from "the undiscussed value of spontaneity," so that the
problem for political theory is to ensure "the most complete
exercise of spontaneous freedom by reconciling my freedom
with the freedom of others" [ 1969b, p. 83 ] . Levinas does not
deny this spontaneous freedom; in fact, he insists that
hypostasis is a first freedom, a primordial independence and
sovereignty. 4 And he claims that "Free beings alone can be
strangers to one another" [ 1969b, p. 73 ] . But he also claims
that this spontaneous freedom or primordial sovereignty is
seen to be arbitrary when it is called into question in the
face to face relation with the transcendent Other. He
argues that in order to know one's own imperfection, it is
necessary to have the idea of the perfect; similarly, "to
discover the unjustified facticity of power and freedom, one
must measure oneself against infinity" [ 1969b, p. 84 ] . The
idea of the perfect is present in desire, and desire
describes the welcoming of the Other in the metaphysical
relation. In welcoming the Other there is shame, "where
freedom discovers itself murderous in its very exercise ....
I
am not innocent spontaneity but usurper and murderer"
[ 1969b, p. 84 ] . The Other reveals a resistance to my powers
that is not a greater force but rather "calls in question
the naive right of my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a
living being" [ 1969b, p. 84 ] . And thus Levinas claims,
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Morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified by
itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent"
[1969b, p. 84]
.
According to Levinas, "Existence is not in reality
condemned to freedom, but is invested as freedom" and his
description of the metaphysical relation is intended to
"disclose the investiture that liberates freedom from the
arbitrary" [ 1969b, pp. 84-5 ] . The "for itself" of egoism is
only arbitrary and unjustified freedom, "virtually a null
freedom," by which he seems to mean that for separated
being, living from nourishments and wholly turned in upon
itself, freedom has little significance; it is merely the
spontaneity of any living being. But the Other facing me,
the transcendent Other calling me in question, invests my
freedom with the consciousness of shame and calls me to
justice. Thus according to Levinas, freedom requires
justification; in the approach to the Other, I submit my
freedom, my spontaneity as a living being, to judgement.
And Levinas calls this the experience of conscience:
My freedom does not have the last word; I am not
alone.... in conscience I have an experience that
is not commensurate with any a priori framework—
a
conceptless experience. Every other experience is
conceptual, that is, becomes my own or arises from
my freedom. We have just described the essential
insatiability of conscience, which does not belong
to the order of hunger or satiety. It is thus
that above we defined desire. Conscience and
desire are not modalities of consciousness among
others, but its condition. Concretely they are
the welcoming of the Other across his judgment.
[1969b, p. 101]
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If I forget that the Other is facing me, if I refuse this
challenge or avoid it by reducing the Other to categories or
generalities in order to preserve my spontaneous freedom,
then I risk moral failure and injustice. Spontaneous
freedom no longer serves as the ground for justice; rather
the significance of freedom depends on the ethical relation,
the face to face relation within which I am called to
justify my freedom. 5
In concluding his preparatory challenge to Western
philosophical traditions, Levinas re-asserts the radical
separation of the same and the other in order to emphasize
the pluralism in existence that opposes the ancient
privilege of unity. He refers once again to the way that
Greek metaphysics located the Good beyond the totality of
essences, and he insists that what is at issue is society,
the relations between human beings through which desire and
goodness first take on meaning. Once again, Levinas resists
the primacy of the social whole or the dissolution of the
existent into a relation with Being. Separation produced as
psychism is not a negation or a simple withdrawal from
participation in totality; it is a positive moment that
"opens upon the idea of Infinity" [ 1969b, p. 105 ] . To seek
the Good is not to fulfill some lack or privation; it is to
transcend the totality in desire. But all of these claims,
built around the idea of infinity, must be developed
concretely through the phenomenological analyses of
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separation and relation that take up the major work of
Totality and Infinity .
B. The Phenomenological Descriptions
1 • Interiority and Economic Existence
Levinas begins the phenomenological descriptions of
human existence and human relations with an analysis of the
separation of inner life, interiority, what Levinas calls
psychism. In his discussion of enjoyment, nourishment, and
the independence of separated being, Levinas explicitly
refuses several aspects of the Heideggerian analysis of
Dasein. He claims that the things we live from, "good soup,
air, light," are not tools or implements but simply objects
of enjoyment. For example,
Nourishment, as a means of invigoration
,
is the
transmutation of the other into the same, which is
in the essence of enjoyment: an energy that is
other, recognized as other, recognized, we will
see, as sustaining the very act that is directed
upon it, becomes, in enjoyment, my own energy, my
strength, me. [ 1969b, p. Ill
]
This enjoyment, living from that which fills my hunger and
nourishes me, is a consciousness but not a reflection or a
knowing or "an ontological Sorge for this life;" rather life
is love of life, enjoyment, happiness [ 1969b, p. 112 ]
.
Levinas insists that the human being thrives on its needs;
enjoyment is the exploitation of nourishments, a dependency
that turns into sovereignty and the happiness of
accomplishment.
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a * Sinoyment: An Elemental Condition of Human Being .
Enjoyment is not a psychological state but "the egoism of
life." Subjectivity, the upsurge of the self, psychism,
occurs in the independence and sovereignty of egoist
enjoyment: "For the I to be means neither to oppose nor to
represent something to itself, nor to use something, nor to
aspire to something, but to enjoy something" [ 1969b, p. 120 ]
.
And this enjoyment is personal; happiness marks the
particularity of personality so that the I of enjoyment is
not merely the product of the species or the network of
social relations. Levinas points again to the secrecy of
interiority and claims that the solitude of enjoyment is a
break with totality, a radical separation that produces a
pluralism in Being that is not merely a numerical
multiplicity
.
Levinas describes enjoyment as an unref lective
,
elemental condition of human being in a world of plenitude.
Every thing I encounter offers itself to enjoyment, and
enjoyment accompanies every use of things. Enjoyment is
naive, not bound up with any care for existence but carefree
and playful: "...it consists in sinking one's teeth fully
into the nutriments of the world, agreeing to the world as
wealth, releasing its elemental essence" [ 1969b, p. 134 ]
.
Need and enjoyment are "innocently egoist;" I am simply a
hungry stomach enjoying the wealth of nutriments that
satisfy my hunger. 6
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The enjoyment of the elemental plenitude of material
things constitutes sensibility; or as Levinas says,
sensibility is the mode of enjoyment. Enjoyment
accomplishes separation and the interiority of sensibility.
But sensibility does not constitute the world; it is not
reducible to representation and does not belong to the order
of thought. At the level of sensibility as a mode of
enjoyment, I simply stand in the world, at home with myself,
unreflective
,
without care or relations. Levinas insists
that we enjoy the world before things are fixed by language
or represented in thought; we simply relish life before any
care for existence. 7
The I of enjoyment is the autochthonous I, native,
indigenous, enrooted in the elemental world of nourishments,
independent and closed over upon itself in a self-sufficient
egoist atheism. But Levinas points to a necessary ambiguity
in the interiority of separated being; its closedness must
not prevent the revelation of the Other. "Interiority must
be at the same time closed and open" [1969b, p.149].
Exteriority must be able to speak to separated being,
otherwise there would be no incentive to rise above an
"animal complacency in oneself." And Levinas claims that
enjoyment itself supplies this necessary ambiguity.
Enjoyment has no security; "nourishment comes as a happy
chance" and the uncertainties of the future remind the I of
its dependence on the non-I. "The happiness of enjoyment is
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stronger than every disquietude, but disquietude can trouble
it; here lies the gap between the animal and the human"
[ 1969b, p. 149 ] . The pain of need, although it refers to the
happiness of satisfaction, reminds the I that the freedom of
enjoyment is limited. This insecurity experienced in the
instant of enjoyment is lived concretely as "concern for the
morrow" [ 1969b, p. 150 ] . Thus the analysis of separated being
expands from the paradisiacal enjoyment of elemental
plenitude toward the necessity of economic existence,
habitation in a dwelling, the labor that masters the
uncertainty of the future, and the first revelation of the
Other in the gentleness and peaceable welcome produced
primordially in the intimacy of the home.
b. Dwelling in a Home: Withdrawal and Intimacy .
According to Levinas 's analysis, the event of dwelling in a
home involves withdrawal from immediate enjoyment and allows
the separated being to "recollect itself" [se recueillir, to
meditate or gather its thoughts]. He speaks of the
privileged role of the home as the condition for human
activity, the place to which the human being can retire and
the place of inwardness from which the human being can go
forth into the world. 8 In the intimacy of the home, one
achieves a distance from enjoyment that is the condition for
labor and representation: "The recollection necessary for
nature to be able to be represented and worked over , for it
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to first take form as a world, is accomplished as the home"
[ 1969b, p. 152 ]
.
The separated being does not retreat into an
indifferent region" or "the cold void of the interstices of
being in order to contemplate the world. The distance
needed for recollection, the movement of attention away from
immediate enjoyment, is made possible by the familiarity and
gentleness of the elemental world of enjoyment. To dwell is
to "retreat home with oneself," and the separated being
dwells in the familiarity of nourishments that conform to
its needs. But according to Levinas, this "spontaneous
agreeableness of the elements is not yet habitation"
[ 1969b
,
p . 155 ] . Dwelling is also characterized by the
intimacy and familiarity of a human welcome. "The
anteriority of recollection is a solitude in a world already
human. Recollection refers to a welcome" [ 1969b, p. 155 ]
.
This intimate welcome in the home is produced as gentleness
and warmth; it is not the face to face encounter with the
transcendent Other, nor is it experienced as "a shock
negating the I." In this welcome the presence of the Other
is both revealed and withdrawn because the welcome involves
a familiarity and intimacy that is not a challenge to my
enjoyment of the world but an acceptance and sharing of that
enjoyment which Levinas characterizes as discretion.
Levinas describes this situation carefully:
And the other whose presence is discreetly an
absence, with which is accomplished the primary
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hospitable welcome which describes the field of
intimacy, is the Woman. The woman is the
condition for recollection, the interiority of the
Home and inhabitation ... .The Other who welcomes in
intimacy is not the you [vous] of the face that
reveals itself in a dimension of height, but
precisely the thou [tu] of familiarity: a language
without teaching, a silent language, an
understanding without words, an expression in
secret ... .This alterity is situated on another
plane than language and nowise represents a
truncated, stammering, still elementary language.
On the contrary, the discretion of this presence
includes all the possibilities of the transcendent
relationship with the Other. It is comprehensible
and exercises its function of interiorization only
on the ground of the full human personality,
which, however, in the woman, can be reserved so
as to open up the dimension of interiority.
[1969b, p.155] 9
Discretion is an attribute of "feminine alterity;" it is
produced as the cautious reserve of gentle familiarity
rather than as the challenge of the interlocutor.
There have been some objections to this interpretation
of welcome in the dwelling as the dimension of the feminine.
Simone de Beauvoir, for example, objects that Levinas
deliberately takes a man's point of view and asserts the
traditional male privilege that regards man as the rational
Subject and woman as the Other, defined relative to man and
therefore denied her own subjectivity and freedom [De
Beauvoir, 1952
]
xo Tina Chanter has summarized possible
feminist objections to this description of the feminine
including the fact that the woman is relegated to the
"relatively serene abode of the domicile," that the feminine
face is deprived of verbal speech, that the feminine is
characterized by gentleness and intimacy and therefore
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deprived of authority, dominance, and self-assertion, and
that the equation of femininity with discretion exemplifies
the historical invisibility of the woman behind the scenes
[Chanter, 1988]. At this point in his exposition, and
perhaps in anticipation of these feminist objections,
Levinas says,
The feminine has been encountered in this analysis
as one of the cardinal points of the horizon in
which the inner life takes place—and the
empirical absence of the human being of "feminine
sex" in a dwelling nowise affects the dimension of
femininity which remains open there, as the very
welcome of the dwelling. [ 1969b, p. 158
]
As Edith Wyschogrod explains, "Levinas 's intention, in my
view, is not to divide humanity so that one sex retains
human status while the other fades into the infra-human
which is neither expression nor reason. His effort is
directed not to reducing the human status of women, but to
separating the feminine element from the pure humanity of
women in order to bring to light the meaning of the erotic"
[ 1974 ,p. 120 ] . The human relation in the intimacy of the
home includes all of the possibilities of language and the
transcendent relationship. But it is the possibility of
intimacy and welcome rather than challenge, the possibility
of a sharing rather than a question or command that make
this relation part of the separation of the same and a
condition for the recollection that permits representation
and the labor that permits possession and property.
Femininity is the attribute of the human being (whether male
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or female) that provides the first welcome, warmth,
gentleness, and intimacy that transform the dwelling into a
home
.
11
c * Labor and Possession . The separated being may now
move out into the world of plenitude and grasp, seize and
take away elements. This activity that proceeds from the
home is no longer the living-from of enjoyment but labor.
Labor draws things from the elements, discovers durable
substances, acquires them as moveable goods, and puts them
in reserve in the home. By taking possession, by seizing
and fixing and depositing the elemental in the home, labor
suspends the uncertain future. Possession detaches the
elements from the "there is" and thus "removes being from
change" [ 1969b, p. 160 ] . As property, elements lose their
independence and become things. Levinas says that labor is
"the destiny of the hand," the grasping and taking prior to
any plan or project, "the first and blind grasping in the
teeming mass" [ 1969b, p. 159 ] . Thus labor is not a
transcendence: "The power of the hand that grasps or tears
up or crushes or kneads relates the element, not to an
infinity by relation to which the thing would be defined,
but to an end in the sense of a goal, to the goal of need"
[ 1969b, p. 160 ] . This is why Levinas has already claimed that
labor and possession, economic existence, are part of the
separation of the same and the egoism of the I; the
resistance of matter, of the non-I, is already broken in
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contact with the hand that detaches and removes it.
"Possession grasps being in the object... In placing it in my
home as a possession it confers upon it a being of pure
appearance, a phenomenal being; the thing that is mine or
another's is not in itself" [ 1969b, p. 162 ]
.
This activity of labor and possession is made possible
by recollection, a work of separation and a condition for
representation, which also takes place in the home.
Recollection draws me out of submergence in enjoyment and
implies withdrawal from the elemental. Recollection is not
an intellectual contemplation but merely the activity of "a
separated existence which affirms its independence in the
happy dependence of need" [ 1969b, p. 164 ] . The dwelling
allows the postponement of the insecurity of elemental
enjoyment; recollection is a consciousness of this
postponement. Levinas says, "To be conscious is precisely
to have time—not to exceed the present time in the project
that anticipates the future, but to have a distance with
regard to the present itself, to be related to the element
in which one is settled as to what is not yet there"
[ 1969b, p. 166 ] . Recollection is the work of localization in
the dwelling and achieves a distance from the present that
permits representation.
But representation depends on a further condition.
Levinas defines representation as "a determination of the
other by the same, without the same being determined by the
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other" [ 1969b, p. 170 ] . According to Levinas,
representational thought cannot be achieved in the
interiority of the separated being that is immersed in
living from the elemental. I must be able to see things in
themselves in order to represent them to myself; I must
therefore refuse both enjoyment, because I am immersed in
and therefore conditioned by the elemental Being of what I
enjoy, and possession, because the independent Being of a
thing is lost when I deposit it in my home. Levinas says,
...in order that I be able to free myself from the
very possession that the welcome of the Home
establishes, in order that I be able to see things
in themselves, that is, represent them to myself,
refuse both enjoyment and possession, I must know
how to give what I possess. Only thus could I
situate myself absolutely above my engagement in
the non-I. But for this I must encounter the
indiscreet face of the Other that calls me into
question. The Other—the absolutely other
—
paralyzes possession, which he contests by his
epiphany in the face. [ 1969b, p. 171
]
In his earlier discussions of the solitary ego, locked in
self-identification even in economic existence, Levinas
spoke of the face to face relation as a redemption from
self-reference and a liberation from the monotonous series
of instants that make up the present in the time of economic
life [see Chapter IV]. The Other interrupts the series of
instants with the absolute alterity of something new; the
face to face relation with the Other liberates the separated
being from its solitary enchainment to itself and introduces
the absolute alterity of the future. In Totality arid
Infinity . Levinas adds to his analysis of economic existence
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and insists that representational thought is also dependent
upon the relation with the "indiscreet other."
Liberation from Solitude . This indiscreet Other is
not familiar, not part of the intimacy in the home. The
Other calls into question my naive enjoyment and possession;
and this calling into question is manifested in language.
The Other breaks into the closed circle of solitude with a
height and mastery that Levinas describes as teaching:
The height from which language comes we designate
with the term teaching. .. .This voice coming from
another shore teaches transcendence itself.
Teaching signifies the whole infinity of
exteriority. And the whole infinity of
exteriority is not first produced, to then teach:
teaching is its very production. [ 1969b, p. 171]
The relationship with the Other consists in speaking,
speaking is a generalization that offers the world to the
Other, and therefore language is "a primordial
dispossession, a first donation" [ 1969b, p. 173 ] . Language
transforms a world that was wholly mine into a common world,
a world in which things receive a name. It is in speaking
to the Other, in giving what I possess, that I gain
sufficient distance from my absorption in the non-I to
permit representational thought. This relation with the
face of the indiscreet Other, a relation accomplished
through language, is therefore prior to the epistemic act of
representation. One cannot represent the world to oneself
in thought until one has achieved a distance from enjoyment
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and absorption in the world. This distance is accomplished
in relation to the indiscreet Other. 12
Only the face to face relation with the Other can break
through the solitude of economic existence. Laboring and
possession reduce the other to the same, and even the
products of labor, exchanged and possessed by the Other, do
not break through this separation, because interiority is
not manifest in alienable works. As Levinas says,
Through works alone the I does not come outside;
it withdraws from them or congeals in them as
though it did not appeal to the Other and did not
respond to him... From the work I am only deduced
and am already ill-understood, betrayed rather
than expressed.
But neither do I break through the crust of
separation by approaching the Other in his works,
which, like my own, are delivered over to the
anonymous field of economic life, in which I
maintain myself egoist and separated, identifying
in the diverse my own identity as the same,
through labor and possession. The Other signals
himself but does not present himself.
[1969b, p.176]
Thus in the economic life of laboring, production, activity,
and exchange, interiority is preserved and the presence of
Others engaged in economic activity "is simply signified by
a sign in a system of signs" [ 1969b, p. 178 ] . By contrast,
the Other expresses himself when he presents himself as a
face, when he speaks.
Radical separation implies the possibility that I can
close myself up in egoism, remain isolated and at home with
myself, and forget the transcendence of the Other. But I
can also welcome the Other by opening my home to him. And
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according to Levinas, it is only in approaching the Other
that I attend to myself. He claims,
The face I welcome makes me pass from phenomenon
to being in another sense: in discourse I expose
myself to the questioning of the Other, and this
urgency of the response—acuteness of the present-
-engenders me for responsibility; as responsible I
am brought to my final reality. [ 1969b, p. 178 ]
Levinas speaks of being attentive to the call of the Other,
recognizing the mastery of the Other, receiving commands.
This relation constitutes self-conscious subjectivity.
Commanded by the Other, called to respond, I am conscious of
myself as subject to the Other. In speaking to the Other,
in responding to the Other, I express myself, reveal myself,
and thereby become conscious of myself. Thus self-
consciousness can only occur when the solitude of separated
being is broken by the indiscreet Other.
This entire analysis contains an implied criticism of
Heidegger's discussion of Being-with as a fundamental
structure of Being-in-the-world
,
of the they-self and the
inauthenticity of everydayness, and of the call of
conscience in Being-towards-death. Where Heidegger's
analysis moves from the inauthentic they-self of
everydayness to the authentic Being-oneself that Dasein
comes to in facing the solitude and anxiety of death,
Levinas insists that the solitude of the separated ego is a
problem that is solved not by everyday economic relations
but by the face to face metaphysical relation. He argues
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that death cannot bring me to my existence as a "thing in
itself." He says,
Death is not this master. Always future and
unknown it gives rise to fear or flight from
responsibilities.
.. .Death, source of all myths, is
present only in the Other, and only in him does it
summon me urgently to my final essence, to my
responsibility. [ 1969b, p. 179
]
It is not the call of conscience in Being-towards-death that
brings Dasein to authentic Being-oneself from being lost in
everydayness, rather the call of the Other brings the
separated being out of egoist solitude and contentment,
evokes desire for transcendence, and gives rise to
responsibility. In Levinas 's view of economic existence and
the radical interiority and separation of the individual
human being, the Being-with of everyday economic relations
is not sufficient to break the solitude of individual
existence
.
It is the exteriority of the face that breaks the
totality of contentment and reveals "an insufficiency of the
separated being that is without possible satisfaction"
[1969b, p. 179] . This insufficiency is Desire. The
exteriority of the face does not limit free interiority,
rather the relationship with the Other is the desire for the
Other; and to speak face to face is to offer one's being to
the Other. Thus Levinas concludes this section,
The surpassing of phenomenal or inward existence
does not consist in receiving the recognition of
the Other, but in offering him one's being. To be
in oneself is to express oneself, that is, already
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to serve the Other. The ground of expression is
goodness. [ 1969b, p. 183
]
This is the metaphysical relation, the ethical relation, the
relation with exteriority that breaks through the solitude
of spontaneous egoism and permits self-conscious
subjectivity, the subjectivity which Levinas will claim is
not initially for itself but fundamentally for another. 13
2 . Exteriority. Discourse, and Responsibility
Having described the concrete conditions of radical
separation, the interiority of sensible experience and the
naive egoism of economic life, Levinas turns to examine more
closely the encounter with exteriority in the face of the
Other. He considers what he calls "the privilege of vision"
in Western philosophy, the idea that the access to beings is
through vision and that we use the language of vision to
describe all sensible experience: "The object disclosed,
discovered, appearing, a phenomenon, is the visible or
touched object" [ 1969b, p. 188 ] . Thus, for example, he
compares the face of the Other to the facade of a building;
a facade does not reveal, it simply appears, exposed and
relative to egoist sensibility. But by contrast, the face
of the Other person cuts across sensibility and reveals
itself in speech: "The relation with the Other alone
introduces a dimension of transcendence, and leads us to a
relation totally different from experience in the sensible
sense of the term, relative and egoist" [ 1969b, p. 193 ]
.
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The face of the Other is not a relative alterity but
infinitely transcendent and foreign. Levinas uses the term
epiphany to describe this manifestation of face, to capture
the claim that the face is neither simply seen nor touched,
that the face refuses to be comprehended or contained in
egoist sensibility. And yet epiphany is also intended to
describe the relation between the Other and me established
in speech, a relation that maintains absolute difference, a
relation between separated terms. According to Levinas,
Language accomplishes a relation between terms
that breaks up the unity of a genus. The terms,
the interlocutors, absolve themselves from the
relation, or remain absolute within relationship.
Language is perhaps to be defined as the very
power to break the continuity of being or of
history ... .Speaking, rather than "letting be,"
solicits the Other. Speech cuts across vision.
[1969b, p. 195]
Of course the Other can present itself as a theme, but as
interlocutor, the Other is freed from any theme and contests
any meaning I ascribe to him. Thus Levinas claims, "The
formal structure of language thereby announces the ethical
inviolability of the Other..." [ 1969b, p. 195]
.
a. Ethical Resistance . The idea of infinity in the
welcome of the face is produced by the presence of a being
that does not enter into but overflows the same and puts the
naive egoism of the I in question. The face resists
possession, resists both enjoyment and knowledge; the Other
is the stranger who is not part of my familiar world of
enjoyment. The face speaks and invites me into a relation
152
outside of labor and representation. Levinas says, "The
expression the face introduces into the world does not defy
the feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power [Mon
pouvoir de pouvoir]" [ 1969b, p. 198 ] . And yet the face is
still exposed to power, not to my power to take or consume
or comprehend, but to the possibility of murder:
Murder alone lays claim to total negation.
Negation by labor and usage, like negation by
representation, effect a grasp or a comprehension,
rest on or aim at affirmation; they can. To kill
is not to dominate but to annihilate, it is to
renounce comprehension absolutely. Murder
exercises a power over what escapes power.
[1969b, p. 198]
The Other, facing me, opposes my power to kill; the infinity
of his transcendence resists me: "This infinity, stronger
than murder, already resists us in his face, is his face, is
the primordial expression
,
is the first word: 'you shall not
commit murder'" [ 1969b
,
p . 199 ] . The face presents the
ethical impossibility of the temptation to kill, a purely
ethical resistance because it is not a matter of perception
or of conscious struggle but of a transcendence, a relation
with infinity.
This ethical resistance is not merely negative; the
Other presents itself in expression, speaks to me with both
height and humility, surprises me, appeals to me with its
destitution and hunger and solicits my response: "To
manifest oneself as a face is to impose oneself above and
beyond the manifested and purely phenomenal form. . .The being
that expresses itself imposes itself , but does so precisely
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by appealing to me with its destitution and nudity— its
hunger without my being able to be deaf to that appeal"
[ 1969b, p. 200 ] . The face of the Other is naked before me, it
is more than its manifestation as phenomenon and it escapes
description or qualification. There is both "mastery" and
"poverty" in the face of the Other that evokes "Desire" in
me. My desire for transcendence, desire for something I
cannot find in myself, characterizes my response to the face
as transcending and commanding. And desire to give of
myself and my wealth characterizes my response to the face
as destitute, as exposed to me without defense and yet
questioning my naive enjoyment. The Other is the one to
whom I owe everything, even my self-conscious subjectivity;
and the face of the Other evokes both submission and
generosity in me; "Thus in expression the being that
imposes itself does not limit but promotes my freedom, by
arousing my goodness" [ 1969b, p. 200 ] . Whatever the
possibilities for violence or disregard in relation to the
Other, Levinas insists that this analysis of the ethical
relation with the face is primary. The face speaks, and
face to face with the Other, I do not simply contemplate in
silence, I respond.
b. Discourse: Expression. Response, and
Responsibility . Levinas speaks of the "bond between
expression and responsibility" as the essence of language.
Confronted by the face of the Other, I am called into a
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discourse that I cannot evade. Prior to any disclosure of
Being, language has this ethical function; separated being
is called into question, called to justify itself before the
Other, called to respond. Levinas clearly has Heidegger in
mind when he says, ’’Preexisting the disclosure of being in
general taken as basis of knowledge and as meaning of being
is the relation with the existent that expresses himself;
preexisting the plane of ontology is the ethical plane"
[ 1969b, p. 201 ] . This is a "primordial discourse whose first
word is obligation," a discourse that "obliges the entering
into discourse;" this is discourse prior to the distinction
between voluntary and involuntary and therefore my response,
my responsibility, is "irrecusable"— it cannot be refused or
rejected [ 1969b, p. 201 ]
.
This event of expression which interiority cannot avoid
and cannot evade even by silence, is the first rational
teaching according to Levinas. The presentation of the
self, bearing witness to oneself in the face to face
relation, produces intelligibility. Confronted by the
Other, I come to see my egoism as contingent, my solitary
and spontaneous freedom as arbitrary, and I am drawn into
the discourse that founds signification. In discourse the
act of using a sign to designate a thing modifies my
relation of enjoyment and possession of the thing. I detach
things from my own usage and make them exterior: "The thing
becomes a theme. To thematize is to offer the world to the
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Other in speech" [ 1969b
,
p . 209 ] . The objectivity of things
therefore results from language and depends on
communication. As Levinas says,
To know objectively would therefore be to
constitute my thought in such a way that it
already contained a reference to the thought of
others. What I communicate therefore is already
constituted in function of others. In speaking I
do not transmit to the Other what is objective for
me: the objective becomes objective only through
communication. [ 1969b, p. 210
]
Thus Levinas claims that the pluralism of society is the
condition for objectivity. Material things that I consume,
enjoy, and possess do not become objects until I separate
them from my solitary and unreflective enjoyment, designate
them as exterior, and offer them as objects to the Other in
discourse
.
c. The Other and the Others: "The Third Party" . It is
in the context of the problem of objectivity and language
that Levinas first expands the horizon of relations to
consider what he refers to as "the third party," the
presence of Others in human society. In some passages,
Levinas simply seems to accept as fact that there are many
people. He does not attempt to deduce the third party;
rather he proposes a multiplicity of Others as in the
following example: "Everything that takes place here
'between us' concerns everyone..." [ 1969b, p. 212 ] . But
Levinas is also critical of the Western philosophical
conception of society that grants priority to the social
whole and defines individuals with reference to their
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participation in this whole. Levinas begins instead with
radical separation and the face to face relation, the
proximity of speaking to one another that establishes
relation while maintaining separation. But how do we move
from this face to face relation with the personal Other to
the multiplicity of social relations that constitute human
community? Levinas answers that the face to face relation
is not exclusive, never closed to all the Others. Instead,
he claims.
Language as the presence of the face does not
invite complicity with the preferred being, the
self-sufficient "I-Thou" forgetful of the
universe. . .The third party looks at me in the eyes
of the Other—language is justice .... the epiphany
of the face qua face opens humanity. [ 1969b, p. 213
]
The face of the Other who regards me is first a challenge
and an infinite demand, but also and at the same time, the
revelation of any possible human being. The Other is not my
beloved or my friend but the revelation of any Other. The
third does not have any specific feature but remains simply
the poor one, the stranger, destitute and naked and equal
because what is revealed in the face is otherness. And here
Levinas points to the fact that the Other who faces me is
also the servant of an Other. If the Other who faces me is
already obliged by another, then I am commanded to join in
this obligation to the third and thereby join in a network
of relations to Others. The relation with the Other, which
Levinas describes as discourse, is not only the putting in
question of my naive enjoyment; it is not only the call to
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responsibility; it is not only the speaking by which I give
lip my possessions and set forth an objective and common
world; it is the institution of human community.
d* Kinship and Community . Levinas insists that this
human community, instituted by language, must be understood
as a kinship;
The very status of the human implies fraternity
and the idea of the human race. Fraternity is
radically opposed to the conception of a humanity
united by resemblance .... Society must be a
fraternal community to be commensurate with the
straightforwardness, the primary proximity, in
which the face presents itself to my welcome.
[1969b, p. 214]
This description of society as a fraternal community, built
up from face to face relations between radically separated
individuals, is opposed to the idea of humanity as a unity
of individuals who share a common genus. Fraternity
involves "individualities whose logical status is not
reducible to the status of ultimate differences in a genus,
for their singularity consists in each referring to itself"
[ 1969b, p. 214 ] . But fraternity also involves the commonness
of a father; and Levinas claims, "Monotheism signifies this
human kinship, this idea of a human race that refers back to
the approach of the Other in the face, in a dimension of
height, in responsibility for oneself and for the Other"
[1969b, p. 214] . 14
This is a fraternity born out of asymmetry, since
Levinas insists that the face to face relation is
asymmetrical. The Other who faces me approaches from a
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dimension of height, dominates me in his transcendence,
summons me to respond, and judges me. But the presence of
the face is neither "a numinous essence arousing fear" nor
merely a phenomenon reducible to a representation. As
Levinas says, "To hear his destitution which cries out for
justice is not to represent an image to oneself, but is to
posit oneself as responsible, both as more and as less than
the being that presents itself in the face" [ 1969b, p. 215 ]
.
In responsibility, I am less than the Other because the
Other comes from a dimension of transcendence; but I am more
in that I am able to respond to his destitution and give of
my resources.
Finite Freedom . This analysis of responsibility in
the metaphysical relation leads into a discussion of
temporality and the idea of finite freedom. Levinas
explains
,
A being independent of and yet at the same time
exposed to the other is a temporal being; to the
inevitable violence of death it opposes its time,
which is postponement itself. It is not finite
freedom that makes the notion of time
intelligible; it is time that gives a meaning to
the notion of finite freedom. Time is precisely
the fact that the whole existence of mortal being-
-exposed to violence—is not being for death, but
the "not yet" which is a way of being against
death, a retreat before death in the very midst of
its inexorable approach. [ 1969b, p. 224
]
The embodied will can be affected as a thing, can be
mistreated, coerced, enslaved and killed; and yet, in its
interiority, the will can resist and refuse the foreign
will, postpone death, and thus maintain its finite freedom.
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As long as interiority can express itself, speak, it can
resist the threat of foreign wills and give itself a
reprieve from illness and injury. According to Levinas, the
essence of time is this "against-death of postponement"
[1969b, p.229]
.
Levinas opposes the traditional interpretation of death
and in particular, Heidegger's interpretation of death and
temporality. The traditional interpretations of death place
it within the alternatives of Being and nothingness; death
is either a passage to a new existence or it is departure
and disappearance. In Heidegger's ontology, Being-towards-
death determines the human being as a temporal being. But
according to Levinas, death is a menace, it approaches as a
mystery, and the imminence of death gives rise to fear for
my Being. The time that separates me from my death
constantly dwindles and yet I cannot apprehend the moment of
my death. Death "threatens me from beyond," across the
interval of transcendence, and it "strikes without being
received" [ 1969b, p. 233 ] . But the imminence of death
involves both menace and postponement. Levinas says, "To be
temporal is both to be for death and to still have time, to
be against death" [ 1969b, p. 235 ] . Furthermore, by contrast
to the movement produced by anxiety in Heidegger's Dasein,
the movement toward taking hold of one's ownmost
possibilities and becoming an authentic individual, Levinas
describes the "other chance" that the will seizes upon:
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The will, already betrayal and alienation ofitself but postponing this betrayal, on the way todeath but a death ever future, exposed to deathbut not immediately
,
has time to be for the Other,
and thus to recover meaning despite death.... We
have to show this in the course of bringing
to light the other chance that the will seizes
upon in the time left it by its being against
death: the founding of institutions in which the
will ensures a meaningful but impersonal world
beyond death. [ 1969b
,
p . 236
]
Since the freedom of inner life may be extinguished in the
sufferings of violence and death, this freedom must be
realized and confirmed in social and political institutions.
Here again, in the discussion of social and political
institutions, the primacy of ethics makes special demands.
Although the individual subjectivity submits to the
judgement of universal laws, justice demands that judgement
be a summons to respond, that the will be free to defend
itself through the personal discourse of apology. And truth
is tied to this summons to respond. According to Levinas,
In the justice that indicts my arbitrary and
partial freedom I therefore am not simply called
upon to concur, to consent and assume—to seal my
pure and simple entry into the universal
order .. .behind the straight line of the law the
land of goodness extends infinite and unexplored,
necessitating all the resources of a singular
presence. I am therefore necessary for justice,
as responsible beyond every limit fixed by an
objective law. [ 1969b, p. 245]
Clearly in his discussion of justice, law, and social
institutions, Levinas insists that the infinite
responsibility of the face to face relation, the "inward and
subjective morality," is necessary for justice. He further
insists that it is not the judgement of history that
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determines truth and justice but the summons of living
individuals to speak the truth, to bring the voice of
particular persons to bear against the judgement of history
and the justice of universal laws. 15
But death is inevitable for every particular person,
and beyond death, the judgement of history is met only by
silence and not by the apology of a living will. Levinas
insists that the manifestation of truth and goodness
requires more time than the lifetime of any particular
individual. And he therefore turns to a phenomenological
analysis of love and fecundity and the phenomenon of
paternity as "the primary phenomenon of time," the
phenomenon of the "not yet" that provides "the time
necessary for the manifestation of truth behind visible
history" [ 1969b, p. 247 ]
.
f. Eros. Fecundity, and Paternity . These human
experiences both presuppose and transcend the face to face
relation; they carry the I beyond death, and yet involve a
return to the self and a recovery of subjectivity in
relation to Others. For example, Levinas describes the
ambiguity of love interpreted as desire for the transcendent
on the one hand and as a return to self in the fulfillment
of needs on the other hand. Similarly he analyzes the
caress as sensibility; and yet, moved by desire, the caress
transcends the sensible. The caress does not aim at a
person or a body-thing; it seeks what always escapes, moved
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by desire that is "reborn in its satisfaction"
[ 1969b, p. 258 ] . Voluptuosity, erotic desire, is a pure
experience that involves neither vision nor expression, and
yet it presupposes the face to face relation. As what has
lost expression, the erotic refers to the face and yet goes
beyond the face. The lovers are isolated in a closed
relation that excludes the third party; this relation is an
intimate society without language.
Levinas describes paternity as a "trans-substantiation"
and a total transcendence; "the I is, in the child, an
other" [ 1969b, p. 267 ] . The father discovers himself in the
child and at the same time the child is a stranger; "My
child is a stranger (Isaiah 49), but a stranger who is not
only mine, for he is me. He is me a stranger to myself"
[ 1969b, p. 267 ] . The relation with the child establishes a
relationship with "the absolute future or infinite time."
Levinas explains that fecundity is a relation with the
future of a child, that fecundity produces infinite being
through the ever-recommencing being of children. He says;
Fecundity continues history without producing old
age. Infinite time does not bring an eternal life
to an aging subject; it is better across the
discontinuity of generations, punctuated by the
inexhaustible youths of the child. [ 1969b, p. 268
]
It is through the relation with the Other in love and
voluptuosity that this relation with the future is possible.
But Levinas does not limit paternal relations to biological
paternity. 16 He suggests that parental relations without
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biological bases and the relation of master to disciple also
illustrate paternity and filiality. And even here, the
relation with future generations depends on relations with
Others. As Levinas says, "This relationship resembles that
which was described for the idea of infinity: I cannot
account for it by myself
,
as I do account for the luminous
world by myself" [ 1969b, p. 247 ] . The relation with the
future established through fecundity transcends the unity of
Being and substance; this transcendence is time, it is
dependent on being for an Other, and it makes possible the
production of goodness and truth. There is a sense of the
openness of the future, not as a future possibility or a
projection drawn out of the past and acted upon in the
present, but as what is wholly new and "not yet." And
Levinas draws again on the notion of desire to describe this
open relation with the future:
Transcendence, the for the Other, the goodness
correlative of the face, founds a more profound
relation: the goodness of goodness. Fecundity
engendering fecundity accomplishes goodness .. .Here
the Desire which in the first pages of this work
we contrasted with need, the Desire that is not a
lack, the Desire that is the independence of the
separated being and its transcendence, is
accomplished—not in being satisfied and in thus
acknowledging that it was a need, but in
transcending itself, in engendering Desire.
[1969b, p.269]
Thus the infinity of time, necessary for goodness and truth
is produced by fecundity.
g. Plurality. Temporality, and Transcendence .
Returning briefly to his avowed need to break with
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Parmenides, Levinas explicitly refers again to Heidegger.
He notes that articulating existing as time and substituting
Becoming for Being are the first philosophical attempts to
break with the logic of unity. He applauds Heidegger's
rehabilitation of the possible." But Levinas also claims
that in Heidegger the possible is inverted into power and
domination. The subject recognizes himself in his
possibilities and masters the new. "His freedom writes his
history which is one; his projects delineate a fate of which
he is master and slave" [ 1969b, p. 275 ] . Heidegger's Dasein
remains destined to solitude; and although the later
Heidegger writes of errancy, mystery, and impotence, Levinas
argues that there is no relation to mystery, that the human
being remains a subject of knowing and powers, a subject of
truth and light. It is the erotic relation that breaks up
reality and attests to the plurality of our existing.
According to Levinas,
...in sexuality the subject enters into relation
with what is absolutely other, with an alterity of
a type unforeseeable in formal logic, with what
remains other in the relation and is never
converted into "mine , " . . . In voluptuosity the
Other, the feminine withdraws into its
mystery .. .Sexuality is in us neither knowledge nor
power, but the very plurality of our existing.
[1969b, pp. 276-7]
Similarly, Levinas points out that the categories of
knowledge and power do not describe one's relation with a
child. The child is neither my work nor my property;
fecundity is neither cause nor domination; rather, fecundity
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is the transcendence of the I. in the relation of
filiality, the past is always recaptured from a new
beginning. The child is both unique and a brother among
brothers in the relations of fraternity. Levinas again
notes that although biology provides the prototypes, these
relations free themselves from any biological limitation.
The human I is posited in fraternity, and it is the relation
with the face in fraternity that constitutes the social
order. The face of the Other appears in solidarity with all
the Others so that every dialogue, every face to face
relation refers to the third party and the equality
constituted by fraternity. 17
Levinas speaks of "true temporality" as a consciousness
of connection to the infinity of the future through the
relations of fecundity, paternity and filiality. He claims,
"In paternity, where the I, across the definitiveness of an
inevitable death, prolongs itself in the other, time
triumphs over old age and fate by its discontinuity"
[ 1969b, p. 282 ] . The future does not come to the I as
infinite possibilities grasped in the present; the future
comes to me "across an absolute interval whose other shore
the Other absolutely other—though he be my son—is alone
capable of marking, and of connecting with the past"
[ 1969b, p. 283 ] . Levinas claims that the formal structure of
time is death and resurrection, "a rupture of continuity,
and continuation across this rupture" [ 1969b, p. 284 ] . This
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formal structure of discontinuity presupposes the relation
of the I with the Other in fecundity so that I am conscious
of my connection to the new beginnings of the future.
According to Levinas,
The essential in time consists in being a drama, a
multiplicity of acts where the following act
resolves the prior one. Being is no longer
produced at one blow, irremissibly
present ... Inf inite being is produced as times,
that is, in several times across the dead time
that separates the father from the son. It is not
the finitude of being that constitutes the essence
of time, as Heidegger thinks, but its
infinity . . . .The fact and the justification of time
consist in the recommencement it makes possible in
the resurrection across fecundity, of all the
compossibles sacrificed in the present .. .Time 7 s
infinite existing ensures the situation of
judgement, condition of truth, behind the failure
of the goodness of today. [ 1969b, p. 284
]
Thus the work of time is pardon; time permits the repetition
and purification of the past through the relations of
fecundity. Fecundity allows us to escape from regret over
sacrificed or lost possibilities and be pardoned for our
failings; it liberates the I from the limitations of fate.
Pardon is a recommencement of the past and the possibility
that my apology will have the time necessary for the truth
to be told. In paternity, the I transcends its own finite
possibilities in relation to an Other; it escapes both the
silence of inferiority and the erasure of history that
judges individual life only by its works.
With his analyses of fecundity, paternity, and
temporality, Levinas concludes the work of Totality and
Infinity . In order to avoid the tyranny of subordinating
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the individual to objective rational social systems and the
equally unacceptable anarchy of arbitrary subjective
freedom, Levinas affirms the importance of human relations.
thinking about society, ethics, politics, freedom,
justice
,
and truth changes if we take the alterity of the
Other and the asymmetrical relation with the Other as
central to any description of human existence. The primacy
of responsibility for the Other established in the face to
face relation both limits my arbitrary spontaneous freedom
and, at the same time, permits the relation with the future
that allows me to resist totalization. The individual human
being is unique; we cannot simply be identified, classified
and counted or substituted as interchangeable parts in the
rational State. At the same time, the individual can only
express and realize that uniqueness in the face to face
relation, in speaking with an Other who is wholly exterior
and resistant to the knowing and possessing of my subjective
freedom. And it is the intersubjective relation of speaking
face to face that is the event of meaning and truth. The
human community is built on this communication between
separated beings and not on any prior totality or common
cause or relation to Being. Justice is not first a question
of protecting individual rights or maximizing individual
freedom. The concern for justice begins with the
multiplicity of human relations and the need to modify my
infinite ethical responsibility to the Other by considering
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the call to respond to all the Others including myself,
political system or social organization is preceded by the
ethical relation, the face to face expression of oneself
that is also the revelation of equality and fraternity in a
shared world; and the inevitable institutions that regulate
human life must be held in check by the desire for goodness
and the production of truth in this ethical relation. Thus
with the phenomenological analyses of human relations,
Levinas provides both a criticism and a corrective of
Western ontology. Ethics is not derived from ontology;
rather ontology, the possibility of saying what is, depends
on the ethical saying, the giving of my world to an Other.
C. Critics of Levinas
In order to further elucidate Levinas 's contribution to
an understanding of the meaning of ethics, it is useful to
consider some of the criticisms and questions raised by
various readers of Levinas. There are critics who are
concerned over Levinas 's apparent neglect of some of the
central concepts in Western philosophical ethics, critics
who examine Levinas 's philosophical discourse and method,
and critical readers like Derrida who focus on questions of
language that are a central part of Levinas 's subsequent
work. These critics of Levinas therefore provide a forum
for the clarification of the view of responsibility
contained in Totality and Infinity and a preparation for
Levinas 's restatement and further development of the ethical
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situation of responsibility in Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence .
1- Criticisms and Clarifications
Viewed from the concerns of traditional Western
philosophical ethics, there are many problems opened up by
Levinas s phenomenology of the Other
. One of these problems
is raised by Robert Ehman in a comparison of Levinas with
Sartre [Ehman, 1975 ]. According to Ehman, both Sartre and
Levinas describe the Other as transcendent; for both, the
encounter with the Other transforms the world from private
to common and permits the objectification of things. But
Ehman suggests that despite these similarities, Sartre and
Levinas describe opposite and problematic responses to the
Other. In Sartre, the vulnerability of shame motivates a
struggle by which I attempt to preserve my freedom, to
manipulate and control the Other, to reduce the Other to a
subordinate object. But in Levinas, the encounter with the
Other summons me to justify my freedom, the face of the
Other calls upon me to answer and arouses desire,
generosity, and a movement toward the Other. Ehman 's worry
is that Levinas describes an encounter with the Other that
might subjugate one to potentially unending demands without
reciprocity: "...for Levinas we generously abnegate in
favor of the other. He shames us into giving him a right to
everything we possess. Yet without firm rights, are we not
without legitimate freedom?" [ 1975 , p. 144 ] . According to
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Ehman
,
if the Other transcends us, whether as in Sartre's
view or as in that of Levinas, we get unacceptable
alternatives; either we struggle to negate his transcendence
or we give ourselves over to the Other in an attempt to
fulfill his demands. Ehman therefore rejects both
alternatives in favor of confronting the Other as an alter
ego "who can make no more claims against us than we can
against him" [ 1975
,
p . 144 ] . He claims we must recognize the
Other as another self and thus recognize mutual rights to a
share of the world and mutual limits on freedom. Ehman
concludes: "In order to escape from the never ending
struggle that Sartre describes, we need only mutually
recognize that we do not transcend one another and that the
claim to transcendence on either side is a self-defeating
illusion that destroys the possibility of the mutual respect
which is the foundation of any genuine ethics and genuine
dialogue" [ 1975 ,p. 145 ]
.
A similar concern over unlimited moral responsibility
is expressed by Roland Paul Blum [1983]. He claims that
ethical theory since Kant has viewed moral obligations as
discrete aspects of human existence with specific origins
and objects; we want to be able to evaluate performance, to
say when persons have adequately fulfilled their duties.
And according to Blum, Rawls is the clearest contemporary
example of this view in which rationally self-interested
persons develop a system of rules to guarantee freedom and
171
maximize their individual chances of happiness. Levinas
offers an alternative to this derivative morality, a theory
of "unlimited obligation" concerned with one's
responsibility to Others, responsibility that is a permanent
fact about oneself: "It has never been consciously assumed
and it can never be discharged" [ 1983 ,p. 147 ] . Blum sees
this as an important alternative to what he labels
individualist ethics, an alternative that may help to
explain commitments to parents and friends, for example,
that are part of a moral framework not obviously dependent
on individual decision. But Blum goes on to argue that
Levinas develops a religious ethics without religious dogma,
an ethics that depends on an equivocation or confusion of
commitment to other persons with commitment to God. 18 Blum
accuses Levinas of combining Descartes' arguments regarding
God with Husserl's arguments regarding alter egos; Levinas
focuses on the other person but equivocates on the question
of who this Other is, a humble Husserlian alter ego or
Descartes' infinite God. Thus for example, Blum says,
The Other, indeed, demands everything of me... But
where are the Other's obligations to me? They are
never mentioned. Here the analogy between the
Other and God is clear, for one does not talk of
God's obligations to man. . .Were God to have
obligations, He would be merely another man, for
He would be caught in a network of reciprocal
relations. Similarly, Levinas must view the
Other's status as analogous to that of God, for,
if he had obligations to me, he also would be
caught in a "totality" of reciprocal relations.
[1983, p. 166]
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Blum objects to the possibility of unreciprocated and
unlimited obligations to the Other, claiming that under
conditions of infinite obligation a person is "threatened
with an oppression, a violence just as great as any Levinas
wishes to avoid by constructing his attack against totality"
[ 1983 ,p. 167 ] . Blum affirms the importance of reciprocal
relations even if these require the sort of never-ending
struggle that Sartre describes. And although he
acknowledges Levinas 's discussion of the third party and his
concern for justice, Blum claims that Levinas has not
explained how we should adjudicate between rival claims and
has not given us a theory of society that would allow for
practical ethics.
Both of these critics, so concerned to maintain
reciprocity and rights, either exaggerate or ignore
important aspects of Levinas 's work. Whereas in Sartre's
analysis I attempt to reduce the Other to a subordinate
object, Ehman reads Levinas as claiming that the Other
reduces me to this position. But in Levinas the
transcendence of the Other means that the other person
escapes my comprehension, is not part of my appropriation
and possession of the world; and the first word of the Other
is thou shalt not kill, a negative injunction that both
acknowledges my power to kill and calls me to respond.
Levinas would reject both alternatives o’ffered by Blum to
characterize this Other; this is neither another my (self)
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nor the absolutely transcendent God but the other person who
transcends my categories and yet enters into relation with
me by speaking. Levinas describes a world peopled by many,
he describes the welcome in the home, economic relations of
labor and production, relations of fecundity and filiality,
a world of relations with Others who are not "analogous to
God." Perhaps if there were only the separated self and the
Other in the face to face relation, perhaps if there were
not Others always making their infinite rival demands, we
might worry that this could be an oppressive relation where
I might lose my freedom rather than simply being called upon
to justify it. But already in the face of this Other I
encounter the third party and all of humanity so that
problems of justice, reciprocity, and rights always break in
upon my unlimited responsibility for the Other. Levinas
does not disregard my rights or the obligations that other
persons might have to me. He does insist that my rights and
Others' reciprocal responsibilities are not part of my
ethical concerns but important concerns of justice within
particular social and political institutions. He has not
developed an "ethics" of rules or any programmatic
regulation of the many human relations that call for
justice. But he has insisted that rational self-interest is
not an adequate foundation for justice, and he has described
the need for justice that grows out of the face to face
ethical relation. Justice exercised through institutions
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must guarantee freedom and preserve fraternity and equality.
And the fact that institutions may be unjust (as happened
for example in Germany, in the years 1933-1945) reinforces
his claim that institutions must be held in check by the
priority of the interpersonal ethical relation.
2 . More Cautious Responses to Levinas
In addition to these criticisms, Steven Smith expresses
concern over the status of moral and theoretical argument in
Levinas 's texts [Smith, 1981]. He asks "How can there be a
rational argument concerning an Infinite that avowedly
exceeds any rational Totality?", "How can there be a
phenomenological description of something that is not
evident, or an ontological analysis of something that is
beyond Being?" and "If Levinas 's analysis is neither
phenomenological nor ontological, what is it? Why call it
philosophy?" [ 1981 ,p. 231 ] . Thus for example. Smith claims
that a major thesis of Totality and Infinity is that justice
is prior to truth; but this priority of justice is a
philosophical thesis and Levinas is therefore apparently
arguing the truth of justice. Smith raises further
objections to Levinas 's attempt to describe an ethical
relation to what is absolutely Other and his articulation of
moral considerations opposed to Being and history that
nevertheless "travel in theoretical garb" [ 1981 ,p. 235] . He
says, "...if anti-ontology fails to dissociate itself from
ontology, what is it but bad ontology? And if it succeeds,
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what does it show but the distressing fact that morality and
reality never come together?" [ 1981
,
p . 235 ] . But Smith
quickly transforms these apparent critical questions into an
attempt to show that although Levinas operates with a
theoretical vocabulary his arguments are better seen as
gestures that overflow evidence and logic. Smith describes
Totality and Infinity as performative rather than
descriptive; the ethical relation is not described but
accomplished. He locates the clue to this interpretation in
Levinas 's claim that ethics is an optics. Levinas does not
expect to demonstrate or deduce his conclusions in order to
coerce assent. Rather, as Smith points out,
According to Levinas, Cain is wrong; we are
elected, prior to any conscious and deliberate
assumption of responsibility, to be responsible
for our brothers. But it belongs essentially to
the goodness of this responsibility that it be
gratuitous and independent of coercive
demonstration. [ 1981, p. 240]
In fact. Smith claims, we must acknowledge our moral
responsibilities, put on our moral spectacles in order to
follow the conceptual development of Levinas 's philosophy;
and if we refuse, if we declare ourselves to be moral
skeptics, then we will have logic and evidence on our side.
Smith suggests that we need to appreciate the non-coercive
"sweet" reason of Levinas 's self-conscious rhetoric, the
personal order of appeal and justification that produces a
responsive and open-ended discussion and transcends the
mechanical necessity of coercive argument. Smith says,
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It is thus not a defect but precisely the glory of
purely "rhetorical" argument that it is
inconclusive. The coercive demonstration, the
winning move that would terminate all argument, is
abstained from in order to preserve what argument
is primordially expressive of, viz. moral
fellowship. [1981, p.243]
Levinas 's rhetoric is performative in just this sense, a
call to responsibility, a gesture toward the pre-original
ethical relation that overflows theoretical concepts and
arguments
.
There is a remarkable similarity among other critical
readers of Levinas, a remarkable caution and no simple
rejection of his work. David Boothroyd, for example, in his
concern with Levinas 's reading of Heidegger, expresses the
need to suspend critical demands in order to undertake a
"Levinasian meditation" : "The provocation of the ethical
reflects the fact that I am already implicated in this
discourse which focuses on the I-Other conjuncture. It is I
who am being called to responsibility and not merely to
engage myself in a philosophical discourse on ethics"
[1988, p. 29]. Similarly, Charles William Reed refers to his
own careful investigation of the question of method in
Levinas and concludes that a focus on method misses the
important stylistic gestures and inflections, the questions
that call for a response: "The real provocation of Levinas
lies in the questions he addresses to us not only as
philosophers but also as fellow human beings" [ 1986, p. 74].
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In his frequently cited commentary on Levinas,
"Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida also exhibits this
caution. In one commentary on Derrida's essay, Robert
Bernasconi claims that Derrida is not writing a critique of
Levinas but instruction that re-affirms the incoherence of
saying the unsayable, describing the indescribable, denying
the tradition on which it depends [ 1987
,
p . 130 ] . Thus
Derrida begins with what he refers to as a partial reading
of Levinas followed by several questions of which he says,
"If they succeed in approaching the heart of this
explication, they will be nothing less than objections, but
rather the questions put to us by Levinas" [ 1978, p. 84]. And
when he turns to the questions of language that are his
primary concern, Derrida says, "But if our commentary has
not been too unfaithful, it is already clear that there is
no element of Levinas 's thought which is not, in and of
itself, engaged by such questions ... .the route followed by
Levinas 's thought is such that all our questions already
belong to his own interior dialogue..." [ 1978 ,p. 109 ]
.
Despite this caution, it is important to examine the
questions raised by Derrida, especially since questions of
language become central in Levinas' s subsequent work,
Otherwise than Being or Bevond Essence .
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3 * Derrida's Reading of Lev inas: Fundamental Thinking and
Questions of Language
Derrida rehearses the paradoxes in Levinas, the
absolute proximity and absolute distance in the face to
face, the phenomenon of the Other as non-phenomenon, the
call for a break with Parmenides that would use Greek to
escape the Greek logos. Derrida questions the apparent
necessity of "lodging oneself within traditional
conceptuality in order to destroy it" and suggests that the
Greek logos is inescapable. Thus, for example, although
Levinas wants to claim that the relation with true
exteriority is not a spatial relation because space is the
site of the same, he nevertheless uses the word
"exteriority" which "obstinately beckons toward space and
light" [ 1978 ,p. 112 ] . Similarly, Levinas must speak of the
Other in the language of the Same and he can only state the
infinite that exceeds the totality in the language of the
totality, so that Derrida remarks, "Perhaps Levinas calls us
toward this unthinkable-impossible-unutterable beyond
(tradition's) Being and Logos. But it must not be possible
either to think or state this call" [ 1978 ,p. 114 ]
.
Derrida raises questions regarding Levinas 's reading of
Husserl, suggesting that they are not as far apart as
Levinas supposes. For example, he points to Levinas 's
fundamental disagreement with Husserl, that Husserl makes
the Other the ego's phenomenon; the Other appearing as alter
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ego is thus reduced to the same. But Derrida objects that
Husserl respects the alterity of the Other; he is concerned
with describing how the Other as other is presented to me:
"For it is impossible to encounter the alter ego (in the
very form of the encounter described by Levinas), impossible
to respect it in experience and in language, if this other,
in its alterity, does not appear for an ego (in general)"
[ 1978 ,p. 123 ] . Levinas and Husserl are very close in their
assertions that I can never have access to the subjective
experience of the other person. And according to Derrida,
"by acknowledging in this infinitely other as such
(appearing as such) the status of an intentional
modification of the ego in general, Husserl gives himself
the right to speak of the infinitely other as such,
accounting for the origin and the legitimacy of his
language" [ 1978 ,p. 125 ] . By contrast, Levinas refuses to
acknowledge an intentional modification of the ego and
nevertheless speaks of the infinitely Other; "he deprives
himself of the very foundation and possibility of his own
language" [ 1978 ,p. 125] . Derrida argues that the Same and
the Other are relational concepts that make no sense except
if the Other is already in the Same in some sense (for
example, if I know myself to be other for the Other). And
finally, Derrida claims that the living present is the only
form of egological life, that there is no experience which
can be lived other than in the present, so that Levinas 's
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notion of the face to face relation as a past that was never
a (past) present "marks the impossible-unthinkable-
unstatable not only for philosophy in general but even for a
thought of being which would seek to take a step outside
philosophy" [ 1978
,
p . 132 ] . Thus Derrida points to the
paradox that Levinas 's metaphysics both presupposes and puts
in question Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. He
points to the paradox that Levinas must use the
phenomenological method, the language of philosophy, to ask
a question that escapes phenomenology; Levinas can only
create a silent opening with a question put to philosophy as
logos
.
Derrida also spends a portion of this essay examining
Levinas 's relation to Heidegger. Derrida looks closely at
Levinas 's claim that the priority granted to Being over the
existent subordinates the ethical relation to an impersonal
relation with the Being of the existent. But Derrida
argues, on behalf of Heidegger, that Being is not a
mysterious ontic power; "Being is but the Being-of this
existent, and does not exist outside it as a foreign power,
or as a hostile or neutral impersonal element" [ 1978 ,p. 136 ]
.
When Levinas claims that ontology as first philosophy is a
philosophy of power, Derrida argues that the thought of
Being is neither ontology nor first philosophy because it is
not concerned with the search for first principles.
Furthermore, according to Derrida, "the thought of Being is
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neither concerned with, nor exercises, any power" because
power is a relationship between existents and because the
thinking of Being "has no result" and "produces no effect"
[ 1978, p. 137 ] . Derrida concedes that the thinking of Being
is "radically foreign to ethics" but he claims that it is
neither a counterethics nor a kind of ethical violence.
Rather
,
he claims that no ethics can be opened without the
thought of Being, that the "precomprehension of Being"
conditions the recognition of the essence of the existent,
and therefore conditions the "letting-be" of an existent
Other as something existing outside of me [ 1978 ,p. 138 ] . And
letting-be does not mean that the Other is the object of my
comprehension first; if the Other is an interlocutor first
and foremost, then letting-be will respect the Other as
interlocutor. Although he is aware that Heidegger and
Levinas are fundamentally concerned over different
questions, Derrida reads them together in order to show that
Levinas' s pointing beyond Being depends on the language of
Being
.
The difficulties that Derrida locates in Levinas' s use
of language can also be seen in Heidegger and contribute to
misunderstandings of his work. Thus for example, Derrida
claims that for Heidegger "it is impossible to avoid the
ontic metaphor in order to articulate Being in language" but
at the same time Heidegger insists that "Being is not an
excellent existent" and would refuse the idea of a relation
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to Being. Contrary to Levinas 's interpretation, Derrida
claims
,
Like the Other, Being is not at all the accomplice
of the totality, whether of the finite totality,(the violent totality of which Levinas speaks) or
of an infinite totality. The notion of totality
is always related to the existent. it is always a
"metaphysical" or "theological" notion, and the
notions of finite and infinite take on meanings in
relation to it. Foreign to the finite totality,
or to the infinity of existents, foreign in the
sense specified above, foreign without being
another existent or another totality of existents,
Being could not oppress or enclose the existent
and its differences. [1978, p. 141]
Thus Derrida claims that Being is foreign to concept,
category, and totality so that Levinas 's "beyond essence"
would not lead beyond Being but only beyond the totality of
the existent or beyond ontic history.
Just as he affirmed Levinas # s simultaneous use and
rejection of Husserl's methods and insights, so Derrida now
insists that "Levinas must ceaselessly suppose and practice
the thought of precomprehension of Being in his discourse,
even when he directs it against 'ontology'" [ 1978 ,p. 141 ]
.
Derrida points out that there is no speech, no Logos, except
if there is already, implicitly, thought of Being. One
cannot speak without using concepts and only "a language of
pure invocation, pure adoration" could avoid predication and
the verb to be [ 1978 ,p. 147 ] . And if thought of Being is
necessary for understanding, required for speaking, then
Levinas must once again presuppose and use what he wishes to
attack. According to Derrida,
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By making the origin of language, meaning, anddifference the relation to the infinitely other,
Levinas is resigned to betraying his own
intentions in his philosophical discourse. The
latter is understood, and instructs, only by first
permitting the same and Being to circulate within
it. [1978, p.151]
But of course, as Derrida acknowledges, Levinas is aware of
these problems of language. He is aware that even the
concept of experience is determined by the metaphysics of
presence, and he therefore attempts to speak of the face to
face relation as prior to or outside of experience. As
Derrida notes, Levinas can only describe "the dream of a
purely heterological thought at its source A pure thought
of pure dif ference . . . . We say the dream because it must
vanish at daybreak, as soon as language awakens"
[1978, p. 151]
.
Thus according to Derrida, reading with Levinas we may
view his work as radically opposed to Heidegger, but we may
also view the work of these two thinkers from outside as
"the proximity of two 'eschatologies' which by opposed
routes repeat and put into question the entire
'philosophical' adventure issued from Platonism"
[ 1978 ,p. 149 ] . Heidegger approaches the Western
philosophical tradition with the question of the meaning of
Being; Levinas approaches the same tradition with the
question of otherness. Both must use a language that
obscures the questions they raise. And both must attempt to
say the unthinkable and unsayable.
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What this inside/outside critical reading itself
obscures is pointed out by Theodore de Boer in his
interpretation of Levinas [De Boer, 1986]. De Boer also
notes affinities between Levinas and the later Heidegger.
In particular, he claims that both reject the autonomy of
thought. in Levinas 's analysis, critical consciousness and
objectivity arise only in relation to the indiscreet Other
who challenges my solitary and spontaneous enjoyment with
the first rational teaching. And in Heidegger the rejection
of the autonomy of thought can be seen in discussions of man
as the shepherd of Being and in the claim that to think is
to thank and that Being is a gift. But de Boer also says:
"Despite these changes in the thought of Heidegger, however,
there is one important trait that remains constant—the
ethical indifference of his philosophy" [ 1986 ,p. 108 ]
.
Derrida acknowledges this in his own way: "All the
classical concepts interrogated by Levinas are thus dragged
toward the agora, summoned to justify themselves in an
ethico-political language that they have not always sought
—
or believed that they sought—to speak, summoned to
transpose themselves into this language by confessing their
violent aims" [1978, p. 97]. But Derrida is primarily
concerned with the problems of language, the problems
encountered when the philosopher paradoxically attempts to
open a critical space within the Greek Logos through the
inescapable use of that same Logos. The complexity of
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Derrida's reading of Levinas is guided by these concerns
over language and not by the problem of the Other and ethics
that moved Levinas himself. As we will see in the following
section, Levinas had already acknowledged concerns over
language in the preface to Totality and Infinity and would
continue to wrestle with the problems of speaking in the
language of Being about that which is other than Being in
his next major work, Otherwise than Being or Bevond Essence ,
without ever losing sight of the priority of ethics.
D. Bevond Being or Otherwise Said
When Robert Bernasconi considers the problem raised by
Derrida, the problem that Levinas 's ethical language is
necessarily "contaminated by the language of ontology," he
argues that we cannot simply impose a purifying formalism on
Levinas's language [ 1988 ,p. 249 ] . Levinas himself is
committed to a higher value than the purity of philosophical
language; he is committed to the attempt to "say" the
ethical situation of responsibility. Bernasconi explains,
Levinas is familiar to the point of exasperation
with the objection that his own discussion is a
thematizing. He is clear that the beyond, the
anarchical, the non-thematizable
,
can only be said
by "an abuse of language," such as the unsaying of
every saying... and the unsaying must unsay itself
in turn and so on without halt. There are no
definitive formulae, but always only the recourse
to an "otherwise said." [1988, p.249]
Thus even the preface to Totality and Infinity begins the
process of unsaying what has been said, the attempt to "undo
the inevitable dogmatism that gathers up and gauges an
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exposition in pursuit of its theme" [Levinas 1969b, p. 29].
As Levinas says in the conclusion to this preface,
The word by way of preface which seeks to break
through the screen stretched between the author
and the reader by the book itself does not give
itself out as a word of honor. But it belongs to
the very essence of language, which consists in
continually undoing its phrase by the foreword or
the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting
to restate without ceremonies what has already
been ill understood in the inevitable ceremonial
in which the said delights. [1969b, p. 30]
Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence begins with
these problems of language, with concerns over the
"undethronable royalty" of the verb to be, the difficulty of
getting beyond Being, and the hold that the said has over
saying. 19 Saying as "the proximity of one to the other" is
congealed or immobilized in the said, and although Levinas
describes this as a betrayal of the pre-original speaking
face to face, it is also "the price that manifestation
demands" [1981, p.7]. According to Levinas, in the attempt
to state transcendence, no linear exposition is possible;
rather, the exposition is repetitive, overlapping, an
unsaying and re-saying, using metaphor, analogy, and even
hyperbole to describe subjectivity as constituted by
infinite responsibility.
1 . The Savina and the Said
This book is filled with passages like the following:
Vulnerability, exposure to outrage, to
wounding, passivity more passive than all
patience, passivity of the accusative form, trauma
of accusation suffered by a hostage to the point
of persecution, implicating the identity of the
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hostage who substitutes himself for the others:
all this is the self, a defecting or defeat of the
ego's identity. [1981, p.15]
This passage describes the subjectivity of the subject,
exposure to the Other, the pre-original ethical relation
that Levinas claims is only an "echo of the saying" in the
said, an echo that can easily be effaced and ignored. 20
The task of philosophy according to Levinas is to reduce
what shows itself in the said in order to prevent it from
congealing into an essence; "reduction is reduction of the
said to the saying beyond the logos, beyond Being and non-
being, beyond essence... It is the reduction to
signification, to the one-for-the-other involved in
responsibility— " [1981, p. 45].
But going back from the said to the signification of
the saying is not a passage from an apparent world to a more
real world; Levinas uses the phrase "the hither side of or
the beyond being" in an attempt to articulate what he refers
to as the amphibology and diachrony of the unsayable
otherwise than Being. He says, "This saying, in the form of
responsibility for another, is bound to an irrecuperable
,
unrepresentable, past, temporalizing according to a time
with separate epochs, in a diachrony" [ 1981, p. 47].
Diachrony indicates the problem that saying and being unsaid
cannot be assembled at the same time, and Levinas uses the
analogy of the role of skepticism in philosophy to
illustrate: "To conceive the otherwise than being requires,
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perhaps, as much audacity as skepticism shows, when it does
not hesitate to affirm the impossibility of statement while
venturing to realize this impossibility by the very
statement of this impossibility" [I981,p.7]. The attempt to
resay the unsayable in Otherwise Than Being contributes to
an understanding of responsibility; it provides both a
restatement and further development of the priority of
ethics and the intersubjectivity that is the locus of
meaning, goodness, and truth.
2 . Exposure and Passivity
Levinas is concerned to find new ways to speak about
the pre-ontological proximity that marks responsibility.
Thus he speaks of saying as exposure to another; one
approaches a neighbor "despite oneself," without any
reference to a wish or will, in passivity that is prior to
any voluntary action, prior to any consciousness of freedom
or non-freedom. This despite oneself is "the living human
corporeality, as a possibility of pain, a sensibility which
of itself is the susceptibility to being hurt, a self
uncovered, exposed and suffering in its skin" [ 1981, p. 51].
And further, he says.
The most passive, unassumable, passivity, the
subjectivity or the very subjection of the
subject, is due to my being obsessed with
responsibility for the oppressed who is other than
myself ... .The exposure to another is
disinterestedness, proximity, obsession by the
neighbor, an obsession despite oneself, that is, a
pain. [1981, p. 55]
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This exposure to the Other is not something added to the
ego, rather the one in its uniqueness is the one-in-
responsibility: "Here uniqueness means the impossibility of
slipping away and being replaced— uniqueness of the chosen
or required one, who is not a chooser..." [1981, p. 55]. I am
not aware of my unique particularity and my activity cannot
be characterized by will or choice until my solitary and
spontaneous enjoyment of the plenitude is broken by exposure
to the exteriority of the face which speaks to me and
commands a response. And the passivity of exposure,
conceived to be on the hither side of freedom and non-
freedom, "must have the meaning of a 'goodness despite
itself,' a goodness always older than the choice"
[1981, p. 56] . 21
Levinas repeats much of his earlier discussion of
sensibility as enjoyment of plenitude, as a savoring in
contentment prior to the pragmatic purposive relations
described by Heidegger. But Levinas also situates
sensibility in the one-for-another of proximity; he claims
that the vital principle of the psyche, that which animates,
is exposure to the Other, and the signification of
sensibility, the meaning in sensibility, depends on giving.
Thus for example, he says,
The signification of the gustatory and the
olfactory, of eating and enjoying, has to be
sought on the basis of the signifyingness of
signification, the-one-for-the-other . . . . It is the
passivity of being-for-another , which is possible
only in the form of giving the very bread I eat.
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But for this one has to first enjoy one's bread,
not in order to have the merit of giving it, but
in order to give it with one's heart, to give
oneself in giving it. Enjoyment is an ineluctable
moment of sensibility. [1981, p. 72]
Thus sensibility is an exposedness to the Other and the
meaning in sensibility depends on giving; there is no
meaning in the unmediated enjoyment of pure egoism coiling
back upon itself
. Levinas uses the image of maternity here
to indicate the passivity of the for-the-other
,
the
vulnerability, and the sense of giving one's own mouthful of
bread. He describes the problematic tradition that locates
subjectivity in self-consciousness, "a tradition in which
intelligibility derives from the assembling of terms united
in a system for a locutor," a tradition in which "the
subject is origin, initiative, freedom, present," and a
tradition in which "a subject-origin which is also a subject
of flesh and blood becomes problematic" [1981, p. 78].
Levinas 's alternative description of subjectivity refuses to
separate corporeality from subjectivity, refuses to locate
subjectivity in "the adventure of cognition." Rather,
Levinas claims.
Subjectivity of flesh and blood in matter—the
signifyingness of sensibility, the-one-for-the-
other itself— is the preoriginal signifyingness
that gives sense, because it gives. Not because,
as preoriginal, it would be more originary than
the origin, but because the diachrony of
sensibility, which cannot be assembled in a
representational present, refers to an
irrecuperable pre-ontological past, that of
maternity. [1981, p. 78]
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Thus maternity seems to provide an image of a pre-original
proximity
,
on the hither side of freedom or self-
consciousness, a gratuitous relation, an asymmetrical
obsession, a responsibility without reciprocity. 22
3 . Obsession
Levinas speaks of subjectivity obsessed by the
neighbor
:
The knot of subjectivity consists in going to the
other without concerning oneself with his movement
toward me. Or, more exactly, it consists in
approaching in such a way that, over and beyond
all the reciprocal relations that do not fail to
get set up between me and the neighbor, I have
always taken one step more toward him—which is
possible only if this step is responsibility. In
the responsibility which we have for one another,
I have always one response more to give, I have to
answer for his very responsibility. [ 1981, p. 84]
This neighbor concerns me, "orders me before being
recognized," so that I am first a servant of the neighbor.
This obsession is not a consciousness, it is "unassumable
like a persecution," because, as Levinas claims, "To take
hold of oneself for a present of welcome is already to take
one's distance, and miss the neighbor" [ 1981, p. 88]. The
distance of consciousness can only produce the weak ethical
language of should and ought. But Levinas 's ethical
language, the language of proximity and obsession bears the
trace of a contact with another that is part of who I am
without any distance to be bridged, without any real or
imagined contract, independent of voluntary action or
initiative.
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This passivity of obsession does not enter into
consciousness; there is only a trace of the relationship of
proximity in the ethical situation that disturbs the present
and "troubles being." Levinas notes that "reduction of
subjectivity to consciousness dominates philosophical
thought" but he claims that subjectivity is not wholly
described by consciousness: "It already rests on a
'subjective condition,' an identity that one calls ego or I"
[1981 ,p. 102 ] . The who or the me, the one that is a term, a
recurrence, is outside memory, beyond or on the hither side
of consciousness. And according to Levinas,
Nothing here resembles self-consciousness. It has
meaning only as an upsurge in me of a
responsibility prior to commitment, that is, a
responsibility for the other. There I am one and
irreplaceable, one inasmuch as irreplaceable in
responsibility. This is the underside of a fabric
woven where there is consciousness and which takes
place in being. [1981, p. 103]
Once again, Levinas uses the image of maternity to
illustrate this sense of the oneself: "The oneself cannot
form itself; it is already formed with absolute
passivity ... .This passivity is that of an attachment that
has already been made, as something irreversibly past, prior
to all memory and all recall" [ 1981 ,p. 104 ] . This time of
birth or creation is irrecuperable time so that the
conscious self is as an orphan or atheist, ignorant of its
creator
.
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4 . Persecution
Levinas also uses the terms hostage, persecution, and
substitution to describe this situation. He says, for
example, the oneself is "bound in a knot that cannot be
undone in a responsibility for others" and further, "In the
exposure to wounds and outrages, in the feeling proper to
responsibility, the oneself is provoked as irreplaceable, as
devoted to the others, without being able to resign, and
thus as incarnated in order to offer itself, to suffer and
to give" [ 1981 ,p. 105 ] . The term persecution expresses this
passivity of the oneself antecedent to consciousness,
assigned to answer and thereby assigned to be a unique self.
Levinas says, "Persecution is not something added to the
subjectivity of the subject and his vulnerability; it is the
very movement of recurrence ... .The subjectivity of a subject
is responsibility of being-in-question..." [ 1981
,
p . Ill ]
.
Levinas speaks of the subject as "accused in innocence" and
"obsessed with responsibilities" prior to any movement of
the will:
I have not done anything and I have always been
under accusation
—
persecuted. The ipseity, in the
passivity without arche characteristic of
identity, is a hostage. The word I means here I
am, answering for everything and for
everyone. .. .Responsibility in obsession is a
responsibility of the ego for what the ego has not
wished, that is, for the others. [ 1981, p. 114]
The subject as hostage, obsessed in responsibility for
Others, is also described as "a substitution of me for the
others" [ 1981 ,p. 114 ] . The self is an "expiation," I must
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answer for the Other and I am responsible even to the point
of responsibility for the responsibility of the Other.
Antecedent to the for-itself that signifies self-
consciousness, the I, the unique one substitutes itself for
the Other; the oneself is responsibility for the Other,
"under the weight of the universe, responsible for
everything" [ 1981 ,p. 116 ]
.
According to Levinas, I exist through the Other and for
the Other in obsession prior to choice, in responsibility
prior to freedom and non-freedom, in vulnerability and
passivity prior to any action or commitment. Levinas says,
In this sense the self is goodness, or under the
exigency for an abandon of all having, of all
one's own and all for oneself, to the point of
substitution .... The self is the very fact of being
exposed under the accusation that cannot be
assumed, where the ego supports the others, unlike
the certainty of the ego that rejoins itself in
freedom. [1981, p. 118]
This hyperbolic language of persecution and obsession does
not describe any sort of experience of the human subject.
Levinas is pointing to what is prior to the coming into
being of subjectivity; he is trying to write an exposition
of something which cannot be exposed except as a trace.
Levinas says.
If ethical terms arise in our discourse before the
terms freedom and non-freedom, it is because
before the bipolarity of good and evil presented
to choice, the subject finds himself committed to
the Good in the very passivity of supporting.
[1981, p. 122] 23
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To speak of a being that is not for itself but for the Other
to the point of substitution is to expose a pre-original,
"transcendental" structure of subjectivity that provides the
"grounds" for the possibility of moral experience—the
possibility of concern for the Other, of giving of oneself
to Others, of feeling obliged, even of sacrificing oneself
for the Other. Accusation and persecution are metaphors for
the command of the Other that liberates me from the closed
circle of enchainment to myself in the endless repetition of
sensible enjoyment. And substitution marks an infinite
responsibility that is prior to the finite freedom of the
will. 24
5 . Substitution as One-for-another
Face to face with the other person, I need no rational
contemplation or deliberation to decide what to give.
Substitution as the subjectivity of the subject means that I
put myself in the place of the Other; I am as one-for-
another; I am faced with the immediacy of the Other's hunger
or poverty as though it were my own. Levinas notes that
questions like "Why does the other concern me?" and "Am I my
brother's keeper?" have meaning only if one has already
supposed that the ego is only concerned with itself. But as
Levinas insists,
The ego is not just a being endowed with
certain qualities called moral which it would bear
as a substance bears attributes, or which it would
take on as accidents in its becoming. Its
exceptional uniqueness in the passivity or the
passion of the self is the incessant event of
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siabjection to everything, of substitution.
.. .The
self is through and through a hostage, older thanthe ego, prior to principles it is through the
condition of being hostage that there can be inthe world pity, compassion, pardon and proximity-
even the little there is, even the simple "After
you, sir." [1981,p.ll7]
Even the possibility of communication depends on taking
seriously the responsibility for Others prior to any
relationship of the ego with itself. According to Levinas,
communication would be impossible if it had to begin in the
ego; communication cannot be something added on to a
solitary and self-certain ego, "to whom every other would be
only a limitation that invites war, domination, precaution
and information" [ 1981 ,p. 119 ] . Rather, communication
requires proximity, "the for-the-other proper to
responsibility," a complete openness to the Other; "there is
in the transcendence involved in language a relationship
that is not an empirical speech, but responsibility"
[1981, p. 120]
.
6 . Responsibility of the One For All: Justice
Finally, Levinas returns to the considerations
introduced by the fact that the Other is also a neighbor, a
third party. He says once again that responsibility without
a prior commitment is an infinite responsibility for the
Other, without reciprocity and without anyone being able to
take my place. But he continues,
If proximity ordered to me only the other
alone, there would have not been any problem, in
even the most general sense of the term. A
question would not have been born, nor
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consciousness, nor self-consciousness. The
responsibility for the other is an immediacy
antecedent to questions, it is proximity. it is
troubled and becomes a problem when a third party
enters ... .The third party introduces a
contradiction in the saying whose signification
before the other until then went in one direction.
It is of itself the limit of responsibility and
the birth of the question: What do I have to do
with justice? A question of consciousness.
[1981, p. 153]
The third party is other than the neighbor but also another
neighbor and a neighbor of the Other, thus making
comparison, an order among responsibilities, even concern
for oneself part of the concern for justice. The
introduction of the third party is not a separate empirical
event; rather, "In the proximity of the other, all the
others than the other obsess me, and already this obsession
cries out for justice, demands measure and knowing, is
consciousness" [ 1981
,
p . 158 ] . Thus, as Levinas says, the
relationship with the third party is "an incessant
correction of the asymmetry of proximity in which the face
is looked at" [ 1981, p. 158 ] . Care for oneself, concern for
the rights and needs of Others, does not depend on
reciprocity in the ethical relation but rather on the
extension of the relationship to Others; the fact of the
third party does not diminish my infinite responsibility to
the Other but multiplies it. The entry of the third party
is ethical not numerical; it is the discovery of the
exigency for justice. As Levinas says.
In no way is justice a degradation of
obsession, a degeneration of the for-the-other , a
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diminution, a limitation of anarchic
responsibility
.. .But the contemporaneousness ofthe multiple is tied about the diachrony of two:justice remains justice only in a society where
there is no distinction between those close and
those far off, but in which there also remains theimpossibility of passing by the closest. The
equality of all is borne by my inequality, the
surplus of my duties over my rights. The
forgetting of self moves justice. [ 1981, p. 159 ]
I am thus answerable for all. And Levinas offers a
wonderful speculative reversal of Hobbes' justification for
the State: "it is then not without importance to know if
the egalitarian and just State in which man is fulfilled
(and which is to be set up, and especially to be maintained)
proceeds from a war of all against all, or from the
irreducible responsibility of the one for all, and if it can
do without friendships and faces" [ 1981
,
pp. 159-60 ]
.
According to Levinas, the work of philosophy is "to
conceive ambivalence," to break up thematized
representations, to "refuse the simple synchrony of saying
and said," and interrupt it with the diachronic thought of
the-one-for-the-other
,
the otherwise than Being. Otherwise
Than Being challenges the reader to understand the
subjectivity of the subject beyond essence. It does so, as
Levinas acknowledges, by "introducing some barbarisms in the
language of philosophy" [ 1981 ,p. 178 ] . Whereas philosophy
has "mainly remained at home in saying being, that is,
inwardness to being, the being at home with oneself, ol
which European history itself has been the conquest and
jealous defense," we are compelled to state the beyond ot
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being because the history of the West bears in its margins
"the trace of events carrying another signification"
[1981 ,p. 178 ] . The victims of history cannot be separated
from the meaning of history; philosophy is called to thought
by the exigencies of justice. Thus Levinas concludes this
labor
,
The modern world is above all an order, or a
disorder in which the elites can no longer leave
peoples to their customs, their wretchedness and
their illusions, nor even to their redemptive
systems, which, abandoned to their own logic, are
implacably inverted. These elites are sometimes
called "intellectuals." We find the
agglomerations or dispersions of peoples in the
deserts without manna of this earth. But each
individual of these peoples is virtually a chosen
one, called to leave in his turn, or without
awaiting his turn, the concept of the ego, its
extension in the people, to respond with
responsibility: me, that is, here I am for the
others, to lose his place radically, or his
shelter in being, to enter into ubiquity which is
also a utopia. [1981, p. 185]
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1* According to Levinas, radical separation of the same and
the other and metaphysical asymmetry are also indicated by a
concrete moral experience: "...what I permit myself to
demand of myself is not comparable with what I have the
right to demand of the Other" [ 1969b
,
p . 53 ] . He claims that
this commonplace experience is evidence of the impossibility
of totalization, "the radical impossibility of seeing
oneself from the outside and of speaking in the same sense
of oneself and of the others" [ 1969b, p. 53 ]
.
2. One finds oneself facing an Other as it is in itself,
and the manifestation of this being consists in its telling
itself to us, expressing itself, announcing itself. Thus
Levinas says, "The absolute experience is not disclosure but
revelation
:
a coinciding of the expressed with him who
expresses, which is the privileged manifestation of the
Other, the manifestation of a face over and beyond form"
[1969b, pp. 65-6]
.
3. Of course, as Levinas points out, not every discourse
establishes the relation of truth because not every
discourse is a relation with the exteriority of the Other.
In the discourse of rhetoric, propaganda or flattery for
example, one approaches the other not to face him but to
"solicit his yes" and thus corrupt his freedom. We avoid
this injustice by facing the Other in a "veritable
conversation" [ 1969b, p. 70 ]
.
4. In Time and the Other . Levinas speaks of this
spontaneous freedom of material existence:
As present and "I," hypostasis is freedom.
The existent is master of existing. It exerts on
its existence the virile power of the subject....
It is a first freedom—not yet the freedom of
free will, but the freedom of beginning .... Freedom
is included in every subject, in the very fact
that there is a subject, that there is a being.
It is the freedom of the existence in its very
grip on existing. [1987b, p. 54]
But this is also the freedom that is already limited by
responsibility; as a spontaneous living being, I am riveted
to myself, encumbered by myself, enchained to matter, locked
into the solitude of material existence.
5. Levinas contrasts his view with the Western philosophical
tradition that justifies solitary freedom in relation to
impersonal reason and the totality of a universal order. He
says
,
The I can indeed, to justify itself, enter upon
a different course: it can endeavor to apprehend
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itself within a totality. This seems to us to be
the justification of freedom aspired after by the
philosophy that, from Spinoza to Hegel, identifies
will and reason, that, contrary to Descartes,
removes from truth its character of being a free
work so as to situate it where the opposition
between the I and the non-I disappears, in an
impersonal reason. Freedom is not maintained but
reduced to being the reflection of a universal
order which maintains itself and justifies itself
all by itself .. .Knowing would be the way by which
freedom would denounce its own contingency, by
which it would vanish into the totality.
[1969b, p. 87]
But Levinas resists this disappearance of freedom "into the
Neuter." He says later in the text that freedom can be
manifested only outside totality and this "outside totality"
opens with the transcendence of the face [ 1969b, p. 225 ] . He
says that the quest for truth requires "the unity of
spontaneous freedom, working on straight ahead, and
critique, where freedom is capable of being called in
question" [ 1969b, p. 89 ] . And this unity is achieved in
describing the I as "atheist and created," as both radically
separated and, at the same time, dependent on an
exteriority, dependent on the Other who challenges arbitrary
freedom. The investiture that liberates freedom from the
arbitrary is critique, and according to Levinas, "The
freedom that can be ashamed of itself founds truth..."
[1969b, p. 83]
.
6. Levinas again directs his attention to Heidegger:
It is interesting to observe that Heidegger does
not take the relation of enjoyment into
consideration. The implement has entirely masked
the usage and the issuance at the term—the
satisfaction. Dasein in Heidegger is never
hungry. Food can be interpreted as an implement
only in a world of exploitation. [ 1969b, p. 134
]
7. It is important to notice the influence of Bergson in
Levinas 's descriptions of the significance of enjoyment for
human being. In An Introduction to Metaphysics, for
example, Bergson described human intuition as a series of
acts of direct participation in the immediacy of experience,
a kind of "intellectual sympathy" without symbolic
representation [Bergson, 1955]. In intuition, one could
immerse oneself in the current of direct awareness, seize
something without reducing it to conceptual representation.
Bergson spoke of this as the method of metaphysics, in
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contrast to the method of the sciences, and claimed that
hv
e
mLS=
n Pers°naif fcy ^ its flowing through time is graspedy eans of intuition and not by conceptual analysis. Onecan communicate this intuition only in metaphors sinceintuition places itself in living mobility and continualflux whereas analysis and language operate only on theimmobiie and reduce an object to solid perceptions and
stable conceptions. Bergson claimed that the difficulties
and antinomies of metaphysics are the result of attemptingto reconstruct living reality from fixed concepts. Analysisis a necessary operation for language and practical life
—
one must be able to communicate and utilize the real—but
this is very different from the metaphysical knowledge ofliving reality.
Levinas makes extensive reference to Bergson in a short
essay, "The Old and the New," in which he speaks of
Bergson's contributions to the crisis of human freedom,
power, and knowledge in 20th Century philosophy:
It is important to underline the importance of
Bergsonism for the entire problematic of
contemporary philosophy; it is an essential stage
of the movement which puts into question the
ontological confines of spirituality. It no
longer returns to the assimilating act of
consciousness, to the reduction of all novelty—of
all alterity—to what in one way or another
thought already supported, to the reduction of
every other [Autre] to the Same. It is no longer
what one could call the thought of the equal, a
rationality revealing a reality which keeps to the
very measure of a thought .... It is the emergence
of the always new, of the unequal. [ 1987b, p. 132
]
8. Levinas objects to what he calls "the absurd world of
Geworfenheit , " Heidegger's analysis of the throwness of
human being. He insists that this is "the limit case in
which need prevails over enjoyment, the proletarian
condition condemning to accursed labor in which the
indigence of corporeal existence finds neither refuge nor
leisure at home with itself" [ 1969b, p. 146 ] . His description
of the home as a retreat and refuge, a place of inwardness
and intimacy, and a place of "belongingness" leads him to
claim that the human being "does not find himself brutally
cast forth and forsaken in the world" [ 1969b, p. 152 ]
.
9. At this point in his exposition, Levinas makes reference
to Martin Buber. He says, "The I-Thou in which Buber sees
the category of interhuman relationship is the relation not
with the interlocutor but with feminine alterity"
[1969b, p. 155] . Perhaps the most accessible brief
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explanation of Levinas' s relation to Buber is the following
passage from Totality and Infinity :
Buber distinguished the relation with Objects,
which would be guided by the practical, from the
dialogic relation, which reaches the other as
Thou, as partner and friend. This idea, central
in his work, he modestly claims to have found in
Feuerbach. In reality it acquires all its force
only in Buber's analyses, and it is in them that
it figures as an essential contribution to
contemporary thought. One may, however, ask if
the thou-saying [tutoiement] does not place the
other in a reciprocal relation, and if this
reciprocity is primordial. On the other hand, the
I-Thou relation in Buber retains a formal
character: it can unite man to things as much as
man to man. The I-Thou formalism does not
determine any concrete structure. The I-Thou is
an event (Geschehen ) , a shock, a comprehension,
but does not enable us to account for (except as
an aberration, a fall, or a sickness) a life other
than friendship: economy, the search for
happiness, the representational relation with
things. They remain, in a sort of disdainful
spiritualism, unexplored and unexplained. This
work does not have the ridiculous pretension of
"correcting" Buber on these points. It is placed
in a different perspective, by starting with the
idea of the Infinite. [ 1969b, pp. 68-9
]
Additional useful references can be found in Levinas 's
discussion of the work of Gabriel Marcel and Martin Buber on
the dialogic relationship [Levinas, 1984a] and in Andrew
Tallon's essay comparing Buber with Levinas [Tallon, 1978].
10. In her introduction to The Second Sex , Simone de
Beauvoir writes.
Thus humanity is male and man defines woman not
in herself but as relative to him; she is not
regarded as an autonomous being. ... she appears
essentially to the male as a sexual being. For
him she is sex—absolute sex, no less. She is
defined and differentiated with reference to man
and not he with reference to her; she is the
incidental, the inessential as opposed to the
essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute-
-she is the Other. [1952,p.xix]
In a footnote to this passage, de Beauvoir cites
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Levinas, claiming that he expresses the otherness of woman
explicitly in Time and the Other . She quotes Levinas 's
claim that alterity is the essence of the feminine and
comments
,
I suppose that Levinas does not forget that
woman, too, is aware of her own consciousness, or
ego. But it is striking that he deliberately
takes a man's point of view, disregarding the
reciprocity of subject and object. When he writes
that woman is mystery, he implies that she is
mystery for man. Thus his description, which is
intended to be objective, is in fact an assertion
of masculine privilege. [1952,p.xix]
11. In a brief essay, "Judaism and the Feminine Element,"
Levinas speaks of the woman as a human being who is
fundamentally a moral being and who has femininity as an
attribute. He describes woman as an equal being who
"completes man," not as a part completes another into a
whole, but "as two totalities complete one another." In
this essay he also uses the Talmud and Rabbinical
commentaries to describe woman as "the original
manifestation" of all the perfections of tenderness,
goodness, and kindness, "the origin of all kindness on
earth." And he says, "'without woman man knows neither
food, nor succor, nor joy, nor blessing, nor pardon.'
Nothing of what would be required for a soul !.. .Nothing
which transforms his natural life into ethics..." [Levinas,
1969a] .
Many feminists have embraced these traditional feminine
qualities as positive and valuable characteristics of women,
to be celebrated as fundamental human qualities and used to
promote social change. There is a growing body of
literature in feminist ethics, for example, that resists the
patriarchal devaluation of the feminine and attempts to
develop alternative ethical theories based on women's
experiences. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice ,
Harvard University Press, 1982. Nel Noddings, Caring ,
University of California Press, 1984. Eva Feder Kittay and
Diana T. Meyers (eds.), Women and Moral Theory , Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, 1987. And Sara Ruddick, Maternal
Thinking . Beacon Press, 1989.
12. This discussion of representation lays the groundwork
for Levinas 's later description of the face to face ethical
relation as "pre-original" and "anarchical." This relation
with the exteriority of the face is prior to experience,
prior to thought, prior to critical consciousness. These
claims are perhaps most clearly stated in an early essay,
"The Ego and the Totality." In that essay, Levinas refers
to solitary enjoyment as "biological consciousness," a
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consciousness without problems, "a purely inner world... to
which the term unconscious or instinct corresponds"
[ 1987a
,
p . 26 ] . And he claims that thought can only begin
when this vital consciousness becomes conscious of
exteriority and therefore self-conscious:
For exteriority to be able to present itself to
me, it, as exteriority, must overflow the "terms"
of vital consciousness, but at the same time, as
present, it must not be fatal to consciousness.
This penetration of a total system into a partial
system which cannot assimilate it is a miracle.
The possibility of thought is the consciousness of
a miracle, or wonder. This miracle breaks up
biological consciousness; it has an intermediary
ontological status, between the lived and thought.
It is the beginning of thought or
experience ... .This relationship of both
participation and separation which marks the
advent of, and the a priori proper to, thought, in
which the bonds between the parts are constituted
only by the freedom of the parts, is a society, is
beings that speak, that face one another. Thought
begins with the possibility of conceiving a
freedom external to my own. [ 1987a ,pp. 27-8
]
Levinas refers to the face to face relation as "an ultimate
situation." But because this ethical relation is prior to
experience, it is not itself an origin but "pre-original;"
it cannot serve as source or first principle and is
therefore labeled "anarchical." It is not itself a
foundation for experience but remains outside experience,
"otherwise than Being," prior to representation and
therefore misrepresented in any description. Levinas 's
concern over his own use of language, his discussions of the
saying and the said in Otherwise than Being for example, are
the conscious articulations of the limits of any gesture in
the direction of this paradoxical past "experience" that is
beyond the limits of knowledge or memory.
13. In Totality and Infinity . Levinas uses the terms
'metaphysical ' and 'ethical' almost interchangeably. It
should be clear from his preparatory discussion of
metaphysical desire that Levinas is using the term
'metaphysics' provocatively to indicate that ethics is
concerned with the Good beyond Being. This is also a
polemical rejection of Heidegger's ontology. Heidegger uses
'physis' as a synonym of the horizon of Being, a synonym for
the unfolding of that which is (see An Introduction to
Metaphysics for Heidegger's etymology of the Greek word
physis). And Levinas therefore uses 'metaphysics' to
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indicate that ethics transcends this horizon of Being. The
metaphysical relation transcends the possibility of knowing
or disclosing and metaphysical desire in the face to face
relation breaks with the totalizing thought of Being.
Levinas clearly understands Heidegger's deconstruction of
onto—theological metaphysics, and he later drops this
equation of metaphysics and ethics? but in Totality and
Infinity
,
ethics is metaphysics in the sense that ethics isfirst philosophy, prior to ontology, prior to epistemology,
and "otherwise than being."
14. This link to monotheism is perhaps best explained by a
reference that Levinas makes earlier in Totality and
Infinity when he speaks of radical separation and desire for
the absolutely Other:
The great force of the idea of creation such as it
was contributed by monotheism is that this
creation is ex nihilo—not because this represents
a work more miraculous than the demiurgic
informing of matter, but because the separated and
created being is thereby not simply issued forth
from the father, but is absolutely other than him.
[1969b, p. 63]
In other words, Levinas insists on a primordial separation
and interiority in the upsurge of the existent; human
community, always present in the face to face relation, must
be a kinship of separate but related individuals rather than
a participation in a common essence or nature. This is
again a rejection of the primacy of ontology: "To affirm
origin from nothing by creation is to contest the prior
community of all things within eternity, from which
philosophical thought, guided by ontology, makes things
arise as from a common matrix ... .One may speak of creation
to characterize entities situated in the transcendence that
does not close over into a totality" [ 1969b, p. 293 ]
.
15. Levinas adds that in justifying oneself and one's
freedom through apology, one does not "blindly affirm the
self, but already appeals to the Other" [ 1969b, p. 252 ] . The
freedom of the I is not arbitrary and isolated, nor is it
rational conformity to universal law. Rather "My arbitrary
freedom reads its shame in the eyes that look at me"
[ 1969b, p. 252 ] . My apology refers to and solicits the
judgement of the Other.
Levinas makes a distinction between my political being
and my religious being as the difference between appearing
in history without a right to speak and appearing to the
Other "while attending one's own apparition" [ 1969b, p. 253 ]
.
He claims that my being or the truth of my being is produced
in my revealing of myself in discourse while attending the
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judgement of the Other. And he says, "I am in truth bybeing produced in history under the judgement it bears upon
me, but under the judgement that it bears upon me in mypresence that is, while letting me speak" [ 1969b, p. 253 ] .
16 ' In Totality and Infinity he does not say much aboutpaternal relations that are not biological:
Biological fecundity is but one of the forms of
paternity. Paternity, as a primordial
effectuation of time, can, among men, be borne by
the biological life, but be lived beyond that
life. [1969, p.247]
But in Ethics and Infinity he says,
It is not necessary that those who have no
children see in this fact any depreciation
whatever; biological filiality is only the first
shape filiality takes; but one can very well
conceive filiality as a relationship between human
beings without the tie of biological kinship. One
can have a paternal attitude with regard to the
Other. To consider the Other as a son is
precisely to establish with him those relations I
call "beyond the possible." [ 1985 ,p. 70-1
]
17. Levinas acknowledges the idea of society as a
collectivity. He says, "...the common function men may
exercise in the world as a totality permits the applying to
them of a common concept" [ 1969b, p. 213 ] . But he argues that
the "essence" of society is not this totalizing unity;
instead, he describes society as "the human community
instituted by language, where the interlocutors remain
absolutely separated" [ 1969b, pp. 213-14 ] . In contrast to
Heidegger's description of the they-self of Dasein as
primordial and authentic being-oneself as a modification of
the they-self, Levinas describes radical separation and an
asymmetrical ethical relation as primordial. The relation
with the face of the other person, the ethical relation,
establishes the kinship which Levinas labels fraternity.
Social order built on discourse permits both relations and
separation and depends upon the ethical relation prior to
any collectivity.
18. Edith Wyschogrod raises related though more careful
objections to what she says is a disguised natural theology
in Levinas 's work. Through what is presumably a
phenomenology of the moral self, Levinas locates a focus of
value in the face of the other. But in order to answer the
question as to why the face commands, Levinas is forced to
reply that the face "bears the trace of transcendence," the
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imago dei . Wyschogrod carefully qualifies this objection by
noting that Levinas speaks of the trace as that which can
never be brought into full presence, that he refuses all
discourse which attributes either positive or negative
attributes to God, and that the face to face is a particular
encounter with the suffering of the other in which we feel a
sense of responsibility that cannot be made into a universal
law. [Wyschogrod, 1971]
19. At the end of his preface to the English translation of
Autrement qu'etre
,
Alphonso Lingis notes that even
"Levinas ' s composition in this book reflects the
understanding of the work of language the book puts forth."
He goes on to explain that in the original French, Levinas
avoids predicative assertions, writing in clauses rather
than sentences in order to avoid the verb to be. Because of
grammatical constraints, Lingis does not reproduce these
"expressive devices" in the translation.
20. Here we see another aspect of the term "pre-original."
The term is part of Levinas 's effort to speak in the
language of Being about that which is not Being or non-being
but wholly other than Being. Pre-original responsibility is
an exposure and subjection to the Other that is prior to the
assembling of oneself, prior to the coming into being of
subjectivity. Lingis offers the following clarification in
his introduction to Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence .
Subjectivity is opened from the outside, by the
contact with alterity. Before subjectivity is a
locus posited by Being for its own manifestation,
it is a support called up or provoked to respond
to alterity. Before it is a devotion to Being, it
is a subjection to the Good. . . .Before finding
itself a freedom in the free space opened by the
play of being and nothingness, where an exercise
of options is possible, subjectivity is a
subjection to the force of alterity, which calls
for and demands goodness of it. [198l,p.xxi]
Thus the "origin" of self-conscious subjectivity, the locus
for all initiatives and representations, even the event of
hypostasis that Levinas first described as the emergence of
an existent from anonymous being, is conditioned by the
"pre-original" exposure to alterity. The human subject is
in this sense "created," called into being through exposure
to the Other. But the trace of this pre-original relation
is easily lost or ignored in the "atheist" sovereignty of
self-conscious subjectivity.
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21. Levinas is very emphatic about this description of
responsibility as “on the hither side of freedom and non-freedom. He goes against the traditional Western
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ctlons of a subject. Responsibility is a
relationship with the Other, a relationship prior to freedombecause responsibility is constitutive of subjectivity.
Responsibility is "pre-original" in the sense that it isprior to all initiatives that would originate in the self-determining subject. Levinas insists that ethics does not
supplement a preceding existential base and responsibility
is not an attribute of subjectivity; rather subjectivity isinitially for another. Subjectivity is thereby conditioned
without being determined because ethical exigency is not
ontological necessity. As Levinas says, responsibility is
"an imperative force which is not a necessity" [ 1981, p. 93].
22. The term "pre-original" refers to Levinas 's claim that
this proximity is prior to self-conscious subjectivity. The
term points to the paradox that the separated and self-
conscious subject posits itself as origin of all experience
and posits the Other as part of that conscious experience
when in fact, as Levinas claims, the relation with the Other
must be presupposed in order to explain the possibility of
self-conscious subjectivity. Levinas also uses the phrase
"posteriority of the anterior" to describe this situation.
In his discussion of representation, Levinas explains that
representation aims at constituting the world, forgetting
that the subject who represents is himself constituted by
that world; similarly, I put my consciousness at the origin
of experience but my relation with the Other is prior to
that origin.
23. Levinas is rejecting the Western philosophical
tradition in which ethics is a branch of philosophy
dependent on ontology for a description of the universal
order from which all particular human situations receive
their meaning. Under this view, the ethical subject must
submit freedom of the will to the rule of rationality in
order to find principles for human action that are
universally intelligible and valid. By contrast, Levinas
attempts to describe the particularity of the face to face
relation as the origin of meaning and intelligibility. He
attempts to describe subjectivity before its ontological
constitution, before its coming to be as an entity among
other entities, and before its free activity in the world.
Subjectivity is constituted as radical passivity, as being
"subject to" the other in an inescapable relation; and this
subjection to the other is the origin of responsibility and
unmediated obligation. Fabio Ciaramelli provides a helpful
clarification of the difference between the traditional
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sense of the term obligation and Levinas
absolute and unmediated obligation:
s radical view of
For Levinas, as we shall see, "ethics" means an
anarchical assignation of the particular subject
to morality by the appeal of the other .... Ethical
obligation arises not from the logical and
ontological universality of reason which discloses
to knowledge criteria for freely determined
action, but rather immediately from the unigueness
the moral situation itself. in a reversal of
the classical order of privilege which promoted
speculative reason, obligation is no longer first
disclosed in its universality and intelligibility,
known and then evaluated. On the contrary, moral
obligation binds us because it takes hold
immediately, before understanding or decision on
the part of the subject. [ 1991, p. 85]
24. In the translator's introduction to Otherwise Than
geing or Beyond Essence . Lingis explains that responsibility
is a fact that does not originate in any act of
subjectivity. He says.
Responsibility is a bond. It is a bond with an
imperative order, a command. All subjective
movements are under an order; subjectivity is this
subjection. This bond does not only determine a
being to act, but is constitutive of subjectivity
as such, determines it to be.... It does not only
have the status of "always already there" when an
act originates or begins, but the assembling of
oneself and beginning which characterizes the act
of consciousness will be shown to be launched from
it. In this sense it is "pre-original," prior to
all initiatives and their principles, an-archic.
[ 1981 ,p.xiii-xiv]
This fact of responsibility antecedent to freedom means that
responsibility is not limited to my own projects or
commitments and does not end with consequences that I could
foresee. Lingis points out that responsibilities multiply
as they are taken up. And responsibility is infinite in the
sense that "I am responsible for the situation in which I
find myself, and for the existence in which I find
myself.... I am responsible for processes that go beyond the
limits of my foresight and intention, that carry on even
when I am no longer adding my sustaining force to them--and
even when I am no longer there." [1981,p.xiv] Subjectivity
is constituted in relation to the other; subjectivity is the
condition of being hostage, answerable for what one does,
even answerable for what one is. As Levinas says in the
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conclusion to Ethics and Infinity , truly human life cannot
remain satisfied with its own being in a life of quietude;
it is awakened by the other, and even its naive and natural
perseverance in being is put into question. [Levinas, 1985]
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Levinas was deeply influenced by Heidegger's
phenomenological analyses of human Being in Being and Timp>
r
and much of his own work depends on a critical rethinking of
Heidegger's Dasein analytic. Both men use phenomenology to
penetrate beneath modern epistemological questions and
explore the subjectivity of the human being. Both men
examine primordial structures of human existence; both
analyze history, language, truth, and the phenomena of
temporality and human freedom. Both attempt to avoid the
assumptions of Western metaphysics and both struggle with a
philosophical language that is permeated by traditional
metaphysical thinking. But their analyses are guided by two
very different questions, and these questions produce
radically different views of human existence and radically
different programs for philosophical thinking.
The question of the meaning of Being determines
Heidegger's existential analysis of human Being as the
entity whose Being is accessible and for whom Being is an
issue. According to Heidegger, the human being is onto-
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logical, which means that an understanding of Being is a
characteristic of human Being, even if this is only evident
in a fleeing from or forgetfulness of Being. Marked by the
formal indicator "I”, the human being is not a mere entity
available for disinterested disclosure; Dasein is a "who"
not a "what" and the essence of human Being lies in its
existence, in its choice of possible ways to be. Thus
Heidegger begins the Dasein analytic with the claim that the
Being which is an issue for Dasein "is in each case mine"
[1962, p. 67]. This claim that "mineness" [ Jemeinigkeit ] is a
fundamental characteristic of what it means to be as Dasein
also determines the direction of thinking in Being and Time .
Heidegger begins by uncovering the average everyday "they-
self" as an existential structure of human Being and moves
toward disclosing authentic Being-one's-self as an
existentiell modification of everyday Being-with. Authentic
Being-one's-self, the taking hold of my Being as my own, is
only one mode of Being as Dasein but it is an important
focal point in disclosing the meaning of Dasein's Being as a
whole. The effort of the ontological analytic of Dasein is
to disclose Dasein's Being as care where care is "the
primordial totality of Dasein's structural whole"
[ 1962 ,p. 225 ] . Temporality, Dasein's Being in time, is
disclosed as the ontological meaning of care—the
ontological structures of human existence are modes of
temporality. Most importantly, the future is the
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fundamental determination of time. Being-towards-death
confronts each Dasein with a reminder that we project
ourselves toward a future; anxiety in the face of death
individualizes Dasein and discloses Dasein as Being-possible
and as Being-ahead-of-itself
,
as becoming actual out of
projected possibilities. The primordial totality of
Dasein 's Being as care is captured by the phrase, "ahead-of-
itse If-already-being- in (a world) as Being-alongside
(entities encountered within-the-world)
" [ 1962 , p . 375 ] . And
the temporal interpretation of these structural moments
discloses temporality as a unitary phenomenon—directedness
toward the future discloses the thrownness of our having-
been and gives off the present as we realize projected
possibilities. This preparatory ontological analysis of
Dasein provides one approach to the question of the meaning
of Being as such. In subsequent essays, Heidegger claims
that we cannot grasp Being in its totality, that Being
withdraws into mystery, and that Being is never something
complete to be disclosed. Being is "continual presencing"
and the task of Dasein, as the shepherd of Being, is to take
a path of thinking that brings us into a nearness to Being
as it continually unfolds. Thought is the point where Being
is brought into light so that for Heidegger, the concern of
thought is Being, the cause of thinking is the disclosure of
Being, and the analyses of human Being are only part of his
effort to disclose the meaning of Being as such. In
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Heidegger's view the movement of responsibility is the
resolve to think in response to what Being gives, and
philosophical thought must be replaced by this task of
thinking directed by Being.
By contrast, it is the problem of the meaning of ethics
that directs Levinas 's philosophical work. Whereas
Heidegger insisted that we rethink the ancient guestion of
the meaning of Being as such, Levinas insists that we
rethink the Platonic formulation that locates the Good
beyond Being. He claims we can only find traces of the Good
in what is, that the Good "troubles Being," and that moral
consciousness is desire for the Good beyond Being. Whereas
Heidegger's phenomenological analyses are directed toward
thinking the meaning of Being, all of Levinas 's
phenomenological analyses are carried out with reference to
the Good that transcends finite Being-in-the-world . And all
of the paradoxical formulations of the pre-original,
anarchical, and pre-ontological in Levinas's work reflect
this effort to rethink the Good, otherwise than Being,
beyond essence. Levinas does not dispute Heidegger's claim
that Being is an issue for human being, that my own Being is
of concern to me. But he does challenge the claim that
ontological analysis captures the totality of Dasein's
Being. Human being is not merely onto-logical , not only,
not even primarily concerned over its own Being. Human
being is also ethical, troubled by injustice, concerned over
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the well-being of Others, and seeking the Good beyond Being.
There are moral phenomena that cannot be described in the
language of Heidegger's ontology. There are moments when
who I am is neither the mineness of authentic Being-one's-
self nor the anonymous Being-with of the they-self. There
are moments when I am faced with another person, moments
when I am troubled by the desire for justice, moments when
who I am is wholly concern for another. It is "otherness"
rather than "mineness" that serves as the focal point in
Levinas 's work. And phenomenological descriptions are
inadequate to capture the irreducible alterity of the Other.
For Levinas, what calls for thinking is the problem of
ethics, the exigencies of justice provoke thought, and the
analyses of human subjectivity and human relations reveal
the traces of the Good beyond Being. In Levinas 's view, the
imperative of responsibility is articulated in the face to
face relation; one is initially one-for-another in
irrecusable responsibility.
But the differences between Heidegger and Levinas are
not only those brought about by different questions. We
cannot simply say that Heidegger is concerned over the
question of fundamental ontology and Levinas over the
question of ethics, nor that Levinas is merely adding an
analysis of ethical phenomena to Heidegger's Dasein
analytic. Levinas expresses the need to release ethics from
subordination to ontology, the need to break with the
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priority given to the thinking of Being in Heidegger.
According to Levinas, the problem of ethics is too urgent to
be set aside, delayed in thought, or subordinated to
ontological thinking; Levinas insists that ethics is prior
to ontology (both pre-ontological and having priority for
philosophical thinking)
. Confronted by the problem of
ethics, Heidegger rejects ethics as a branch of philosophy
and speaks instead of ethos as dwelling in nearness to
Being, of nomos given by Being; he calls for an attunement
to Being. Thinking the truth of Being has ontical priority
because Being (my own Being) is an issue for Dasein.
Suffering and hunger, the homelessness and poverty of the
other person, never appear in Being and Time and do not
trouble the thinking of Being and disclosure of truth. When
Heidegger takes up the problem of ethics, it is as though
the only ethical question were "from whence can we obtain
practical directives for our active lives?" and the
Heideggerian answer, "ponder the truth of Being." But faced
with the suffering of another person, I am thereby faced
with the ethical question, "what am I to do for this other?"
Heidegger's description of the modes of solicitude,
considerateness and forbearance, the regard that Dasein may
have for Others in a shared world of common projects and
concerns, seems inadequate to explain the sense of urgency
and personal responsibility evoked by another's suffering.
In this frequently indifferent regard for Others, there is
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no necessity for a particular Dasein to respond and
apparently only the motive of preserving instrumental
relations and common interests.
Perhaps Heidegger merely sets aside such moral
questions, as Descartes did in his epistemological
meditations, not because these questions are unimportant but
simply in order to focus his philosophical work on the
meaning of Being. Heidegger claimed priority for his
phenomenological ontology because everything we have in view
is Being, even inquiry is a mode of Being, and in this sense
ontological thinking is a foundation for understanding moral
phenomena. But Levinas 's entire philosophical project can
be seen as challenging the primacy of ontology in an effort
to point to the priority of ethics for human existence and
thought. There are moral phenomena to be described, but
Levinas looks for the traces of the Good beyond Being in
these phenomena. He uses phenomenological analysis to peel
back the layers of subjectivity, to push beyond
phenomenology to the paradoxical pre-personal experience of
responsibility. There are traces of this responsibility in
the pangs of conscience suffered in the face of the Other's
pain or hunger, in the generosity of simple gestures such as
polite consideration for another person, and in heroic
actions to the point of self-sacrifice. And there are
traces of this responsibility in discourse which not only
discloses a common world but also involves speaking to
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another, greeting another, expressing myself and responding
to the other person facing me in a direct relation that is
not mediated by Being-in-the-world
. Levinas 's radical and
polemical re—thinking of what it means to be for human being
is permeated by the need to give priority to these ethical
relations
.
The entire analysis of human existence changes if we
take the alterity of the other person as the focal point for
thinking about human being. A clear example of this can be
seen in the very different descriptions of human conscience
that come from Heidegger and Levinas. The phenomenon of
conscience is central to Heidegger's analysis of authentic
Being-one's-self. As Heidegger describes it, conscience
calls Dasein to itself and yet the call of conscience comes
from Dasein. Conscience as the call of care appeals to the
they-self but reveals Dasein as anxious about its own
potentiality-for-Being-its-self and directs Dasein to the
possibility of choosing itself. Conscience is the
ontological condition for the possibility of morality
because only in the mode of authentic existence can Dasein
be considered answerable or responsible for its actions.
Conscience is thus linked to the notion of authenticity as
"mineness" and described as a phenomenon that arises wholly
within the individualizing experience of Being-towards-death
as Dasein's ownmost possibility. By contrast, in Levinas's
analysis, conscience is the voice of the Other in me. The
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call of the Other brings separated being out of its self-
satisfied solitude and evokes the desire for transcendence.
The call of the Other gives rise to responsibility and
constitutes self-conscious subjectivity as one-for-another
.
Only in relation to the Other, as subject to the Other, do I
become answerable and responsible. And I am not only
responsible in the sense of answerable and accountable for
my own actions; I am responsible for another, responsible
before I have done anything, called to respond to the needs
of another. The face to face relation is not the formal
condition for morality; it is the pre-original ethical
relation. Moral phenomena merely bear the trace of this
infinite responsibility that is prior to my concern over my
own Being, prior to ontology.
Levinas also rejects what he calls totalizing thought
in Heidegger's ontology, and this also leads to distinctive
differences in his analysis of human existence. Levinas
includes Heidegger in his criticism of the history of
Western philosophy as the recurrent attempt to thematize and
comprehend the world and human being, as the search for the
unity of Being that suppresses the beyond and reduces
individual differences to their underlying similarities and
unifying structures. In his effort to break with the
totalizing thought that characterizes Western philosophy,
Levinas emphasizes the singularity of the individual and the
radical separation of ego and other. He analyzes mere
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traces of this radical separation in order to push back to
unreflective and elemental conditions of human existence.
Heidegger had already provided a phenomenological analysis
of economic existence, the pragmatic and concernful
absorption in the world of labor and possession and Being-
with. But beneath and before the anonymous Being-with of
economic existence, Levinas points to the spontaneous living
being, sovereign and independent, absorbed in the world of
nourishments, solitary and self-satisfied. Only the trace
of this unreflective condition is available to us in the
phenomenon of enjoyment, in the ordinary pleasures of
eating, sleeping, and breathing for example. We can imagine
a solitude prior to the origin of self-consciousness because
we can be wholly absorbed in momentary enjoyments and the
satisfaction of needs. Only a trace of the insecurity that
troubles this solitary enjoyment remains in everyday hunger
pangs or the "concern for the morrow." We can imagine the
enchainment to oneself that Levinas ascribes to separated
being, being encumbered by one's own inescapable Being, in
moments of illness, physical pain or pleasure, moments when
we are wholly absorbed in corporeal and sensible existence.
There are traces of the familiarity of a human welcome in a
shared home. And finally, there are traces of the absolute
alterity of the Other in the face of a stranger, an
otherness that escapes the human effort to comprehend, an
otherness that transcends the categories of totalizing
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thought. Levinas undertakes a phenomenological analysis of
these traces, but he must always push beyond phenomenology
to the elemental conditions for the possibility of these
traces
. His analyses are always guided by the need to
preserve singularity and alterity, a pluralism that escapes
totalizing thought.
At the same time, this emphasis on pluralism and
radical separation makes the relation between separated
beings problematic. Of course, Heidegger avoids this
problem by insisting that the human being is always already
engaged in the world with other persons, and therefore
thinking about human Being must begin with Dasein as it
finds itself in average everydayness, as they-self. We do
not need to construct relations to other persons because
Being-with other Dasein is constitutive of human Being-in-
the-world. But Levinas claims that this anonymous Being-
with effaces the radical alterity of the other person as
well as the radical separation and interiority of oneself.
Anonymous Being-with in a with-world is not the primordial
relation between human beings. We cannot adequately explain
human relations by granting priority to a social whole and
assuming a sameness of individuals. There are moments of
radical separation, interiority, and secrecy that mark the
singularity of the individual and must be preserved in
relation to Others. But there must be relations for the
possibility of discourse and communication; there must be
223
relations for the possibility of society; there must be
relations for the possibility of morality. And these
relations must accommodate separation and preserve radical
alterity. The face to face relation with the transcendent
Other in the proximity of speaking that maintains distance
is Levinas 's central example of an encounter with a radical
otherness that cannot be contained in the categories of
Being-with or Dasein-with.
And yet the face to face relation is also constitutive
of subjectivity; the human being is subject in the sense of
"subject to the Other." It is the face to face relation
that opens up the Being of human being to that which is
beyond the solitude of self-satisfied enjoyment. Only in
the confrontation with the face of the Other, in speaking to
the Other, in expressing and revealing myself to the Other,
do I become conscious of myself as separated and as "subject
to the Other." Furthermore, only the radical alterity of
the other person can break the succession of present
moments, the self-reference of each instant, and introduce
the possibility of the future as something absolutely
surprising. Only the challenge of the Other can break
through unreflective consumption to permit the distance
needed for representation and recovery and preservation of
the past. Only discourse with the Other can make a common
world and allow things to become objective, divorced from my
solitary consumption and offered to the Other in
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communication
.
It is in speaking to the Other, in using a
sign to designate a thing, that signification arises. And
even the quest for truth depends on the struggle between
thinkers in a face to face discourse that reveals what might
otherwise remain as error in the secrecy of inferiority.
The face to face relation is also Levinas 's distinctive
contribution to an understanding of ethics. The face to
face confrontation with the radical alterity of the other
person brings separated being out of egoist solitude and
contentment, evokes desire for transcendence, and gives rise
to unlimited responsibility. Self-conscious subjectivity is
thus not initially "for itself" but it is also not initially
a they-self constituted by anonymous relations to Others
present with me in a shared world. Self-conscious
subjectivity is essentially one-for-another
,
constituted in
relation to the face of another and characterized by
responsibility. In this pre-original face to face relation,
I owe the Other everything, including my own self-conscious
subjectivity. But this immemorial past is prior to
conscious experience, and only the trace of this asymmetric
responsibility remains in the phenomena of morality. We can
describe the face of the other person and analyze the
phenomenon of facing another; but Levinas insists that this
relation is both phenomenon and non-phenomenon, it exceeds
the egoist sensibility of phenomenal appearances. The task
of philosophy is to reduce what can be described and
225
thematized in the language of ontology, to prevent it from
congealing into an essence, to push back to the pre-
original
,
immemorial past in order to say something about
what is otherwise than Being, the ethical face to face
relation
.
Levinas tries to find a language in which to speak of
that which precedes language, and therefore he resorts to
the metaphorical language of obsession, persecution,
passivity, and substitution to describe the infinite
responsibility and asymmetry in the ethical relation.
Responsibility is a fact, an essential structure of
subjectivity. I do not assume or take up this
responsibility for another; it does not depend on any act of
my will and it is not the result of any rational argument.
I am fundamentally responsible for the Other, I am initially
one-for-another
,
and the term substitution marks my infinite
responsibility for the Other facing me. Infinite
responsibility implies that I am responsible even for the
existence in which I find myself, not because my willful
actions caused that existence, but because I am called to
answer for my own existence. The human being does not
simply live life satisfied with spontaneous natural
existence; the human being is awakened by the Other and
called to justify its spontaneous consuming and possessing
and its natural compulsion to survive. This is what Levinas
means by the claim that Being is not its own reason for
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being; naive and natural perseverance in Being is put in
question by the Other facing me. This infinite
responsibility also means that I am responsible for the
complexity and boundless effects of my existence,
responsible before life and beyond death. Only the Western
elevation of reason has limited this responsibility. We
excuse ourselves beyond the bounds of willful action or
rational foresight, but we thereby fail to respond to the
past because we were not willful participants, and we fail
to take responsibility for the future because of the limits
of rational foresight and control over the outcomes of our
individual and collective actions. At most we are asked to
learn from the past and imagine possible benefits and harms
to the future. But Levinas insists that we must answer for
both past and future; I am responsible even for the Other's
responsibilities. I am responsible for the injustice of the
past, called to respond with remembrance, apology, and
vigilance in the present. I am responsible for establishing
just institutions for the future and for engendering
responsibility in my children, my students, and all those
who will come after me.
Levinas makes a careful distinction between this pre-
original ethics of infinite responsibility and the morality
of everyday life. Ethics refers to a vigilant passivity to
the command of the Other that Levinas has labeled an "ideal
of saintliness" [Levinas, 1988]. This is a utopian ideal, a
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recognition of the value of infinite responsibility as
something that cannot be fully realized but which guides all
moral action. Levinas claims that his entire philosophy
depends on the idea that with the appearance of the human
being there is something more important than one's own
continued existence and that is the life of the Other. What
is human begins in the value of being more attached to the
Being of the Other than to one's own Being, in the value we
place on "saintliness as goodness ." 1 But Levinas
recognizes a great separation between the way the world
functions concretely and this ideal of infinite
responsibility for the Other. In my everyday life the face
of the Other commands me but as an authority without force.
I am responsible for this Other, but I may refuse to respond
because self-conscious subjectivity is sovereign and most of
the time my life and my concerns are granted priority.
Injustice and suffering may trouble me but even the pangs of
conscience may be muffled by the weight of my own rational
self-interest.
According to Levinas, morality refers to a series of
rules relating to social behavior that operate in the socio-
political order to organize and improve human existence.
The pre—original ethical responsibility of the face to face
relation must inspire and direct the moral and political
order, but it cannot be universalized or legislated. There
is no program for accomplishing the moral because the one-
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for-another is always only my own responsibility; I demand
more of myself than I expect of Others. If I make this a
standard for the Other then I exploit the Other. If I
demand infinite reciprocal responsibility from the other
person, then I am saying be virtuous towards me, work for
me, love me. I can only make claims for myself in the realm
of justice where ethical responsibility must be modified to
meet the needs of all the Others including myself. Levinas
says that the asymmetry of ethical responsibility does not
exclude the possibility that the Other experiences me in the
same way, feels the same infinite responsibility for me; but
he claims this does not concern me because I cannot demand
this responsibility. It is only with the introduction of
the third party and with the notions of kinship and
fraternity that reciprocity becomes a necessary part of the
demand for justice. Infinite responsibility for the Other
must be modified by the concerns of justice as soon as the
face to face relation expands to include the third party.
The face to face relation is also therefore the locus
for Levinas 's distinctive view of the human community.
Society is not primarily a collectivity of anonymous human
beings bound loosely together by common goals or shared
truths. Society does not initially depend on the sacrifice
of unlimited individual freedom that would result in
conflict and hostility if left unregulated by universal
norms and laws. Beginning with the asymmetrical
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responsibility of one for another, society is built upon the
relations of kinship and fraternity that radiate out from
the face to face relation. It is infinite responsibility
rather than unlimited individual freedom that must be
modified by the just institutions and universal laws of
society. Based on the priority of responsibility rather
than the self-centered egoism of rational subjectivity,
justice no longer describes a judgement between conflicting
rights but the attempt to address the needs of each person.
And justice is not the last word; there is a violence in
justice that must be modified by charity, apology and mercy.
Justice must be held in check by the responsibility of a
unique I to a unique Other that might call for something
other than universality would demand. Ethics must retain
the role of challenging the justice of universal laws and
institutions, maintaining the human faces and the proximity
that permits flexibility and allows human beings to
constantly seek a better justice. Levinas 's view of human
society is that of a community peopled by men, women and
children, lovers, friends, neighbors, and strangers who are
not only and not primarily involved in relations of conflict
but are also involved in the extended kinship of
responsibility for one another.
The ethical relation is entirely outside experience, on
the hither side or beyond Being. It cannot even be
described without distortion in the language of Being. And
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yet our everyday relations with one another, including
simply speaking to one another, bear witness to this pre-
original face to face relation. The interlocutor is first
of all in the ethical posture by which I am addressed and
called to respond. Responsibility for the Other is a
goodness we do not find in ourselves; we find only the
desire for this goodness and the traces of this goodness in
our compassion, pity, generosity, charity, and occasional
self-sacrifice. Utopian concern for the Other is "out of
place in this world" and yet it manifests itself in
conscience, cutting through rational self-interest. The cry
of the Other, the suffering of the Other opens the self to
the interhuman order and interrupts complacent and self-
satisfied existence.
Ethics also does not belong to the time of world
history; ethical responsibility can only interrupt the
history written by the victors and survivors with the cry of
the victims and the call for justice, remorse, remembrance,
and vigilance. In the modern age of mass destruction and
instant communication, confronted by the horrors of
genocide, world wars, mass exploitation and starvation, we
must think again about the meaning of this ethical
responsibility. We must find ways to respond to the
suffering of Others. And Levinas claims that philosophy is
not enough. The philosopher withdraws from everyday
concerns in order to think; and the aesthetic pleasure of
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philosophy may insulate us from the hunger and homelessness
that surrounds us and neutralize even the ethical claims of
those closest to us. Ethics as first philosophy refuses
this aesthetic pleasure, takes seriously the suffering of
the other person, and disrupts our intellectual insulation.
And philosophy is not enough; we cannot only think about the
meaning of ethical responsibility, we must look for
practical ways to institute justice, feed the hungry,
condemn the violence, and end the exploitation and
suffering
.
If critics cannot sustain their criticisms but are
drawn into the work of Levinas, perhaps this is because his
work is no mere philosophical exercise. He is not merely
calling into question some failure in Heidegger's
existential phenomenology. Levinas suggests a radical
reversal of the terms of our thinking about ethics,
politics, justice, goodness, and truth. His discourse
challenges the reader to respond to the horrors of the
twentieth century, to see oneself and one's relations to
Others not through the egoism of rational subjectivity but
through the exigency of ethical responsibility. Levinas 's
writing is both philosophical labor and ethical discourse
that commands a response.
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1* In response to a series of questions about his
philosophy of responsibility, Levinas says,
Heidegger says at the beginning of Being and Time
that Dasein is a being who in his being is
concerned for this being itself. That's Darwin's
idea; the living being struggles for life. The
aim of being is being itself. However, with the
appearance of the human—and this is my entire
philosophy—there is something more important than
my life, and that is the life of the other. That
is unreasonable. Man is an unreasonable animal.
Most of the time my life is dearer to me, most of
the time one looks after oneself. But we cannot
not admire saintliness. Not the sacred, but
saintliness: that is, the person who in his being
is more attached to the being of the other than to
his own. I believe that it is in saintliness that
the human begins; not in the accomplishment of
saintliness, but in the value. It is the first
value, an undeniable value. [ 1988 ,pp. 172-3
]
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